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In present international economic relations gold,
American dollars, British pounds sterling, and occasionally
a few other currencies, such as the French franc and the
German mark are used as international money. These are
international money because they are accepted over national
boundaries of different countries. In addition to such
media, from time to time several countries have had to,
and still have to, resort to different international credit
agreements in order to overcome either the pressure of lack
of adequate international moneys or to resist speculative
movements and/or balance of payments adjustment problems.
One of the problems with the gold-exchange standard-- 
and perhaps overlooked by its architects at Genoa-- 
is that dollars and sterling can only be accumulated 
as reserves if America and Britain themselves run 
balance of payments deficit.^
^lan Shannon, International Liquidity— A Study in 
the Economic Functions of Gold (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1966), p. 21.
2
The key currency component of international money 
is the difference between total outlays and receipts that 
certain countries such as the U.S. and Britain have on 
their international transactions. It becomes available as 
international reserves "only to the extent that the key- 
currency country incurs a balance-of-payments deficit.
A sound monetary system requires the existence of
a certain amount of money in circulation--just enough and
not too much. Among the factors that affect the need of
a country for money are: volume of production, trade and
transactions, velocity of money in circulation, payment
habits of the people, and credit facilities availabel to
the society. It is often believed that if there is too
much money in circulation--too much with respect to the
production and trade of a country--inflation sets in. If,
however, there is not an adequate supply of money, trade,
exchange, and transactions may have to be cut. The need
for adequate media of payment holds true at the level of
the international economy.
Just as there is a relation (within limits) between 
the volume of domestic transactions and the need for 
domestic money, so is there one between the size of 
international trade and the need for international 
money.2
^Delbert A. Snider, Introduction to International 
Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1963, Third edition), p. 507. Underline his.
2Alvin H. Hansen, The Dollar and the International 
Monetary System (New York:- McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1965), ip- 54.
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The question of adequacy of.international liquidity 
is a controversial issue which will be discussed in a later 
chapter. For the moment, however, it might be noted in 
passing that according to some authorities the growth of 
foreign exchange has not been sufficient to keep pace with 
the growing needs of international trade. Concern has 
also been expressed, given the possibility of devaluation, 
about the future value of the dollar and sterling.^
Furthermore, the growth of gold production of the 
world (as will be seen in the next chapter) has not been 
keeping pace with growth of the volume of international 
transactions. This, along with the fact that there have 
been, from time to time, exchange controls, currency 
depreciations, tariff protection, barter agreements, 
mutual and multilateral credit negotiations, and resort 
to different import devices has made some economists feel 
that the functioning of the present international monetary 
system is not smooth or satisfactory. Even those who 
think that the present system is basically sound would not 
deny that something could at least be done to improve it.
There are, of course, other people who have 
expressed more objections to the present international 
monetary system. For example, Robert Triffin has been
^This dissertation was prepared before the 
November 196? pound devaluation; due to this, a foreign 
exchange rate ofe^l = $2.80 is used throughout. See 
Appendix I on recent British devaluation.
concerned about the use of national currencies as inter­
national money.^ Britain's John Maynard Keynes, in the 
discussions leading to the formation of the International
Monetary Fund, supported the creation of an international
2monetary unit to be named "bancor".
In this study an attempt will be made to look at 
the following questions:
1. What is the structure of the present interna­
tional monetary system, and how did it come into existence?
2. How well does the system perform?
3. What basic proposals have been made in order to 
improve, change, or modify the system?
4. What are the fundamental problems that are 
causing divisions among those who carry on the discussion 
of feasible solutions, and
5. What guidelines can be derived for constructive
action?
The basic concern of the study is to review criti­
cally some of the positive and negative aspects of rela­
tively important plans which have been suggested in the
^Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis (New 
Haven, Connecticut : Yale University Press, Inc., revised
edition, I96I), p. 8?.
2See the "Proposals by British Experts for an 
International Clearing Union," April 8 , 1943, reproduced 
in U.S. Government Printing Office, Proceedings and Docu­
ments of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Con­
ference, volJ II (Washington, D. C., 1948), pp. 1348-73•
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i960's for reform of the present international monetary 
system. In the course of this analysis several proposals 
will be discussed from the standpoint of their practi­
cality, and attention will be focused on some of the pos­
sible reasons why they have failed to be accepted. Similar 
work has been done in this area previously,^ but rela­
tively recent plans were not included. Furthermore, many 
such analyses were indifferent with respect to evaluation 
of the acceptability and/or feasibility of different plans 
and proposals.
Significance of the Problem
The problem of international money and liquidity
has become a widespread and vital concern. The countries
affected can be classified into three groups (excluding
the Soviet bloc):
1. Key currency countries such as the U.S. and
U.K. whose continuance of large deficits "must be ruled
out as a source of future reserve increases for the rest 
2of the world." Such countries' concern is not only for
^Fritz Machlup, "Plans for Reform of the Inter­
national Monetary System," in Princeton University, 
International Finance Section, Special Papers in Inter­
national Economics, No. 3, Revised (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, March 1964).
2Group of Ten, Communiqué of Ministers and 
Governors and Report of Deputies on July 25th and 26th 
in the Hague, ?th July, I906, ^  I8; this source will 
hereafter be referred to as Communiqué of Ministers.
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their balance of payments position but also for their 
international prestige, international liquidity, and the 
economic development of the free world.
2. During recent years, the growth of reserves in 
some parts of the world has been felt by a 
number of countries to have been more than 
adequate, an impression supported by the infla­
tionary tendencies that have prevailed.^
West Germany, Japan, and France would fall in this cate­
gory.
3. Finally, there are countries who feel that "the
growth in the stock of monetary gold has not been, and is
not expected to be, adequate to meet the reserve needs of
2international monetary system." Developing countries
would be among those in this group.
Smooth functioning of an international monetary
system and adequacy of international reserves are regarded
to be a matter of legitimate interest for all countries.
As the Group of Ten specifies :
We wish to stress our general agreement that the 
stability and smooth working of the international 
monetary system depend in a direct and substantial 
way upon the maintenance of a satisfactory equilibrium 
of the balances of payments of the larger countries.
We are agreed that, while global reserves are suffi­
cient at present, the existing sources of reserves
Ibid., p. 8. The Group of Ten is composed of the 
following countries: United States, United Kingdom, West
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Bel­
gium, and Sweden.
^Ibid., p. 2.
are unlikely to provide an adequate basis for world 
trade and payments in the longer run.^
Reasons for the Study
This study is being made for several reasons.
First, there is disagreement in the available literature 
as to how serious the problem is and how urgently it 
requires attention. Second, in recent years, there has 
been some dissatisfaction with the present international 
monetary system, lack of an international money, lack of 
adequate international liquidity, and temporary pressures 
on certain countries. Third, the topic has economic, 
social, and political implications. An examination of the 
economic aspects of these points in the light of available 
data is therefore necessary.
Robert Roosa has noted the difficulties which 
pound sterling and the dollar have been experiencing in 
foreign exchange markets of the world. Because of the 
economic distortions which several European countries have 
suffered, great concern over the supply of world liquidity 
has arisen. It is frequently during the period of such 
disturbance that reexamination of institutions attracts 
most attention. In Roosa's opinion, such a reexamination 
is necessary for the well-being of an orderly system in
^Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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order that it might bar possible serious disturbances.^
Method of the Study
Exhaustive coverage of each proposal for reform is 
not intended; rather the method is to present the essen­
tial features of the major issues. This method is accepted 
basically for two reasons. First, full details of any 
proposal may not be of real, help when the objective is the 
diagnosis of the direction in which one should go. Some 
agreement is needed on the diagnosis of a disease before 
any remedy can be prescribed; only when the disease is 
recognized should the possibility of proper cure be taken 
into account. Second, the discussion of the details of 
each and every proposal lies outside the scope of this 
study. Excerpts often presented in the form of quotations 
are merely fractions of larger documents which retain 
their author's assessment of how the problem should be 
attacked. Thus details of many proposals will not be 
discussed as the objective is to help provide guidelines 
for actual solution of the problem.
Occasional use will be made of statistical methods 
of analysis for the purpose of projections, estimates, 
and correlation among variables, along with the use of 
computer facilities.
^Robert Roosa, Monetary Reform for the World 
Economy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 19&5)» p. 5«
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Outline of the Study
After the introduction to the problem the study 
will attempt to analyze the present structure of the 
present international monetary system. Elements of the 
system such as gold, dollars, sterling, drawing rights on 
the International Monetary Fund, and the role that each 
plays will be discussed. The discussion will be followed 
by a look at the supply of and demand for international 
liquidity, which will be supplemented by a presentation 
of the factors affecting the. adjustability of the system. 
Production of the world gold will be examined to see if 
it has kept pace with the growth of international trade. 
Then reliance on dollars and pounds as means of foreign 
exchange will be dealt with as other components of inter­
national reserves. It will be seen whether doubts can 
arise as to the adequacy of the growth of international 
reserves to the extent that the key currency countries do 
not want to incur deficits, to the extent that other coun­
tries do not want to accept the deficits of other countries 
indefinitely, and to the extent that gold production is 
increasing less than the need for international reserves. 
This is done in Chapter,II.
A large set of proposals have been made to provide 
the world with more international reserves. Therefore, 
after the diagnosis of the vulnerability of the system, 
the substance of the plans for the reform of the
1 0
international monetary system will be discussed, regard­
less of their individual advocates or opponents. Pros 
and cons of each economic argument will be evaluated.
This will create a background upon which further study of 
the major proposals can be built. The principles or argu­
ments can be classified as a change in the price of gold, 
acceptance of flexible exchange rates, and increasing 
international understanding and/or cooperation. Each of 
these categories will be dealt with in Chapter III.
Based on the background of the substance of pro­
posals, and following the same classification, a review 
of the proposals made in the 1960's will be undertaken in 
Chapter IV. Part of this chapter contains the plans that 
deal with gold. Another group of these proposals calls 
for the acceptance of a flexible exchange rate system. 
Still a third sector discusses the creation of an inter­
national agency either essentially along lines parallel 
to national central bank operations or creation of more 
international reserves. The proposals of Lerner, Meade, 
Angel1 , Lutz, Stamp, Bernstein, Hansen, Zolotas, Maulding 
and Hart-Kaldor-Tinbergen will be discussed; those of 
Keynes and Triffin are also included due to their pio­
neering significance.
Then as it is thought that the official and semi­
official views may be significant in terms of their prac­
tical effect on possible solutions of the problem.
1 1
Chapter V is devoted to the evaluation of the IMF's posi­
tion, the findings of the Group of Ten, and the position 
that the U.S. Joint Economic Committee has taken.
Chapter VI attempts to throw further light on the 
negotiating aspects of the problem which are often neglected 
in a good many proposals. The different approach of various 
countries whose influence on the system is significant will 
be covered. Within this chapter the reader is introduced 
to the attitudes of France, the U.S., and the U.K. as 
examples of different views of the industrialized coun­
tries. Focusing attention on the views of these countries 
necessitates considerations for the view of underdeveloped 
countries.
Chapter VII attempts to study the data of the past 
two decades in relation to international economic condi­
tions. The data published by the IMF in International 
Financial Statistics will be statistically reviewed; this 
review will attempt to establish any behavior pattern 
which may be discernible through an analysis of the past 
records presented in the IFS. It will further attempt to 
see how much of the world trade as measured by imports is 
correlated with time, gold, international reserves, and 
world income separately and in relation to one another 
through simple and multiple correlation programs; static 
and dynamic multiple correlations will be undertaken to 
see if the introduction of a time lag affects the results
1 2
considerably. It further attempts to project the future 
of these variables and the consequences should the present 
situation be left to itself.
Chapter VIII will then try to combine the findings 
of the previous theoretical and statistical assertions.
The objective is to help not only to understand the diag­
nosis of the problem but also to aid in choosing among 
different solutions. The chapter will set up criteria for 
success and in its light to judge the acceptability of 
various proposals. The chapter will also include the 
opinion of the writer and hopes to focus attention on the 
directions which may have a higher probability of success.
Sources
The source materials for this study will be com­
posed of available literature and data from academic, 
national, and international institutions such as The 
Economic Journal, The Economist, publications of the 
International Finance Section, University of Princeton: 
Essays in International Finance, Special Papers, and 
Articles in International Economics, books by Triffin, 
Roosa, Hansen, etc. International Financial Statistics, 
Annual Reports of the IMF, and United Nations statistics 
will also be relied on.
CHAPTER II 
STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Explanation of the System 
The present international monetary system is a set 
of written and unwritten rules by which countries do busi­
ness with each other. Each country has a currency of its 
own, and since countries may want to have international 
trade, there has to be some orderly system for converting 
currency of one country into another. Thus a starting 
point for the system is the establishment of a rate of 
exchange for its money in terms of other currencies. The 
value of currencies, however, varies from time to time.
Mere establishment of a rate of exchange for one currency 
in terms of another would not work well in so far as cur­
rency is stated in terms of something which has a rela­
tively more stable value--such as gold, then each nation 
can, by establishing a par value for its currency in terms 
of gold, tell foreigners what the currency is worth in 
terms of gold--and indirectly in terms of other currencies; 
this makes orderly trade possible.
After a country becomes a member of the IMF, the
13
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par value of its currency is formally announced to the 
Fund, and for convenience each nation may establish the 
value of its currency in terms of U.S. dollars. Thus, for 
example, a Canadian dollar is worth 92.5 U.S. cents. As 
a government announces a par value for its currency, it 
also agrees, according to the rules of the IMF, to maintain 
that value within prescribed limits by official engage­
ment in the foreign exchange market any time that private 
supply and demand tend to move the price outside the per­
mitted limits. Since the U.S. government stands ready to 
buy and sell gold at $35 an ounce, any country's gold can 
be turned into dollars and vice-versa. Here then comes 
another important stage of the system: countries hold
both gold and dollars (or pounds, and even other curren­
cies) in their reserves: of course, the proportion of
these two elements of reserves held depends on their confi­
dence in various types of reserves, on their customs, 
financial ability, etc.
To intervene in the foreign exchange market for 
the purpose of maintaining their foreign exchange rates 
governments may have to resort to their reserves of gold 
and/or foreign exchange.
To support the price Of its currency a government 
may have to lose all or part of its reserves. The loss of 
reserves, be it in gold, dollars, or otherwise, may not be 
taken lightly by any country; in fact, it is taken as a
15
signal that a country must try to improve its balance of 
payments. In addition to the use of reserves, a country 
can borrow from the IMF, or from individual countries,^ 
or it can simply devalue its currency. Thus the present 
international monetary system is based on: l) existence
of domestic currencies, 2) establishment of a par value 
in terms of gold for each currency; the relative par 
values in terms of gold determine the official rate of 
exchange, and 3) establishment of a rate of exchange 
between different currencies. In this system then, gold, 
currency reserves, the IMF, and bilateral and multilateral 
agreements each play a role.
Elements of the System
Gold
For centuries gold ownership has been desired by
human beings. According to some writers, notions of the
2value of gold are not based solely on mysticism. The 
fact that there is a fixed price for gold and that it is 
uneconomical for any one country to increase its production
^Much of this section is based on the simple, yet 
thorough, explanation of Edwin L. Dale, in his article 
"International Monetary System Meets a Test" reprinted in 
Warren L. Smith and Ronald Teigen, Readings in Money, 
National Income, and Stabilisation R o l i c y (Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 195b), pp. 480-4.
2Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, University 
Economics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., Second Printing, 1964), p. 644.
i 6
of gold to unlimited amounts due to increasing cost of
production has placed gold supply beyond the control of
any one country; for these reasons gold has long been
regarded as a safe form of holding wealth. Furthermore,
People have sought for good reason to own gold and use 
it widely as money. It is portable, easily recog­
nizable, readily divisible, and storable. In a world 
ridden with unstable governments and threats of con­
fiscation of wealth or expulsion from a country, 
people find gold a relatively attractive form in which 
to own wealth (consider the problems of hiding and 
secretly transporting peanuts, cotton, steel, or 
land.
In the words of Robert Roosa, "Because gold has
been tested as a store of value through the centuries,
while man-made monies have suffered violent changes, most
countries will wish to include some gold in their reserves."'
Hoosa further asserts that
In the international monetary system as it has evolved, 
gold has become a pillar of stability, while reserve 
currencies and credit facilities have been built around 
it to carry the bulk of the regular burdens of ful­
filling the reserve needs of individual countries.^
Thus the acceptance of gold as a principal element 
in reserves makes the following questions pertinent. What 
is the current annual gold production? What are the pros­
pects for its future production? Will gold production 
keep pace with the growing needs of international trade?
^Ibid., p. 644.
2Roosa, op. cit., p. I5.
^Ibid., p. 10.
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A. H. Hansen asserts:
As became evident after World War I, the world's gold 
supply has not been increasing rapidly enough. For 
one thing, much of it was hoarded. Even allowing for 
hoarding, gold production has not kept pace with the 
growing needs of world trade and international transac­
tions . 1
To test whether available statistics support or
contradict such assertions, a statistical method was used
on the basis of the following information. Table 1 shows
world gold production for the years 19^5 through I966.
(The span of years for two decades seems an appropriate
sample size.) Upon plotting a scatter diagram for the
data of Table 1 it became evident that there is not a
linear relation between world gold production and time
(measured in years) for the decade of 1955-1964. Then,
2applying a "second degree curve" which seemed to best fit 
the data, the following regression equation was obtained:
Yc = 757.126 - 2.083t + 1.738t^.
In the above formula Y designates gold production; 
the subscript c next to it stands for computed value or
^Hansen, op. cit., p. 57*
2It is necessary to note that when a scatter dia­
gram was drawn for world gold production in the decade of 
1955-65, a linear regression line did fit the data, but a 
sample of only one decade seemed to be inappropriately 
small for projection. Accordingly, data were carried back 
to the extent that they covered the period after WWII.
As this was done, and as a scatter diagram was drawn for 
two decades covering 1945 to 1964, a straight regression 
line could no longer fit the data. Hence application of 
a "second degree curve."
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TABLE 1
WORLD* PRODUCTION OF GOLD; 1945-1966 















Source: International Monetary Fund, Interna­
tional Financial Statistics, vol. 6 , no. 9 
(Washington, D.C., Sept., 1953)» p. 29 for 1945 
figure; vol. 8 , no. 9, Sept., 1955i P* 19 for 
the years 1946 through 1954; vol. l8 , no. 5 , 
May, 1965, p. l4 for the years 1955-1964, and 
vol. 20, no. 7 » P* l4 for the years I965 and
1966.
""Excluding the Soviet Area.
■•■In millions of U.S. Dollars at 35 dollars per 
fine ounc e.
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estimate of gold production; on the basis of a least square 
method; t designates time or year(s); and figures in the 
formula are simply coefficients of the regression line 
that the formula presents. On this basis, one can project 
the amount of gold production (Y) for any year (t) after 
1966 simply by substituting the desired year (t) in the 
formula.
If the evidence of past production of world gold 
can be used as a criterion for estimating its future pro­
duction,^ it can be projected, on the basis of the above 
equation and computer results, that world gold production 
in 1974 would be about 2259*836 million U.S. dollars.
Table 2 shows world trade indices which show that 
the world import index has risen from 100 (which is taken 
by OECD to be the base corresponding to the year 1953) to 
a level of I80 in 1962. Through the application of a 
cumulative interest rate formula it can be calculated that 
this 80 per cent increase over the decade of 1953-1962 
gives a 6.1 per cent cumulative rise per annum. If the
^Two points deserve special attention: 1) better 
use of gold, 2) problem of gold hoarding. Better uses of 
gold can affect its supply. For example, no less than 
$2.7 billion worth of gold was released for international 
purposes by withdrawing gold from internal circulation.
On the problem of gold hoarding Professor Hansen believes 
that after World War I, it became evident that much of 
the world's gold supply was hoarded. Exactly how much of 
the gold supply has been hoarded, Hansen does not say, and 
perhaps there is no accurate way of measuring this magni­
tude, as it may take place quite hiddenly. See Hansen, 




(Value in Millions of U.S. Dollars and Index)
Year
"(T) -
Value of Imports (cif)
(2)Index of Imports
1950 59331 88
51 81390 9852 80186 98
53 76563 100
54 79596 106
1955 88968 11856 98122 127





63* 143600 19764 160800 210+
1965 175000 228 +66 191700 250+
Source : OECD, General Statistics Bulletin, Part 2 , 1964,
p. 4l for' column (2); IMF, International Financial Sta-
tistics, vol. II, no. 5 (Washington, D. C ., 1958), p. 23for the years 1950 through 1957; vol. 18, no. 5» 1965 forthe year 1958, and vol. 20, no. 8 , August 19671 p. 35 forthe years 1959 through 1966.
^Second Quarter
^Index of imports for the years 1964 through 1966 were 
not available*in the above OECD bulletin. They are com­
puted, accordingly, on the basis of comparison between 
1953 r=100) and the figures for the value of imports for 
these years; not seasonally adjusted.
Notes: (l) Seasonally adjusted indices.
(2) The import indices are assumed in the Bulletin 
to be identical to the export indices.
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figure of gold production in .1953 -be taken as a base, it 
can be seen that world gold production over the same decade 
has increased by a little over 53 per cent, which would 
give a cumulative annual rate of growth of 4.35 per cent, 
or much less than the increase in world trade.
The above data, then, suggest that the rise in 
world gold production has not kept pace with the rise in 
world trade. The statistical test supports Hansen's^ 
assertion that "world gold supply has not been increasing 
rapidly enough"^ to keep pace with the growing needs of 
world trade. To the extent that world trade has been 
increasing more than gold production, increasing reliance 
on dollars, pounds sterling, and credit agreements between 
central bankers and governments has been inevitable. Such 
arguments are based on the assumption of a constant price 
for gold ($35 per ounce), because, obviously, a rise in 
the price of gold may make its production more profitable.
Miroslav A. Kriz, after making an analysis of gold 
and its role in international payments, comes to a conclu­
sion that is worth quoting: "To recognize that, so far
ahead as can be seen, continued use should be made of gold
in the international monetary system is simply practical 
2realism."
^Hansen, op. cit., p. 57«
2Miroslav A. Kriz, "Gold: Barbarous Relic or
Useful Instrument?" Princeton University--International
2 2
For reasons to be discussed in the next chapter, 
the idea of raising the price of gold does not seem 
acceptable. Yet, this assertion should not be interpreted 
to mean that there is no advantage whatsoever in raising 
the price of gold. Undoubtedly, it is possible to assume 
that such a step would lessen the problem of international 
liquidity. Exactly how much this price should be changed 
if that alternative were adopted, under what arrangements, 
and how--whether gradually or once-and-for-all— are topics 
which would require econometric studies. It can, however, 
be asserted that solution of the problem of international 
liquidity is possible without raising the price of gold. 
This will be discussed in Chapter III of this study.
So far nothing has been said about the problem of 
gold hoarding. Due to the existence of gold hoarding, not 
all gold produced becomes available for the use of monetary 
authorities. As gold still constitutes a vital component 
of international reserves, the discussion of international 
liquidity should touch, at least briefly, upon this topic. 
Appendix II is therefore devoted to gold dishoarding. At 
this point, it.is sufficient to note that the world's 
monetary liquidity can be increased by drawing the amount 
of hoarded gold into the monetary use; yet, it is not the 
theme of this study to recommend gold dishoarding as a
Finance Section, Essays in International Finance, No. 60 
(Princeton, N. J .: Princeton University Press, June,
1967), p. 29.
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long run and effective method of resolving the problem of 
international liquidity.
Dollars and Sterling
Any time total U.S. and U.K. payments to the world
exceed their receipts, dollars and sterling will be
available as international reserves. But for this very
reason, the amounts of dollars and sterling available to
the world will depend on how ready the U.S. and U.K. are
to have deficits in their balance of payments and also on
how ready other countries are to accept and hold dollars
and sterling. One disadvantage of this syàtem-of exchange
reserves is that if the U.S. and U.K. are successful in
eliminating their deficits as presently hoped for, the
world would be deprived of any increase in present holdings
of dollars and pounds for reserves.
It has been argued, for example, that a serious short­
age of international reserves is almost certainly in 
the offing, especially if the United States is success­
ful in eliminating its deficit. And even more dis­
quieting is the viewpoint of some authorities that the 
present gold-exchange standard, based as it is on 
reserves held largely in the form of certain key cur­
rencies , is inherently unstable and peculiarly biased 
toward the generation of periodic liquidity crises, 
such as that which led to the devastating monetary 
upheavals that characterized the decade before World 
War II.l
The volume of official claims against the dollar 
(that is, the extent to which the dollar is being used for
^Harry D. Hutchinson, Money, Banking, and the 
United States Economy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1967), p. 350.
2k
reserve purposes by other monetary authorities) amounted 
to $l4.3 billion in May, 196?-^ This and similar data, 
can be taken as an indication of how widely dollars are 
used. Why are dollars and pounds so widely used in inter­
national transactions?
Several answers can be given to this question.
First, attention may be focused on some reasons which can
be found in the writings of Shannon. He mentions that
until 1913j England was the major center for both short
and long term credit because of its significant role in
world trade. As London became the center of the world's
remittance mechanism, both tradition and time gave a value
2to sterling equal to that of gold. Shannon goes on to 
say that further needs of international liquidity and the 
fact that gold supply could not be increased as fast made 
some countries withdraw gold from domestic circulation. 
Furthermore, nations started to hold national currencies, 
in addition to gold as buffers against changes in their 
balance of payments. Finally, referring to the fact that 
"the key currencies needed to be both widely acceptable 
and unlikely to depreciate in terms of one another or 
against gold," and that "the key currency countries also 
needed appropriate banking facilities," Shannon concludes,
^Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 53» no. 8, August I967 
(Washington, dI C.), p. l446.
2Shannon, op. cit., p. 19•
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"only the United Kingdom and the United States had suffi­
cient standing in international trade and banking to meet 
these requirements."^
Roosa believes that "the dollar became the center 
of a system that was much more flexible and much more
capable of responding to shifting needs than any system
2based upon gold alone." An even more convincing reason 
is that
The dollar reached its preeminent position, of course, 
during and immediately following World War II when 
there was in reality no other currency available to 
play a world role and when so much of our government 
assistance was made available in freely usable 
dollars.3
Finally, businessmen around the world have come to 
know dollars and sterling so well that they do not want to 
go through the additional trouble of making themselves 
familiar with how much other monies are worth in terms of 
gold, dollars, or sterling. If a foreign trader is paid 
in dollars for his sales, as soon as this payment is made
If.these dollars become international money. Furthermore, 
the U.S. has guaranteed a fixed price of gold since 1934 
at $35 an ounce, and has stood ready to honor this price
^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
2Roosa, op. cit., pp. 17-18»
^Ibid., p. 23.
4Hansen, op. cit., p. 55»
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through various periods of stress.^ Importance of the 
U.S. economy in world trade, credit availability to other 
countries, willingness of some central bankers to use 
dollars--and sterling--, rather than gold for international 
settlement and ready convertibility of dollars into gold 
can all throw some light on why dollars are acceptable.
IMF
In today's international monetary system the role 
of the International Monetary Fund should not be neglected. 
Countries have drawing rights at the IMF, part of which 
can be regarded as readily available upon the Fund's deci­
sion to release them to the country in case of need.
Countries that are members of the Fund have turned 
over a portion of their reserves to it and this 
entitled them to the use of the Fund's reserves. The 
IMF has set up formal procedures to calculate the 
funds available to a country.2
IMF loans take the form of the exchange of one country's
currency for another currency that the country in question
needs. The Fund's resources are available to eligible
members on an essentially short term and revolving basis
to provide members with temporary assistance to contribute
3to the solution of their payment problems. Table 3 shows 
the magnitude of the Fund's operations. The Fund's
^Roosa, op. cit., p. 22.
2Richard Ward, International Finance (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965)> P» l8l.
OIMF, International Financial Statistics, vol. l8, 
no. 5, May 19^5, p. 51
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TABLE 3
, *IMF NET CURRENCY SALES 
(As of March 31» 1965» 











Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics,
vol. l8, no. 5 (Washington, D. C., I965), pp. 2^3
*With the exception of Yugoslavia, only figures 
larger than $100 million have been quoted; for 
other countries, see the above source. It is 
interesting to note that figures for Germany 
(Federal Republic) and France are respectively 
-683.3 and -444.9 million dollars which means 
that their repayments to the Fund exceed their 
drawings. The above source indicates that "Ex­
change transactions with the Fund take the form 
of members' purchases (i.e., drawings) from the 
Fund of the currencies of other members for 
equivalent amounts of their own currencies"
(ibid., p. 4.); and that "A member's purchases 
of currency from the Fund must be repaid by 
repurchases or by the purchase of that member's 
currency by another member." (ibid., p. 5.)
Note: As of the same date there was $1865.8
million repayment to the Fund.
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attitude in this respect is a liberal one, so far as
requests for transactions are within the first credit
tranche, namely, "transactions which bring the Fund's
holdings of a member's currency above 100 per cent but not
above 125 per cent of its quota," provided that the member
in question makes reasonable efforts to solve its problems.^
Provision of short term finance is, however, only
one area of IMF operations. Other important functions of
the IMF may be categorized under support of the system of
multilateral settlement--what Triffin has called "converti-
2bility a la 1959" --and collaboration with the contracting
parties to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade in
the dismantling of restrictions on international pay­
ments and trade, and in the formulation and enforce­
ment of appropriate 'rules of the game' to minimize 
the ill effects of such restrictions as survive the 
dismantling process.3
The remainder of this subsection attempts to throw further 
light on the functioning of the IMF in terms of converti­
bility and support of the system of multilateral settle­
ment .
^International Monetary Fund, Compensatory 
Financing of Export Fluctuations (Washington, D. C.,
February 1963), p. 11.
^Triffin, op. cit., p. 19*
3 Brian Tew, "The International Monetary Fund: Its
Present Role and Future Prospects," Princeton University-- 
International Finance Section, Essays in International 
Finance, no. 36 (Princeton, N. J . :  Princeton University
Press, Itorch, I961), p. 3*
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With respect to restrictions on trade and payments 
it must be borne in mind that there is a division of 
responsibility between the Fund and the G.A.T.T., the former 
being concerned with restrictions on payments, the latter 
with restrictions on trade. Restrictions on trade thus 
lie within the realm of G.A.T.T., hence it will be elimi­
nated from this discussion of the IMF. Tew suggests, how­
ever , that :
since the two kinds of restrictions are frequently 
alternative means to the same end, the choice between 
them being largely a matter of administrative conve­
nience, it would probably have been more efficient to 
have entrusted the supervision of both kinds of 
restriction to one and the same international agency.
With respect to the support of the multilateral 
settlement system, after the return of some European coun­
tries to convertibility in 1958, the world has been
operating "on a monetary regime more or less on the lines
2of the one which was established in the late 1920's."
The success or failure of the IMF is a matter of value 
judgments among economists and lies outside the scope of
3this analysis.
The Fund's rescue of sterling from speculative 
pressures in the spring of I96I was dramatically successful.
^Ibid., p. 11.
^Ibid., p. 8.
OSee, for example, Snider, op. cit., pp. 493-503;
The source of the previous footnote is also an interesting 
discussion of the various aspects of the IMF operations.
30
It has also been successful in attracting the confidence 
of many countries from both blocs. "The Fund offers to 
members the facilities of a club where they can explain 
their actions and intentions, lodge complaints, negotiate 
informal understandings, and coordinate their monetary 
policies."^ The Fund is also a platform for weighty pro­
nouncements of worldwide significance; it also shares with 
G.A.T.T. the job of removal of artificial barriers to 
international trade and payments. It must be noted, how­
ever, that the effect of the IMF upon international 
liquidity is, after all, limited, and sometimes condi­
tional to the willingness of the countries to adopt cor­
rective measures. If the effect of the Fund on interna­
tional liquidity were not limited, the world might not now 
be facing the problem of international liquidity. Fur­
thermore countries tend to regard their own reserves in a 
different light from their IMF drawing rights.
Functional Aspects of the System 
Supply of Liquidity
According to the IMF, the average rate of growth 
of foreign exchange reserves amounted to 4.3 per cent per 
annum, that of gold reserves to 1.6 per cent per annum, 
and that of gold tranche position to 7.6 per cent over the 
decade of 1954-1964. Combining these three items, the
^Tew, op. cit., p. 10.
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Fund has found an average annual rate of growth of 2.8 per 
cent per annum.^
Looking into the supply of international liquidity 
one can notice the following innovations. The innovations 
which are chosen for brief description here are typical 
but not inclusive of all happenings which have affected 
the supply side of international liquidity and have had 
the objective of maintaining the existing system of fixed 
exchange rates (for currencies of the IMF members are 
fixed within one per cent limits around the par value).
(l) The IMF instituted in 1952 what is usually 
referred to as "stand-by credits." This is an "advance" 
given by one country to another guaranteeing that a cer­
tain amount of foreign currency can be drawn by a member 
over a specified period subject to the limiting conditions 
of the IMF. When this advance guarantee is extended to 
another country, it can be considered a "given" factor in 
that country's balance of payments policy. Such "stand-by 
credits" can be regarded as automatic drawing rights, and 
from this standpoint they can perform the same function 
that owned reserves of the country would, if there is a 
need to rely on such sources. These credits have been of 
benefit to a number of underdeveloped countries and some 
developed ones.
^IMF, 1964 Annual Report (Washington, D. C.),
p. 30.
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(2) There have also been increases in the IMF 
quotas of member countries, for example, by 50 per cent in 
1959 and by 25 per cent in 1964. Adjustments were made in 
each case in the quotas of individual countries to allow 
for change in their international economic position. 
Closely related with these increases is the discussion to 
make the gold tranche fully automatic.
(3) General Arrangements to Borrow, adopted in 
1962 is another device to further the ability of the IMF 
to increase international liquidity. The so-called Paris 
Club or Group of Ten and the IMF reached an agreement in 
December, I96I which was put into effect in October I962. 
According to these arrangements, the participating coun­
tries "would stand ready to loan their currencies to the 
Fund" when and if the countries and the Fund agree that 
additional reserves and resources are needed to support 
the international monetary system.^ Massive "rescue 
operations" of the pound were accomplished in 1964 and 
again in I965.
(4) Since I962, the United States has employed
^The resources pledged by each country are as fol­
lows (all in millions of U.S. dollars): U.S., 2000; U.K.,
1000; W. Germany, 1000; France, 550; Italy, 550; Japan,
250; Canada, 200; Netherlands, 200; Belgium, I5O; Sweden, 
100; all amounting to a total of 6 billion dollars. "No 
country is under obligation to advance funds unless, at 
the time a request is made, the country agrees with the 
IMF that support is urgently needed." Hansen, op. cit.,
p. 96.
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"currency swaps." These have taken the form of exchanges 
of currency between the U.S. and another country whose 
currency is relatively stronger in the foreign exchange 
markets. The proceeds of these "swaps" are used by the 
U.S. to support the dollar, and are presumably used to 
repurchase foreign currency for dollars when the dollar 
regains strength. The major objectives of such agree­
ments are to combat temporary speculation against the 
dollar (such as could have occurred at the time of 
Kennedy's assassination) and short-term capital outflows.
(5) The U.S., in order to reduce the pressure on 
the dollar and finance the U.S. deficit without gold 
losses, has sold to other countries the so-called "Roosa 
bonds" (named after Robert Roosa, then Under-secretary of 
the U.S. Treasury) which are intermediate term U.S. govern­
ment securities. To eliminate the possibility of loss to 
lenders due to dollar devaluation and to increase accepta­
bility of these bonds they are denominated in the currency 
of foreign countries. These bonds have been sold to the 
Central Banks of a number of countries but especially to 
Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. As an example, in I963 
such bond sales amounted to $702 million. The advantage 
of these bonds from the standpoint of the U.S. is that the 
short term dollar liabilities are converted to intermediate- 
term liabilities, hence giving additional time to the U.S. 
to correct its balance of payments deficit and at the same
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time saving some gold which could have been demanded by 
the holders of short term claims against the dollar.
Lending countries would, presumably, benefit from dollar 
stability and monetary order^ as well as the interest 
rate.
(6) There was also a London gold pool formed in
196l--a "gentleman's agreement" between some industrially
advanced countries (Switzerland and most of the Group of 
2Ten )--uhder which they agreed to pool gold sales
^For further discussion, see the testimony of 
Robert Roosa in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
Hearings, "The United States Balance of Payments," part I 
(Washington, dT C., July 8 & 9, 19&3), pp. 9&-101. A 
member country can purchase from the IMF a stated amount 
of the currency it wishes to have in exchange for an 
equivalent amount of its own currency. The aggregate 
drawing rights of a member on the Fund is closely linked 
to the size of its quota. Drawing of a member within the 
limits of its quota is almost automatically granted. This 
is referred to as "gold tranche," and because of its rela­
tively automatic nature it is unconditional. The IMF also 
has a liberal policy toward drawings of a member not 
exceeding an additional 25 per cent of its quota. This is 
referred to as "the first credit tranche" and due to its 
semi-automatic nature may also be regarded as unconditional. 
Of course, the member country must make reasonable efforts 
to overcome its payments problems, and in this sense its 
drawing is conditional. But compared to the following 
case it can be regarded unconditional. For drawings of 
larger amounts than 125 per cent of its quota, a member is 
expected to make "intensive efforts"--usually a comprehen­
sive program of fiscal and monetary measures--to overcome 
its difficulties. Drawings over 125 per cent of a member's 
quota are referred to as "higher tranches" and are thus 
"conditional."
2For the list of participant countries in London 
gold pool see Appendix I.
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and purchases on the London gold market. The Bank of 
England is to act as an agent, and the aim is to stabilize 
the price of gold against speculative demand when the 
dollar and the pound are weak. After the establishment of 
this pool, the price of gold has been more effectively 
stabilized in the range of $35 per ounce plus or minus 
shipping costs.
Such a list of monetary cooperation can well be 
expanded. These are, however, adequate to show the magni­
tude and the nature of long run operations. The first 
three improvements--stand-by credits. General Arrangements 
to Borrow, and increases in the quotas--can be regarded 
to be innovations within the IMF; the last three are out­
side of it. They further show that the basic objective of 
all these is to avoid a world monetary crisis. Each has 
necessitated greater coordinated action among industrially 
advanced countries as well as more cooperation. How ade­
quate they are in their scope remains to be seen. If the 
fact that the IMF has, in recent years, undertaken to 
study reserve creation more seriously (as will be explained 
later in this chapter) is interpreted as a sign of realiza­
tion of the possible inadequacies in the future supply of 
international liquidity, then one can perhaps derive the 
conclusion that international reserves don't seem to be 
adequate to the IMF, at least in their present stage:
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. . . The factors which have determined the growth in
liquidity during the past decade seem likely to pro­
vide a smaller annual rate of growth over the decade 
to come. The net addition to official gold holdings 
arising from gold production and sales by the Soviet 
Union, less the non-monetary uses of gold, may well in 
the years ahead be larger than in most recent years; 
even so, however, it could hardly be expected that the 
annual rate of increase of monetary gold holdings 
would exceed 2-2% per cent. . . .  It must be assumed 
that payments deficits of the United States will not 
contribute to the formation of reserves in future on 
the same scales as in recent years. It therefore seems 
safe to forecast that in the future greater reliance 
than over the past decade will have to be placed on 
the provision of international liquidity, as needed, 
by other means. . . .̂
One should also consider short run fluctuations in 
the supply of international liquidity. During short-term 
periods, determined as being less than one year in discus­
sions of international economics, world temporary crises 
(such as the recent Middle East crisis), confidence factors 
affecting gold hoards, and conditions governing gold produc­
tion influence the supply of gold for monetary purposes. 
Reserves increase when key currency countries are in 
deficit and decrease when they are in surplus. On these 
grounds one may safely hold that the supply of international 
liquidity in the short run is too dependent on factors 
which may not be responsive to the need for liquidity and 
may have no relation at all to the need for liquidity.
In this connection, one should not forget that there are 
elements in the present system which do respond to
^The 1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 31»
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variations with need; the IMF's lending operations are one 
example.
Demand for Liquidity
In defining international liquidity attention is • 
focused on the fact that such liquidity is to be used, 
according to the Fund, for adjustment and correction of 
deficits in balance of payments. Fritz Machlup has given 
a similar definition for liquidity: "By liquidity of a
monetary authority one means its capacity to make payments 
to other countries if its foreign receipts were to drop or 
stop.
Taking the growth of the world economy as well as 
a larger international trade and investment into considera­
tion, one can, without adhering to a quantity theory of 
money, hold that more extensive world trade may need 
greater international liquidity. Furthermore, if it seems 
likely that increased world trade would involve greater 
absolute disequilibria in balances of international pay­
ments, the need for liquidity can be increased greatly.
Classifying countries into two groups--industri- 
alized and developing countries--the Fund projects that 
the needs of each would be larger in the future for the 
following reasons. The developing countries would want to
^Fritz Machlup, "The Need for Monetary Reserves," 
Princeton University, International Finance Section, 
Reprints in International Finance, No. 5 (Princeton, N. J.; 
Princeton University Press, October I966), p. 1.
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"be able to avert undue disturbance to their development 
programs because of temporary or unexpected balance of 
payments difficulties"; and for the former "it is impor­
tant that liquidity considerations should not inhibit 
industrialized countries from pursuing policies designed 
to liberalize trade and to augment capital flows and
. Xdevelopment aid."
The IMF further asserts that in the decade before 
1964, the value of international trade rose at an average 
rate of 5-8 per cent per annum, and the value of inter­
national financial transactions increased probably more 
2than that. This estimate roughly corresponds to the
figure of a 6.1 per cent annual increase in world trade
calculated for a teni-y.ear .period as shown in this chap- 
3ter.
Factors such as liberalization of capital move­
ments among financial centers and their probable future 
policy coordination would obviously have some bearing on 
the need for international liquidity. Yet there is no 
precise way of knowing what exact form they would take, in 
what direction and by what means they will go. Measure­
ment of the net impact of these factors, especially in the
^The 1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 29»
^Ibid.
3 See above, p. 19-
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long run, is a difficult task. Private capital movements 
may also affect the demand for liquidity in either direc­
tion and could operate as a helpful or as a hampering 
factor. "On balance it seems prudent to assume no decline 
in the magnitude of payments disequilibria relative to the 
value of international transactions"^ and trade.
The Relation Between Process of Adjustment of Inter­
national Payments and International Liquidity
One of the functions of international liquidity or
arrangements for credit facilities between nations is to
provide.time for adjustment. "To be sure, external
liquidity readily available to a deficit country, can, if
wisely used, enable that country to move to restore balance
between its earnings and its expenditures abroad in an
2orderly manner." This is, in fact, one reason why some 
economists believe the problem of adjustment will be auto­
matically reduced or eliminated as more international 
liquidity is provided.
Provision of international liquidity is a means of 
financing disequilibria, and it must be viewed in conjunc­
tion with the process of adjustment of international pay­
ments. Long ago. Article I (v) of the IMF Agreement paid
attention to the interrelation of these two aspects.
^Ibid., p. 30.
2Robert Roosa, "Balance of Payments Adjustment and 
International Liquidity," Journal of Finance, vol. 19 
(March, 1964), p. 1.
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The Pxmd is to make its resources available to 
members; it is to do so, however, under adequate safe­
guards , in order to provide members with an opportunity 
to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments, 
without, however, resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity.^
Undoubtedly the volume of international liquidity and/or 
its nature plays a significant role in aggravating or 
easing the problems of adjustment in balance of payments. 
One must remember that promotion of economic growth and a 
high level of employment as well as the maintenance of 
price stability are predominant objectives of economic 
policy in today's economies. Countries are also likely to 
pay attention to the adjustment in their balance of pay­
ments only in so far as this does not contradict their 
domestic objectives. This is clarified by one of the U.S. 
monetary authorities in the following manner:
Most countries consider it imperative to work 
toward processes of international adjustment which are 
consistent to the fullest practicable degree with their 
domestic goals for the maximizing of employment, the 
minimizing of economic fluctuations, and the encourage­
ment of growth, within that environment of price sta­
bility which best promotes these other aims. . . .
As a general rule one can safely assert that if 
the volume of international liquidity is so tight that the 
countries participating in international transactions find 
it impossible or difficult to correct the disequilibria in
^The IMF Agreement, Article I (v), reprinted as 
Appendix I in Tew, "The International Monetary Fund: Its
Present Role and Future Prospects," op. cit., pp. 29-37-
2Journal of Finance, op. cit. , p. 5-
kl
their balances of payments without resort to restrictive 
controls--which may very well be destructive to national 
or international prosperity--an increase in the volume of 
international liquidity is desirable. If, on the other 
hand, there is an abundant demand in the international 
economy such that countries do not really have to resort 
to restrictive measures, caution would be appropriate in 
order not to expand international liquidity.
The question remains "How much liquidity is ade­
quate?" This would, of course, vary from time to time 
depending on the rate of growth in world production, the 
willingness of countries to use international trade as a 
means of increasing the standard of living of their popu­
lace and their general economic and social welfare, the 
degree to which they participate in international transac­
tions, etc. Thus any generalization with respect to the 
question of adequacy in all circumstances will most likely 
be incorrect. A rule of thumb, however, is provided by 
Tibor Scitovsky:
There is a lively discussion going on today of whether 
or not the supply of international liquidity is ade­
quate; and if not, what would constitute an adequate 
level. There is much disagreement and little hope of 
its being resolved. All parties to the argument, how­
ever, seem to agree on one thing: if the supply of
liquidity were to be brought to what is considered an 
adequate level, all would wish to keep it stable at 
that level, or, at most, increase it at an annual rate 
of three percent--which is the limit to which respect­
able economists are willing to stretch the meaning of
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the word stable, as a concession to the realities of 
our expanding universe.^
More specifically, judgment^ as to the adequacy of 
international liquidity relative to balance of payments 
adjustments should take into account the probable effect 
of liquidity on the policy of countries participating in 
trade.
With relatively fixed exchange rates, inadequate inter­
national reserves predispose countries, and hence the 
world economy, toward slower growth rates, deflationary 
economic policies, and restrictions on movements of 
goods and productive factors. Inadequate reserves 
increase the world's proneness to crisis in foreign 
exchange markets. Insufficient reserves can also dis­
rupt normal patterns of international trade and pay­
ments and lead to a reduction in the level of foreign 
trade and investment. Contrastingly, with excessive 
international reserves, prices in the world economy 
tend to rise secularly and productive factors tend to 
be malallocated. The goal is to find the 'golden mean' 
between these untenable positions so that the volume 
and liquidity of international reserves is just ade­
quate. 2
Obviously, countries benefiting from increases in interna­
tional liquidity may have a tendency to pursue more liberal 
and expansionary (or at least less contractionary) policies 
with respect to their capital movements and trade. Thus 
one may expect that an increase in international liquidity, 
apart from the greater maneuvering facilities which it will
^Tibor Scitovsky, "A New Approach to International 
Liquidity," in American Economic Association, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No. 5 (December I966), pT 1212.
2M. 0. Clement, Richard L. Pfister, and Kenneth J. 
Rothwell, Theoretical Issues in International Economics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^7) » p"̂ 402.
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provide for the deficit countries, will exert, by and 
large, an upward pressure on the general level of employ­
ment, demand, and possibly prices. By the same token, a 
decrease in international liquidity is likely to have the 
opposite effect.
Thus in the words of the IMF annual report :
Countries that are tending to fall into persistent 
payment deficits should be willing to pursue less 
expansionary policies than they would otherwise pre­
fer, though they should not be expected to endure 
situations of high or prolonged unemployment of 
resources or economic stagnation. Again, countries 
that are tending to run into persistent surpluses 
should be willing to pursue, within limits, a more 
expansionary policy than they would have been inclined 
to adopt for purely domestic reasons.^
More on what countries can, or should, do in terms of
adjustment relative to international liquidity will
follow. Before this, however, it would seem appropriate
to divide the disequilibria in balances of payments into
two general categories: transitory or temporary, and long
term disequilibrium. If the disequilibrium in balance of
payments is of a transitory nature, there is no necessity
and urgency for counteraction as the IMF has had occasion
to observe in a recent report. According to this report,
if a sound set of policies is being followed
. . . no change in them would be needed to meet pay­
ments difficulties that are due solely to temporary 
situations in foreign markets, or to such factors as 
a temporary fluctuation in crops. The mere fact of a
^1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 27*
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falling off in exports would not be taken as an indi­
cation that a corrective program was necessary or that 
the corrective program already envisaged should be 
intensified.!
If, on the other hand, the disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments is not of a temporary nature and due 
to unexpected temporary fluctuations in export earnings,
Ithen there must be some attempts to correct it, especially 
if it is of a deficit nature. Obviously the necessary 
condition for attempting any corrective measure is that 
the country in question must have given adequate weight to 
the considerations relevant to the balance of payments.
In consideration of the range of policy possibili­
ties that a country can resort to for the sake of balance 
of payment adjustment, the following points are signifi­
cant :
1. The ability of a country to resort to corrective 
measures in its balance of payments depends on the range
of policies open to it; the wider this range, the better 
it will be able to adjust by maintaining or quickly 
restoring external balance while at the same time avoiding 
undue contraction, stagnation, or unemployment.
2. Today, fiscal and monetary policies show them­
selves as desirable tools of adjustment in balance of 
payment. The classical medicine of adjustment is that
^Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations, 
op. cit., p. 11.
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"deficit countries should apply fiscal and monetary 
restraint in order to remove their deficits, and that sur­
plus countries should undertake fiscal and monetary expan­
sion in order to eliminate their surpluses."^
3. With respect to the use of fiscal and monetary 
policies one must take the following points into account :
a. Since in modern economies at least some 
costs and prices are rigid in a downward direction, inter­
national adjustment in terms of costs, prices, and incomes 
should, if possible, take the form of increases in produc­
tivity more than proportionate to the increase in costs and 
prices.
b. In addition to fiscal and monetary policies 
which would be on a domestic basis, there are opportunities 
for countries to try to adjust to a disequilibrium through 
international cooperation if adequate liquidity is lacking, 
e.g. through unilateral tariff reductions by the surplus 
country, advance debt repayment arrangements, etc.
c. If disequilibrium, is caused_by capital move­
ments, which may well be speculative in nature, arrange­
ments may be made to curb such movements through interna­
tional cooperation of monetary policies by harmonizing the 
rate of interest, percentage of tax on investment, etc.
^Arthur Smithies, "The Balance of Payment and 
Classical Medicine," in Finn B. Jensen and Ingo Walter, 
Readings in International Economic Relations (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 19&6), p^ 126.
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d. Finally one may pay attention to the assertion
of J. M. Keynes who wrote :
I do not suppose that the classical medicine will work 
by itself or that we can depend on it. We need quicker 
and less painful aids of which exchange variation and 
overall import control are the most important. But in 
the long run these expedients will work better and we 
shall need them less, if the classical medicine is 
also at work.l
4. If the disequilibrium is very serious, the 
country can--with the permission of the IMF, if it is a 
member of the Fund--resort to changing its rate of exchange 
and restrictive controls. This is not, of course, pre­
cluded by the par value. But devaluation should only be 
resorted to if no other effective course of action is 
available, and especially if the barriers to the effective 
use of fiscal and monetary policies are insurmountable.
Also to rely on restrictive controls is hazardous in that 
it may bring retaliatory actions from others. Therefore 
reliance on restrictive measures and/or devaluation should 
rather be used as a last resort.
5. A proper use of policies . . . should make it 
possible to correct and reverse balance of payments 
disequilibria within a reasonably short period, with­
out prolonged unemployment or stagnation in deficit 
countries or undue inflationary pressures on surplus 
countries. It is appropriate that the payments gap 
during this period of adjustment should be bridged by 
the use of international liquidity.^
^J. M. Keynes, "The Balance of Payments of the 
United States," Economic Journal, LVI, No. 222 (June, 1946),
p. 171.
21964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 28.
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6. It must not be forgotten, however, that if a 
country is too liberally supplied with international 
reserves, this may postpone its adjustment to a probable 
fundamental disequilibrium and may perhaps affect its 
eventual adjustment, thus making this adjustment more 
difficult. On the other hand, abundant international 
reserves insure that the country does not have to adjust 
to the disequilibrium through trade and exchange restric­
tions, deflation, exchange rate adjustments, etc. Thus 
adequate international reserves would enable a country to 
incur temporary disequilibrium in its balance of payments 
while holding its exchange rate steady. In view of the 
fact that today countries would not want to allow a drop 
in their income and employment, exchange rate adjustments 
are ruled out and imposition of direct controls is frowned 
upon.
Performance of the System
How well is the international monetary system func­
tioning? This seems to be a controversial question to 
which different authors have given different answers. And 
in most cases, their answers are based on--or biased by-- 
their value judgments.
One group holds that the gold exchange standard 
is basically sound, and it can be improved either with the 
adoption of the additional key currencies or with con­
tinuing increase of dollar and sterling reserves. Advocates
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of this group have sometimes asserted that mutual coopera­
tion and assistance among central banks, or reserve crea­
tion with overdraft facilities available to deficit 
countries, and reserve creation by the world central banks 
can also improve the system.
Opponents of such views assert that a system based 
on a fixed price of gold is basically vulnerable in that 
this fixed price has not facilitated increasing amounts of 
gold for the world trade, and that dollar and pound availa­
bility depends upon U.S. and U.K. willingness to accept 
deficits. Among this group, some go as far as suggesting 
an abolition of the gold-exchange standard. Exactly what 
type of a system should substitute a future gold-exchange 
standard is something on which there is no agreement.
The range of agreement is so narrow that it is 
difficult to arrive at specific conclusions regarding the 
performance of the system. The key parameters, however, 
are adequacy or inadequacy of the growth of monetary 
reserves, the change in the gold-holding position of 
different countries, the adjustability of the system, the 
concern of underdeveloped countries, and the vulnerability 
of the system. Each of these parameters will be briefly 
analyzed in an attempt to look at the performance of the 
system.
Adequacy of the System
With respect to gold. Asserting that gold production
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has not kept pace with the growing needs of world trade 
and other international transactions, Professor A. Hansen 
speaks of several measures which have been taken to econo­
mize on gold.
Gold coin was withdrawn from circulation. Gold was 
freed for international use by reducing the gold cover 
for domestic currencies. And finally, countries were 
encouraged (Genoa Conference of 1922) to keep a part 
of their international reserves in the form of foreign 
exchange, specifically in liquid dollar and sterling 
holdings.1
The same point is supported by Ian Shannon when he says :
"Many countries responded to the need to increase their
own international reserves by withdrawing gold from internal 
2circulation." He goes on to cite International Currency 
Experience of the League of Nations as an evidence of his 
assertion and holds that between 1913 and 1925 no less 
than $2.7 billion worth of gold was released for interna-
3tional purposes by this technique. One can be convinced 
that the growth of the rate of gold production has not 
been adequate, otherwise such measures of gold economizing 
would not have been needed logically. Furthermore, 
increasing reliance has been placed on dollars and pounds.
With respect to reserves: The question of adequacy
--or supposed inadequacy--of reserves is subject to more 
controversy. On the one hand, one is facing the conviction
^Hansen, op. cit., p. 57.
2Shannon, op. cit., p. 20.
^Ibid.
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of the ministers and governors of the Group of Ten who 
hold that:
As concerns liquidity, the ministers and governors are 
agreed that, for the international monetary system as 
a whole, supplies of gold and reserve currencies are 
fully adequate for the present and are likely to be 
for the immediate future.̂
They have further added, at a later point, that "in view 
of the adequacy of the supplies of gold and reserve curren­
cies in the present and in the near future, there is no
immediate need to reach a decision as to the introduction
2of a new type of reserve asset." This Group finally con­
cludes that studies can therefore be pursued without undue
3haste. It can, however, be clearly seen that the group
is not as sure as it sounds when they say: "But, having
recognized the uncertainties concerning the future supplies
of monetary reserves, we agreed that such studies are timely
4and should be put in hand without delay."
On the other hand, another group believes that 
reserves are inadequate. "It has been contended, for
^Group of Ten, Ministerial Statement of The Group 
of Ten and Annex prepared by Deputies (10th August, 19^4), 
p. 1. This Statement is issued by M. Valery Giscard 
D'Bstaing (Ministre des Finances et des Affaires Economiques 
of France) acting as chairman of the Ministers and Governors 
of the Group of Ten Countries. For short, this Statement 





example by Sir Roy Harrod, that reserves have grown too
slowly during the last ten or twelve y e a r s . A  group of
UN experts undertook an analysis of this subject, and came
to the conclusion that the total stocks of international
2reserves were inadequate!
It is not a simple task to try to compromise these 
opposing views. As Robert Roosa has rightly mentioned, 
there are contradictory motives for reform in the inter­
national monetary system. On the one hand, "less developed 
countries, who believe that liquidity is far too small to 
permit adequate expansion of their own economies and of
3the flows of world trade and capital," would favor the 
idea of enlarging the capacity for liquidity creation. On 
the other hand, "some of the critics, and these have been 
mainly from surplus countries recently undergoing infla­
tionary pressure, have felt that a reserve currency system
4by its nature necessarily generates too much liquidity."
Financial problems of underdeveloped countries 
should not be confused with the problem of the inter­
national monetary system. This phase of the subject will 
be analyzed in a later section. For the moment, however.
M̂achlupr. op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
2Ibid., p. l6 .
ORoosa, op. cit., p. 42. 
^Ibid., p. 41.
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one can share the opinion of the Group of Ten as it
appeared in a later study of July, 1966: " . . .  we have
come to the conclusion that the supply of reserves from
traditional sources--gold and reserve currencies--is
unlikely to keep pace with legitimate demands, at any
rate in the long run."^ The words of this quotation can
be accurately checked against the words "fully adequate"
in their previous assertion as quoted on page 50 above.
It seems that the Group, after a more careful analysis of
the question of adequacy, has found more reasons to be
convinced that the problem, if not attacked, may remain
unsolved in the long run. This assertion is further
supplemented with the following comment: "Most of us are
agreed that, although the precise moment for deliberate
reserve creation is not clearly discernible at present,
it would be prudent to begin preparing for such a contin-
gency now." On another occasion, the report mentions
specifically that :
. . . In the longer run some understanding with regard
to the composition of reserves would become necessary 
in any case in order to adjust reserve policies to the 
declining share of gold in total reserves which will 
inevitably come about.3
Change in Gold-holding Position of Selected Countries.
Attention may now be focused on some of the practical




results of the operation of the system. Table 4 shows, 
judging on the basis of 1953 and 1964 comparisons, that 
industrial countries can be divided into three groups :
First there are the countries like France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan whose international liquidity positions 
have improved in terms of both gold and foreign exchange 
holdings.
Second there are countries like the U.S. and the 
U.K. (the key currency countries) who have lost part of 
their gold reserves.
Third are countries like Sweden and the Netherlands 
whose positions of gold holding and exchange reserves have 
gone in different directions between 1953-1964. To what 
extent these types of changes can be tolerated by different 
countries depends on how they look at it. Some countries 
have shown increasing reluctance to hold on to their 
dollars.^ Others, like the U.S., have become more con­
cerned with their balance of payments, and its deficit has 
become a cause of anxiety and concern to the government 
and the public.
The U.S. gold stock fell 28 percent (only) between 
December, 1957, and June, I962. These events have 
revealed the vulnerability of an international 
monetary system that depends upon international 
reserves held largely in national currencies and 
that is anchored by the link between gold and the 
dollar. It has become evident that a flight of funds
^France is a striking example from this standpoint; 
See The French Position in Chapter VI below.
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TABLE 4
INTERNATIONAL GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
HOLDINGS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(End of Period: Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Country
Gold Foreign Exchange
1953 1964 1953 1964
United States 22091 15471 --- 432
United Kingdom 2263 2136 283 179
France 617 3729 212 1376
Belgium 776 1451 312 540
Netherlands 737 1688 426 396
Switzerland 1458 2725 310 398
Germany 325 4248 l4ll 2721
Italy 346 2107 422 1571
Sweden 219 189 315 688
Canada 986 1026 84i 1658
Japan 18 290* 874 1496*
Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics 5 vol. I8
no. 5 (Washington, D. C., May 1965), pp. I6-I7.
For the third quarter
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from the dollar could force the United States to 
suspend gold sales, devalue the dollar, impose exchange 
controls, or adopt some other unpalatable alternative.1
Adjustability of the System
During recent years it has become necessary on
certain occasions to extend the amount of international
monetary cooperation. In addition to the help of the IMF
2in removing certain pressures from specific currencies, 
there have been a number of swap agreements (a network of 
reciprocal credit arrangements between the U.S. authori­
ties and the monetary authorities of a number of other 
countries), and General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB).
The spring of 196I saw an upward revaluation by 
slightly less than five per cent in the Netherlands guilder 
and the West German mark. This revaluation, coupled with 
expectation of further revaluations, created some concern 
over possible depreciation of other currencies such as the 
British pound, especially in view of its weak balance of 
payments position.
The run on sterling was stemmed, and then reversed, 
by the quick and effective support given to it, first 
by a number of European Central Banks which extended 
more than $900 million short-term credits to the
See James G. Ingram's article: "A Proposal for
Financial Integration in the Atlantic Community" in U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Factors Affecting the 
United States Balance of Payments, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
(Washington, dT C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962)
p. 177.
2e.g., in 1961 for pound sterling as the next 
paragraph explains.
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British government, and secondly by massive assistance 
from the IMF.^
The above example as well as the existence of GAB 
and other mutual agreements between central bankers shows 
that the system has been somewhat responsive to the pres­
sures of time. But even if the system has been adjustable 
in the past, it would not necessarily have this feature in 
the future. Taking the long run aspects of world prosperity 
and the international monetary system into account, one 
comes to believe that the problem should not be left 
unsolved and that it would be to the benefit of the world 
if economists would decide to attack it.
So far it has been established that:
1. Dollars and pounds would become available to 
the world in the final analysis, only to the extent that 
the U.S. and U.K. stand ready to continue their deficits 
and/or other countries are ready to accept them.
2. The supply of gold, at the current fixed price,
has not increased rapidly enough to keep pace with the
needs of world trade, and in the words of Robert Triffin
"Inadequate gold supplies are supplemented, in such a
system, by a growing accumulation of national key currencies
2as international reserves."
3. The role of key currency has put responsibilities
^Snider, op. cit., p. 497»
^Triffin, op. cit., p. 145.
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on the U.S. and U.K. to preserve the value of their curren­
cies and has also made them responsible as world bankers.
4. At the same time, some countries, such as 
France, do not feel easy at allowing the U.S. to decide 
the world's need for liquidity on its own initiative alone 
on envious grounds. France wishes to become the world 
central banker and is the chief opponent of the U.S. in 
the international monetary affairs, and as such fears the 
possibility of over-expansion of dollars.
5. There is another aspect to the problem: that 
is the concern of the underdeveloped countries with the 
world's liquidity. This will be taken up next.
The Concern of Underdeveloped Countries
A. Hansen and many other economists have held that 
"the very survival of the free world requires a degree of 
international cooperation that transcends a strictly busi­
ness calculus."^ It is also widely accepted that these 
countries desperately need capital with which to grow. 
However, their monetary and financial problems are different 
from those of advanced countries in that they are more a 
result of a structural capital shortage, rather than lack 
of adequate international liquidity. True, their interests 
and concern "are linked in a trading world which requires 
an international medium of exchange and international
^Hansen, op. cit., pp. 264-2Ô5»
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institutions designed to promote world wide trade and 
finance,'*^ but it would be safe to assume that whether or 
not they possess adequate international liquidity would 
depend much on the structure of the individual economy and 
is more deeply rooted in the underdeveloped nature of the 
economies.
It should not be denied that the well-being of 
underdeveloped countries, at least partially, depends on 
how well the international monetary system functions; 
obviously the better the system functions, the more they 
may take advantage of it, and the easier it becomes for 
them to fulfill their international payments obligations.
In this respect, a group of underdeveloped countries
has stated deep interest in international liquidity and
believe that there is a need for urgent action in the field
2of international monetary policy. These countries offered
the following arguments to demonstrate that they have "very
real liquidity problems:"
Wide fluctuations in the export earnings of developing 
countries. . . .
Relatively minor events such as a small error in fore­
casting the balance of payments, or an unforeseen 
bunching of imports, or congestion in the docks, or 
port strikes. . . .
^Ibid., p. 264.
2United Nations, Committee on Invisibles and 
Financing Related to Trade, Memorandum on International 
Liquidity submitted by Argentina, Brazil and 21 other 
developing countries to the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development on its special session January 27-Pebruary 4, 
1966, Geneva, Supplement No. 4, pp. 7-10.
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Economie growth of these countries . . .  would 
naturally increase their need for liquidity.
The large variations to which domestic food production 
is subject in these countries also call for additional 
amounts of short-term finance.
Quite often these countries have "humps" in their 
external debt service obligations, which also can be 
dealt with effectively with a larger cushion of 
reserves.
The intensive investment programmes in these countries 
often result in the creation of productive capacity 
which, at some stage or other, outruns the domestic 
supplies of raw materials and intermediaries. The 
developing country concerned then has to choose between 
operating at less than optimum capacity, with adverse 
effects on costs and on the international competitive 
position of its exports of manufactur, and importing 
residual requirements. Yet, owing to the inadequacy 
of reserves, such imports are often impossible... . .
In some cases, even short-term and relatively small 
capital outflows generated by speculative factors, 
etc. tend to upset the balances of payments of devel­
oping countries in much the same way as in the case of 
developed countries. . . .^
Yet one could safely assert that the problems of 
capital shortage, lack of technical know-how, inadequate 
training of human resources, as well as other problems of 
such countries would have to be attacked from "within" 
these countries; and that even if the international liquidity 
were adequate, it could only facilitate their growth, 
rather than solving these problems structurally. For these 
reasons it should be contended that the problems of capital 
shortage in underdeveloped countries, even though closely 




In view of the above analysis, one can assert that 
the international monetary system is, and has been, vul­
nerable in that gold production is not sufficient for the 
growing needs of world trade, that a key currency becomes 
available as international money only to the extent that 
the key currency countries incur a balance-of-payments 
deficit, and that the growth of international reserves has 
not kept pace with the growth of international trade. • 
There are, of course, other objections to the use of 
national currencies as international money, to the possi­
bility of danger of collapse of the international monetary 
system (if those holding a key currency decide to withdraw 
large amounts from the key currency countries), and to the 
mechanism of balance of payments adjustments.
CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In order to build a foundation upon which to base 
the support of any particular program, one has to analyze 
carefully the contents of different proposals, and famil­
iarize himself with their pros and cons. Such analysis 
could then be utilized for subjective judgement concerning 
their value.
To cope with the problem of the international 
monetary system a number of plans have been propounded. 
Each of these proposals is frequently associated with the 
name of one or more economists, e.g., the Bernstein Plan, 
the Posthuma Plan, the Zolotas Plan, etc. From the stand­
point of substance one may classify these proposals into 
three general groups: 1) raising the price of gold,
2) accepting freely flexible exchange rates, 3) increasing 
international understanding and/or cooperation either in 
the form of creating new powers for the IMF, IBRD, or in 
the form of creating other international agencies which 
could create international money. It is the purpose of 




A Change in the Price of Gold
A number of economists, such as Sir Roy Harrod,
hold that because the price of gold was fixed at $35 an 
ounce after 1934, and because of the increase in costs of 
gold production, it is not always profitable for gold 
miners to increase their production. At the same time 
they assert that the problem of inadequate liquidity can­
not be solved by insisting on too low a level of gold 
production. The solution they have brought forward would, 
according to their line of reasoning, be a revaluation of 
gold, thus making more international liquidity possible.
The results of an upward revaluation of gold, 
according to its proponents are an increase in the annual
additions to the gold stock and the up-valuing of existing
stocks of gold in the reserves of each country. The two 
effects together, proponents of this set of solutions 
assert, would facilitate international liquidity so Ibng 
as the system relies on gold. More specifically, Machlup 
presents their arguments in the following manner:
If for example, the price of gold is doubled, an ounce 
of gold will be worth $70 rather than $35 and, as long 
as money supply, commodity prices, and trade volume 
have not yet increased, the ratio between the monetary 
gold stock and all those magnitudes with which it is 
usually compared will be doubled too. There may also 
be an increase in the annual increments to the gold 
stocks of the free world through new gold production 
(and perhaps also through sales from the stocks of 
U.S.S.R. and other holders of gold). Without any 
physical increase in the annual supply of gold, the 
annual increase in terms of dollar or other curren­
cies would be twice as high as now; with a physical
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increase in gold production, its money value would be 
higher still (and the same is true for sales from 
Russia and from non-monetary gold stock). Assuming, 
for example (though it is not likely), that a doubling 
of the price were to cause a 50 per cent increase in 
the physical quantity of gold supplied, the money value 
of the quantity annually supplied would increase by 
200 per cent, which would mean a tripling of the value 
of the annual increment to the gold reserves of the 
free world.^
As can be seen from the manner in which the argu­
ment is presented, the expected results of an increase in 
the price of gold depend on a conditional assumption: "as
long as money supply, commodity prices, and trade volume
2have not yet increased"; this may not always be true.
The question is, of course, the abstract nature and validity 
of such assumptions, of which no one can safely be sure.
Furthermore, there are a number of other serious 
objections to such proposals:
1) Since gold is not divided fairly among different coun­
tries, those who have more of it, such as the U.S., may 
benefit more than those who do not. This may widen the 
already unequal distribution of gold possession in the 
world. Moreover, since natural gold deposits are not 
equally distributed over the world, then from the stand­
point of production certain areas such as South Africa and
^Machlup, ■’’Plans for Reform . . . ," op. cit. , p. 62 
(underlines not in the original).
2See Don Patinkin, Money, Interest and Prices (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), especially
chapters 3 through 9*
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Russia^ which have richer natural reserves may benefit 
more from gold revaluation. Besides, the ratio of gold 
to the total international media of payments of each 
country varies; thus countries holding part of their 
reserves in the form of foreign exchange may have to suffer 
a capital loss. Theoretically, of course, they might be 
compensated, but whether or not and how this compensation 
would be effected remain open questions.
2) A more serious objection may be read from the following 
lines :
Nobody could ever have conceived of a more absurd 
waste of human resources than to dig gold in distant 
corners of the earth for the sole purpose of trans­
porting it and reburying it immediately afterward in 
other deep holes, especially excavated to receive it 
and heavily guarded to protect it.^
In a more recent âtudy Miroslav A. Kriz states his opinion,
which seems acceptable, in the following words:
Returning to the price of gold, I will restate two 
objections to a gold price rise that I continue to 
consider valid.
^U.S.S.R. gold holdings are estimated at possible 
$7 billion or more, and U.S.S.R. gold production in 1957 
at about 600 million dollars, nearly equal to that of 
South Africa, and four times as large as that of the next 
largest gold producing country, Canada. See Oscar L. 
Altman, "A Note on Gold Production and Additions to Inter­
national Gold Reserves," IMF Staff Papers (Washington,
D. C., April 1958), p. 282.
2Robert Triffin, "Tomorrow's Convertibility: Aims
and Means of International Monetary Policy," in Banca 
Nazionale Del Lavoro, Quarterly Review, No. 49 (June,
1959)1 p. 142; reprinted in Snider, op. cit. , p. 51^*
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The first is that a gold appreciation . . . would 
bring about a sudden surge in the purchasing power of 
current gold output and accumulated reserves. . . .  
Furthermore, a gold-price rise might mistakenly be 
regarded as a substitute for the effective measures 
that nations will have to take to deal with the mani­
fold issues of international trade and investment of 
the late igSO's. The fundamental task the world is 
facing is to promote economic growth, productivity, 
and viability within a broad framework of economic 
and financial freedom. The world could deceive itself 
in thinking that a gold appreciation could, in some 
undefinable but automatic way, solve these funda­
mental problems.!
He goes on to say: "The second objection is that a gold-
price rise would add fuel to world-wide fires of infla­
tion. . . . "
3) The idea of a rise in gold price is also regarded by
some to be a negation of what gold fundamentally stands
for: a safeguard against clearly excessive discretionary
2powers of governments.
k) Assuming the desirability of raising the price of gold, 
the levels to which it should be raised cannot be left an 
open question: there must be econometric studies to see
exactly how much it should be raised and whether it should 
be a gradual increase. Even if the idea of maintenance 
of the gold price at its 1934 level imposes a handicap on 
the international monetary system, it must not be forgotten 
that this fixed gold price is what has made gold a point 
of reference for national currencies. Besides, it should
^Kriz, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
^Ibid., p. 29.
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not be forgotten that even if one admits that a fixed 
price of gold does impose limitations on the international 
monetary system, one cannot be convinced that an increase 
in the price of gold is the only way to cope with the 
problem.
5) If the price of gold were raised, gold hoarders would 
be "rewarded" for their actions. This may, in turn, 
psychologically prepare them to expect further revaluations 
and engage in further hoardings which could very well be a 
destablizing factor.
6) If countries who benefit from an increase in the price 
of gold are going to compensate other countries who have 
suffered losses, there arises a complicated question of 
how much of the profit obtained by the sudden rise in 
gold's price ought to be given to countries adversely 
affected by the rise in price.
7) "At. the fixed $35 price in terms of gold, the dollar 
has itself become a tradition. Much of the confidence now 
gained by many other currencies throughout the world is, 
in turn, rooted in that tradition."^
8) Furthermore, as Roosa has rightly added, it is not
quite a simple matter to neglect the obligations that the
United States has accepted:
One (such obligation) is that the United States, by 
virtue of its immense size within the trading markets
^Roosa, op. cit., p. I8 .
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of the world, cannot for the forseeable future expect 
to be able to exercise an independent Judgement in 
determining its own exchange rate vis-a-vis the rest 
of the world. Any attempt to devalue the dollar by 
writing up the price of gold would assuredly be 
matched, within hours, by comparable and offsetting 
action on the part of virtually every other country.
The United States would be foreclosed by its size, if 
it were not already prevented by its committed obliga­
tions, from unilateral devaluation. Thus unable to 
change its parity against other countries, the United 
States would find that all that would remain from an 
increase in the price of gold would be the indicated 
profit from the markup on whatever was the stock of 
gold held by the United States at the time. . . . 
Moreover, the strength of the assurance provided for 
the world monetary system by the continuance of the 
United States selling price would also be undermined 
if our bid were lowered or withdrawn. . . .  One final 
reason for maintaining the existing position of the 
United States in buying and selling gold at the $35 
price is the reinforcement that this gives to the con­
tinued role fulfilled by the United States as principal 
banker for the world. . .
9) Finally, an increase in the price of gold is the same
2thing as a devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold.
For a variety of objective and subjective reasons, the
3U.S. is unwilling to devalue the dollar. It is argued 
that a change in the price of gold would make the present 
system more vulnerable. True, the U.S. dollar originally 
owed its value to the economic strength of the U.S. and to 
the guarantee of redemption in a fixed quantity of gold; 
some economists today, however, argue "gold is valuable
^Ibid., p. l8 and p. 21.
2Abba P. Lerner, "Let's Get Rid of our Cross of 
Gold" in Jensen and Walter, Readings in International 
Economic Relations, op. cit., p. 217.
^See Ibid., p. 2l8 .
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because it can be exchanged for dollars rather than the 
other way around."^
In view of the disadvantages mentioned above, the 
arguments for an upward increase in the price of gold--or 
stated differently, a devaluation of dollars--do not seem 
convincing.
Flexible Exchange Rates 
Another set of proposals for the reform of the 
international monetary system can be categorized as the 
acceptance of flexible exchange rates. It would seem 
advisable to take up the pros and cons of this type of 
argument. Attention will therefore be focused first on 
the proposed advantages then on the disadvantages of a 
flexible exchange rate system, and finally an evaluation 
will be made of the arguments.
Advocates of a system of flexible exchange rates 
maintain that it has the following advantages:
1) If such a system were allowed, the need for interna­
tional monetary reserves would be avoided, because, so the 
argument runs, alert traders will provide adequate facili­
ties for the hedging of risks of exchange rate changes 
through their constructive speculation. It is further 
asserted that when exchange rates are free to vary, this 
would mean that "as any one country's external performance
^Ibid., p. 218.
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slips behind that of most other countries, its exchange
rate also begins to slip, giving a clear signal of the
need for corrective action without the need to pay out
reserves."^ George Halm further asserts in connection with
this subject that "assuming insufficient coordination of
national economic policies and a shortage of international
reserves, we are forced to abandon fixed rates of exchange
2in favor of a more flexible system." Arguments in favor 
of the proposal also state that so long as rates of 
exchange are not fixed, they will not move very much: 
"instead they will steady out at the true relationship 
determined by markets, which are always wiser than bureau­
crats.
2) Advocates of this argument further believe a flexible
rather than fixed rate of exchange would be more consistent
with the principles of a market economy. This group would,
therefore, like to accept market forces for exchange rate
determination in many Western countries for determining
the price of many commodities. When a flexible exchange
rate system is used,
instead of allowing reserves to fluctuate and so fill 
the gap left from movements between a short-fall or
^See R. Roosa, op. cit., p. 2?.
2George Halm, "Fixed or Flexible Exchange Rates?" 
in Factors Affecting the United States Balance of Payments, 
op. cit. , p. 259.
oRoosa, op. cit., p. 26. At this point Roosa is 
stating the arguments of the advocates of flexible exchange rate.
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excess in the balance of payments, the exchange rate 
may instead fluctuate to equate, or attempt to equate 
the supply and demand for foreign currencies.^
3) Under favorable conditions, so the argument runs, adjust­
ments can take place without forcing major internal price
or income changes which are not always acceptable as a
2means of correcting the balance of payments disequilibrium.
4) It should be noted here that a flexible exchange rate
system is close to a freely fluctuating in that it allows
the maintenance of an essentially free market; it differs,
however, from a freely fluctuating rate system in that it
involves "conscious intervention in the exchange market"
by a stabilization fund or monetary authorities for the
purpose of influencing the rate. Triffin asserts,
a hard core of validity in the theory of flexible 
exchange rates is that exchange rate readjustment to 
realistic levels is preferable to vain and costly 
attempts to preserve unrealistic exchange levels through 
persistent reserve losses, foreign borrowings, or trade 
and exchange restrictions.3
It is interesting to note that Triffin speaks of gold
revaluation and flexible exchange rates under a title of
"two false solutions" for reform of the international
^Shannon, op. cit., p. 6l.
2Two examples can be cited: a) the U.S. did not
want to deflate its domestic incomes, prices and costs in 
order to correct the deficit in its balance of payments 
in the first 10 years after the war. b) Germany did not 
inflate— the rules of the gold standard— domestically in 
order to get rid of its 1957-1961 surplus. See Meade's 
plan in the other chapter.
^Triffin, op. cit., p. 85*
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monetary system; yet he does accept the above advantage as 
a "hard core of validity."^
5) The flexible exchange rate is further defended by some
economists on the ground that,
it would keep the exchange rate continuously near the 
equilibrium level, would shoulder a substantial part 
of the adjustment burden, would make it unnecessary 
to manipulate interest rates predominantly on the basis 
of balance of payments considerations, would permit 
to insulate the domestic economy against unwelcome 
effects of economic policies in other countries, and 
would greatly reduce the need for reserves of inter­
national liquidity.2
The idea of flexible exchange rates is strongly
3supported by what is known as the Chicago School approach ;
furthermore, from time to time, it has received support
4from other groups such as the Brookings Institution.
  , p. 85.
^Halm, op. cit., pp. 205-266.
3 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, "The Case for Flexible 
Exchange Rates," Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157-203 ; Frank D. 
Graham, "The Cause and Cure of 'Dollar Shortage,'" Essays 
in International Finance, No. 10 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1949); Gottfried Harberler, Currency 
Convertibility (Washington: American Enterprise Associa­
tion , 1954); James E. Meade, "The Future of International 
Trade and Payments," The Three Banks Review, No. 50> June, 
1961; W. M. Scammell, International Monetary Policy 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., I96I); Egon Sohmen,
Flexible Exchange Rates, Theory and Controversy (Chicago: 
Üniversity of Chicago Press, 1961); Charles R.Whittlesey, 
International Monetary Issues (New York: McGiraw-Hill Book
Co., 1937).
4The Institution's idea is to utilize both fixed 
and flexible parities. See: U.S., Congress, Joint Eco­
nomic Committee, Hearings, Outlook for the United States 
Balance of Payments, Byth Cong., 2d Sess., December 12-14, 
19b4, p. 258 ff.
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Yet, for reasons to be discussed below, the idea has never
been popular in politics and business. In this respect,
one can even go as far back as October 22, 1933, when
President Roosevelt announced in a radio broadcast:
Our dollar is not altogether too greatly influenced 
by the accidents of international trade, by the inter­
nal policies of other nations and by political dis­
turbances in other continents. Therefore the United 
States must take firmly in its own hands the control
of the gold value of our dollar. . . .  As a further
effective means to this end, I am going to establish 
a government market for gold in the United States.^
Even today many governments are reluctant to make even
occasional alterations in par values.
Against these advantages, one can cite the following 
disadvantages of a flexible exchange rate:
1) One weakness of a system of flexible exchange rates is
that "it can be misinterpreted as an invitation to the
national economic authorities to disregard the foreign
2payments implications of their domestic actions."
2) A system of flexible exchange rates is also criticized 
on the ground that it inevitably leads to a competitive 
exchange depreciation and/or conflicting stabilization fund 
policies. Furthermore, it may create additional risks 
which tend to discourage international trade.
3) A creditor would not want to lend to, or invest in, a
^Reprinted in Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin, November 1933,
p. 699.
26. Halm, "Fixed or Flexible Exchange Rates?", 
op. cit., p. 260.
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country whose currency is depreciating, and if a loan is 
expressed in units of a creditor's currency which is appre­
ciating, the borrowing country would find it hard to meet 
its obligations. Therefore, as far as long-term interna­
tional capital movements are concerned, one can safely 
hold that they would be seriously impeded if exchange rates 
were permitted to fluctuate.
4) One can further assert that a system of flexible exchange 
rates needs the control or supervision of an international 
agency, such as the IMF, which can see to it that the par­
ticipating members hold near-equilibrium. This ought to
be taken into consideration from the standpoint of its 
practicality.
5) George Halm holds that "other things remaining equal, 
the introduction of flexible exchange rate would greatly 
reduce the need for international reserves because price 
changes would maintain equality between supply and 
demand."^ This is not a convincing argument because not 
only do other things remain equal only under a ceteris 
paribus framework of analysis, but also price changes 
which in this context mean price of foreign exchange might 
not be sufficient enough--or even in the right direction-- 
at all times.
6) The rate of exchange--price of foreign currencies--
^Ibid., p. 260.
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plays the same role in the international economy as 
domestic money does at home. One of the features of money 
at a domestic level is that it should be acceptable, and a 
necessary-but not sufficient-condition for its accepta­
bility is that it must enjoy a relative degree of sta­
bility. Economic calculations of people and businessmen 
are often based on a seemingly firm degree of stability 
of money. The same might hold true in the international 
economy, and international money too should enjoy some 
degree of stability. Reference to stability and its 
desirability is stated in the IMF Agreement as it permits 
fluctuations of exchange rates within an agreed percentage 
of parity (lV-2). Exchange rate stability has also been 
favored by a number of economists. As one example,
J. M. Keynes held that ". . . it is this distance, which
protects the money market of one country from being upset 
by every puff of wind which blows in the money markets of 
other countries."^ Of course, rigid exchange rates can 
only be maintained if the national price and wage policies 
of the different countries "were sufficiently integrated 
to reduce divergent price trends to minor proportions."
But rigid exchange rates are obviously different from rela­
tively stable rates. Moreover, " . . .  actual disequilibria 
in the exchange markets are not exclusively related to
^John M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930), p. 325.
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disturbances in the international cost and price pattern."^
7) Last but not least, the arguments in favor of flexible 
exchange rates are partly based upon a reliance on "con­
structive speculation," and this is something of which one 
can not always be sure. Depending on whether or not it is 
thought that exchange rates are short and temporary, the
nature of speculation would vary, as expectations about
2future price movements would also vary.
What evaluation can be made with respect to the 
two sides of the argument? As mentioned in an earlier 
footnote, the advocates of a flexible exchange rate system 
form an impressive group. They all agree on the following 
two assertions:
a) Under a flexible exchange rate system the rate 
of exchange adjusts so as to keep demand equal to supply 
without any or only minimal sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange by officials.
b) This automatic adjustment occurs without trau­
matic disturbances in domestic commerce, prices, and income 
policies. Thus a flexible exchange rate system would add, 
according to the advocates of this system, to the gold- 
exchange standard the advantage of divorcing domestic 
policy from direct influence of the balance of payments
^Triffin, op. cit., p. 82. 
^Snider, op. cit., pp. l84-l87.
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and reduce the need for depleting gold reserves.
Under the present system exchange rates may vary 
within one per cent on each side of the par value of each 
currency belonging to a Fund's member without the Fund's 
consent (and by more than that with the Fund's approval).
In practice, however, many countries do not allow their 
exchange rates to vary to the full amount of one per cent 
on either side of the par but usually keep the spot rate 
within three-quarters of one per cent of par value.
Apart from the two assertions mentioned above on 
which supporters of flexible exchange rate generally agree, 
the range of agreement among advocates of flexible exchange 
rate varies. Two proposals made by such advocates deserve 
special attention. They will be referred to as the "Band 
Proposal," and "Bloc Flexibility." The former refers to 
flexible exchange rates within wider limits than the present 
one per cent on each side of the par; the latter involves 
fixed exchange rates within a group of countries but 
flexible rates between groups of countries in the world.
The latter is, in fact, a combination of flexible and 
fixed exchange rates based on geographical divisions-- 
geographical lines being determined by historical as well 
as economic criteria.
Band Proposal. The idea of the band proposal 
simply tries to widen the range within which the rates of 
exchange can fluctuate. The whole philosophy behind it is
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that if the present one per cent change around the par 
were to be widened, the need to utilize reserves of gold 
might be eliminated. Thus exchange rates would, in actu­
ality, make part of the adjustment needed for the func­
tioning of the present international monetary system. The 
band proposal is not completely new as it parallels a 
widening of the gold export-import points under the gold 
standard.
A number of economists such as George Halm, Peter
B. Kenn, and Philip Bell have suggested a widening of the 
existing two per cent band under the IMF system in their 
testimony before the U.S. Joint Economic Committee.^ Other 
economists, e.g., James Meade, whose proposal is discussed 
in the following chapter, have also written on this view. 
Even the U.S. Congress, although not recommending the 
adoption of a band proposal, has specified that the admin­
istration should undertake to consider carefully the advan-
2tages and disadvantages of a band proposal.
Admittedly, the band proposal may be looked upon 
as a compromise between those who desire to continue with 
the present relative fixed rates and advocates of flexible 
rates. It offers a substitute for the adjustable peg,
^Outlook for the United States Balance of Payments, 
op. cit., pp. 127, i43, and 181.
^See "A Semi-Official View on Reform" in Chapter V
below.
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within the limits accepted, without completely giving up 
the center of the band, namely, the concept of the peg.
In addition to the gain in balance of payments 
adjustments and the reduction of the need to use reserves, 
advocates of the band proposal tend to think that the 
status quo can be maintained with minor amendments without 
introducing radical change or perfectly new schemes. To 
put the band proposal into practical operation, each 
central bank would undertake to allow its money to fluc­
tuate within the band, e.g., within 5 to 7 per cent around 
the par value, and it would further support its currency 
within this range. Band advocates also add to their argu­
ment that as the world becomes more integrated, the band 
could be theoretically narrowed and eventually eliminated.
The band proposal is not as radical as complete 
rate flexibility; it recognizes the significance of a "peg." 
On the surface this plan appears interesting. Yet, what 
its actual effects would be on the volume of international 
trade and investment remains an open issue; perhaps some 
econometric study should be conducted to measure quantita­
tively the effects of a band proposal on trade and invest­
ment. Moreover, opponents refer to the fact that the wider 
the range of the band, the riskier the involvements in 
international trade and investments.
Bloc Flexibility. The idea of bloc flexibility, 
or what is sometimes referred to as "currency groupings,"
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is based on currency blocs which would include countries 
with close cultural, trade and capital ties. The basic 
theory resembles a customs union in that there is a fixed 
exchange rate within a relatively homogeneous group of 
countries accompanied by flexible exchange rates among 
heterogeneous groups. Advocates of this system claimed 
it would provide an optimum means of maximizing economic 
welfare and reducing problems of balance of payments.^
Some have gone one step further by trying to derive opera­
tional criteria in order to set the limits of the currency 
2blocs.
Advocates of currency groupings argue that the 
problem of risk introduction in international trade and 
investments would be magnified as a fixed rate of exchange 
will be established between countries in one currency bloc. 
Furthermore, the participant countries would not be ham­
pered by barriers and difficulties on their economic policy 
coordinations. Yet balance of payments problems between 
blocs could not disturb the functioning of the interna­
tional monetary system since a flexible rate would be 
accepted between currency blocs. In short, what exists is 
a mixture of fixed and flexible exchange rates based,
^R. A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” 
American Economic Review, vol. $1, September I96I, pp. 65?-
2McKinnon, "Optimum World Monetary Arrangements 
and the Dual Currency System," in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly;Review, December 1963, pp. 376-96.
8o
however, on foreign trade ties rather than on national 
boundaries.
The arguments in favor of a flexible exchange rate 
system in the above form resemble the proposals for finan­
cial integration developed by other economists.^ If the 
idea of bloc flexibility were accepted, theoretically at 
least three "blocs" or "areas" would likely evolve under 
present world circumstances. The western hemisphere is 
likely to remain tied to the dollar. The Common Market 
countries could become one currency area in Continental 
Europe. The outcome for England is not so clear as it 
depends on whether Britain were accepted in the Common 
Market or not. Assuming that Great Britain were not 
accepted to the Market, the British might remain in their 
own sterling area, join the dollar, or even, at a later 
point, be forced to join the European Currency area.
This argument has more appeal to the policy makers 
than a complete flexible exchange rate, as it approaches 
the reality of the world closer.
In the years following World War II problems of 
imbalance in international payments were widespread 
and exchange control was rampant and discriminatory. 
Imbalances in one country's accounts provoked 
imbalances in those of others. Thus, some Latin 
American countries experienced payment difficulties 
not because their over-all accounts were in deficit 
but because their deficits were with the U.S. and
^See footnote 1 on p. 55 above.
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needed to be met in dollars, and their surpluses were 
in currencies which the debtor country would not con­
vert .
The proposal also has an advantage in that, if accepted, 
it can reduce or prevent the unpleasant and distasteful 
policy actions that a deficit country may have to accept 
under pressure of circumstances. The basic flaw in the 
argument, however, is that the system is not perfectly 
flexible but realizes the need for the reduction of risk 
elements through a pegged rate. Whether one likes a 
flexible exchange rate even between "currency areas" 
rather than between all countries remains an open issue; 
most practical economists prefer not to discuss it because 
of the disadvantages that a flexible exchange rate would 
have in general.
Thus flexible exchange rates systems despite their 
theoretical virtues do not appeal to the IMF, central 
bankers, businessmen, and, in short, to practical people. 
The reception that flexible exchange rate proposals have 
received can best be described as cool. Furthermore, 
proposals for reform of the international monetary system 
which have centered around flexibility of exchange rates 
have been practically dismissed as irrelevant in many inter­
national discussions. There is, moreover, much that
^Herbert B. Wooley, Measuring Transactions Between 
World Areas (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, I966), p. 79.
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remains debatable about how a flexible exchange rate system 
would operate in practice. Thus an attempt must be made 
to find out why this system has faced such a cool reception.
Apart from the basic economic disadvantages of a 
flexible exchange rate, there are a number of practical 
problems and operational complexities that are attached 
to such a system which would undoubtedly reduce its accepta­
bility.
First, the implications of the acceptance of a 
flexible exchange rate system is to allow different cur­
rencies to fluctuate vis-a-vis each other, theoretically, 
without limits. This would not only introduce elements of 
risk and uncertainty in some international transactions 
which might retard trade and capital movements but also 
would make the calculation of the cheapest way of making 
international payments a complicated or unacceptable pro­
cedure. Suppose, for example, that a flexible rate system 
is accepted by five countries: Japan, the U.S., France,
England, and Iraq. If the currency of each of these 
countries be designated by yen, dollars, franc, pound, and 
dinar, as they are in practice, then there would be a 
$/pound, a $/franc, a #/yen, a $/dinar rate in New York; 
a franc/pound, a franc/#, a franc/yen, a franc/dinar in 
Paris; a pound/#, a pound/franc, a pound/yen, a pound/dinar 
in London; a yen/#, a yen/pound, a yen/franc, a yen/dinar 
in Tokyo ; a dinar/#, a dinar/pound, a dinar/franc, a
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dinar/yen in Baghdad with which to contend. In addition, 
since the system involves a flexible rate, a trader or 
speculator in each of the above countries would have to 
take into account that the prevailing rates in his home 
country money centers do not necessarily hold in the money 
centers of the other countries. Moreover, for each cur­
rency "spot" rate, there could, and probably would, be 
one or more "forward" rates which must also be taken into 
account. With a cross-connection of the currencies like 
that of the above example, and with the possibility of 
each or all rates fluctuating against each other, the task 
of dealings in foreign exchange would become enormously 
complex and perhaps impractical. Of course, if the 
assumption of only five countries were relaxed and more 
countries be introduced the complexity of calculations 
would undoubtedly become magnified. Under the present 
system such a complexity does exist, but since the rates 
can change only within one per cent of the par on each 
side, the loss or gain produced by miscalculation is 
limited. This, of course, would not be the case if a 
flexible exchange rate were accepted. Moreover, in cur­
rent world transactions, because the dollar and the pound 
with a relatively fixed value are used as key currencies, 
each country uses their value as a unit of account ; there­
fore, a convenient device is provided for hedging at a 
lower cost.
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Second, should a system of flexible exchange rates 
be accepted and should the central bank officials engage 
in operations to smooth exchange rate movements, there is 
always a chance that the policies of two countries may 
either cancel each other out, or compound the amount of 
intervention. If this becomes the case, the advantage of 
"free forces of the market" that a flexible exchange rate 
is to provide over the present system would be doubtful.
Third, the scope of a country's involvement in a 
flexible exchange rate system is not only a function of 
its relative magnitude in international transactions but 
also can be affected by non-economic factors. For instance, 
pride and prestige might dictate that the United Kingdom 
and the United States have monies that would not depreciate 
vis-a-vis the currencies of others. Moreover, the impact 
of a flexible exchange rate system on a country depends on 
the degree to which the country in question depends on 
international trade for its economic welfare. The very 
fact that businessmen think a flexible exchange rate exists 
may introduce substantial additional risk and may disrupt 
their business decisions.
Fourth, the very existence of the idea of scarcity 
of international reserves in the present system poses 
monetary disciplines on some countries that may not there­
fore allow inflationary domestic monetary policies. If 
the situation were to be relaxed under a flexible system.
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these countries might feel free to pursue high employment 
and rapid growth policies without consideration for the 
effect of such policies on their domestic prices. As 
inflation spirals domestically, the external value of the 
currency spirals downward. This would mean that the price 
of imported goods or raw materials may be higher for the 
importing countries. Furthermore, if the prospect of 
depreciation becomes continuous, it might cause capital 
flight and compound the instability of rates. For such 
reasons, advocates of flexible exchange rates have sometimes 
proposed that "limits" be set on the flexibility of the 
exchange rate.
Fifth, it is argued that an inefficient and costly 
reallocation of resources will be induced if a flexible 
exchange rate exists. For example, over the course of a 
business cycle, should the domestic currency depreciate in 
an expansion, the profitability of industries producing 
for the internal economy would be expected to change vis- 
a-vis import and export competing industries, and factors 
of production would have a tendency to move toward the 
profitable industries. A significant appreciation in a 
recession would reverse the process; hence reallocation of 
resources may be subject to short term movements, and if 
the incentive for movement suddenly reverses itself two or 
more costly movements may need to be made, thus making the
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resource reallocations costlier than they would be had 
they not been subject to short term incentives.
Finally, in today's world external and internal 
economic matters are so closely interrelated and so 
intricately entwined that even the acceptance of a flexible 
exchange rate can not insulate domestic economy from 
happenings abroad--exogenous factors over which no nation 
has control. Thus under any international financial 
arrangement international cooperation is needed, and the 
arguments for a flexible exchange rate system underscore 
this need. Opponents of flexible exchange rate usually 
refer to one or more of the above arguments to show that 
the probability of success of this system is nil and that 
flexible exchange rates can be quite an unstable system.
In the light of the above lines of reasoning, one 
can safely assert that benefits are to be derived from 
relatively stable exchange rates--or from avoidance of 
competitive exchange depreciation. The establishment of 
the IMF has facilitated international trade and invest­
ment, and, as time passes, even some of the most ardent 
supporters of flexible exchange rates can observe the 
advantages of providing relative confidence in interna­
tional economic relations on world money.
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Increasing International Understanding 
and Cooperation
A third group of plans has been designated as 
international cooperation and can be broken down into 
mutual assistance among central banks, centralization of 
monetary reserves, strengthening the IMF, and creation of 
an international bank for the settlement and clearing of 
the international transactions. More hope can be placed 
on this category in terms of eventual agreement because 
the range of agreement among the supporters of this cate­
gory of proposals is not very limited despite technical 
differences. Part of the reason for this assertion lies 
in the fact that many economists, for reasons discussed in 
the previous sections, are against either an upward valua­
tion of the price of gold or the acceptance of flexible 
exchange rates. Therefore, they are automatically led to 
alternative types of suggestions which would bring about 
the desired reform. Sir Roy Harrod is an example in this 
respect. His favorite plan, known as the Harrod Plan, is 
based on the idea of an upward valuation of the price of 
gold; he supports this with full conviction. Nevertheless, 
realizing the hesitation of practical men, he has proposed 
alternative plans called A, B, C, and D , all of which aim 
at providing countries so adequately with reserves that 
their permanent concern over restraints on the goals of 
the national economy and about the maintenance of equilib­
rium in their balance of payments would be relieved. As
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late as March 196? > in. response to a question he has
raised: "How quickly a nation that finds itself in deficit
should feel obliged to cure that deficit," he answers:
If it is considered that immediate steps should be 
taken, then we could all get along with modest reserves. 
But if it is considered preferable to re-adjust at 
a more moderate pace, then larger reserves are needed.
Supporters of this category of proposals have 
enumerated the following advantages :
1) There will be some arrangements to clear and settle 
international transactions and claims without resort to 
blocked balances, bilateral clearings, unilateral action 
and competitive exchange depreciation.
2) As a result of these, there can be an orderly conduct 
of production, trade, and distribution on an international 
scale.
3) There will be a means of reassurance to a troubled world 
whereby each country would be relieyed of anxiety created 
by causes which are not of its own making. Furthermore, 
economic authorities of many countries would be able to 
focus their attention mostly on national economic objec­
tives without undue worry about adequacy of international 
reserves. If hot money movements are the cause of trouble 
for monetary authorities of a country, with international
^Sir Roy Harrod, "World Reserves and International 
Liquidity," in Council of the Economic Society of South 
Africa, The South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 35»
No. 2 (June 1967)1 p. 93*
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cooperation of central banks, "the outflow of speculative 
funds need not be associated with a reduction in effective 
demand for goods and services."^ Acceptance of some inter­
national agreement on the world monetary system would also 
make unnecessary those methods of discrimination and/or 
restrictions that some countries have adopted defensively.
4) Defenders of this category of reform proposals have 
further held that countries--especially the ten industri­
alized ones--have had to resort, from time to time, to 
international cooperation and this has led at least to 
preventing crisis or chaos in the present international 
monetary system. One striking example is the General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) which was concluded in Paris, 
in December, 1961, between the ten leading industrial 
countries and the Fund, whereby participating countries 
stand ready to loan their currencies to the Fund whenever 
they and the Fund agree that additional reserves are needed 
for the support of the international monetary system. 
Needless to say, GAB was initiated, at least partially, 
because of serious deterioration in the U.K. balance of 
payments position which was caused by speculative movements 
induced by the prospects of possible further changes in 
the value of the Netherlands guilder and the German mark.
^Machlup, "Plans for Reform of . . . ," op. cit. ,
p. 39.
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Since such arrangements, by and large, have proved to be 
useful--at least in terms of preventing a serious monetary 
crisis--the question is raised: why not initiate a more
ambitious plan of the central banks in order to accept 
arrangements whereby the international monetary problem is 
solved once and for all, at least for the foreseeable 
future?
One rather lengthy example can show how helpful 
cooperation among central bankers has proved to be; it 
illustrates what chaos or vulnerability would have been 
created had they not reached an agreement to act immedi­
ately. Edwine L. Dale, Jr., New York Times correspondent, 
reported in the November 29, 1964 issue^ that
bankers, traders, and others in many countries began 
selling more pounds--and more than $5 billion worth 
of pounds are held by private individuals and busi­
nesses outside Britain . . .  (this because of the 
British balance of payments deficit, the October elec­
tion of a Labor government, and 'justly or not,' the 
world's financial distrust of the Labor party in 
Britain generated by fear that measures Labor would 
favor might make Britain less competitive than ever 
and thus make her deficit worse).%
The report goes on to say that
In the last three weeks, Britain was spending her 
reserves so fast to sxipport the pound (because of a 
run on the world's second most important bank--that 
of Britain) that the danger of devaluation— or forced
^Reprinted in Smith and Teigen, Readings in Money, 
National Income, and Stabilization Policy, op. cit.,
■pp. 480-484.-------  ------------------  -----
^Ibid., p. 483.
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devaluation--began to seem real. And so the run got 
all the worse.
Among the measures that the British government accepted was 
an emergency increase from 5 to 7 per cent in the Bank of 
England's lending rate which, incidentally under the 
British system, determines nearly all other interest rates 
in the economy. Within eight hours of the British announce­
ment, the Federal Reserve acted by increasing the U.S.
counterpart of the bank rate from 3% to k per cent and per-
2mitted the payment of higher rates on savings deposits.
The increase of interest rate in the Bank of England 
"stopped the run on the pound for 24 hours." To the 
astonishment of the British Central Bank authorities, how-
3ever, "the run resumed at midday Tuesday." It resumed, 
according to Dale, simply because of a "report in Europe 
that Britain had run out of borrowing facilities from 
other central banks and that her reserves had sunk danger­
ously low . . .  and that devaluation was still possible." 
After telephone calls between central bankers of Europe, 
Canada, Japan, Britain, and England, these men resorted 
to what might be called a rescue operation by putting
^Ibid., p. 483.
2Ibid., p. 484; Students of money and banking know 
that under the United States monetary system, an increase 
in the discount rate does not automatically mean higher 




together "a massive package of $3 billion in commitments 
from the Federal Reserve and ten other central banks to 
lend reserves to Britain if needed." One hour after the 
package was announced, the run on the pound had stopped.^ 
Vulnerability of the system can clearly be seen in the 
monetary disorder that would have occurred had the central 
bankers not decided to resort to a rescue operation--the 
very same potential danger that Triffin has repeatedly 
emphasized by objecting to the use of national currencies 
as international money.
5) Supporters of international cooperation further assert 
that assistance by foreign or international institutions 
can eliminate the anxiety of losing gold and monetary 
reserves or the international prestige of key currencies. 
Furthermore, the system would be reinforced through inter­
national cooperation against the onslaught of hot-money 
movements. In addition to the above, pressures on monetary 
authorities of countries who suffer from capital outflows 
would be reduced. Needless to add, the pace of develop­
ment and growth in underdeveloped countries could thus be 
made to be more smooth.
6) In a domestic economy, a central bank can extend the 
volume of money and credits if and when it is needed.
^Ibid.; for preparation of this example heavy 
reliance is placed upon Dale's article referred to in the 
previous footnote.
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This potential advantage of a central bank can prevent 
money crises which may occur in the absence of an effec­
tive central banking system.^ Supporters of the establish­
ment of a world central bank also claim--and rightly so-- 
that it can multiply the capacity of the world monetary 
system to create credits by temporarily transferring 
international reserves from one central bank to another 
and thus make individual central banks shock-proof. More­
over, arrangements can be made, so the argument goes, 
whereby assistance among central bankers or the supervi­
sion of an international institution, such as the World 
Bank or an expanded IMF, not be limited to emergency situa­
tions; thus the institution would function on a daily 
basis. Part of the trouble in the present international 
monetary system arising from the role of gold and its 
annual rate of growth can be coped with without exposing 
the system to the danger of collapse.
Obviously, this group of proposals varies in the 
degree of details, technicalities, accurateness, and even 
types of provisions made. Reference to the Triffin and
^Many crises can be found throughout the history 
of different industrialized countries, whose causes have 
been basically the lack of an effective monetary system.
For example, in the U.S. the panics of 1873, l884, l893,
. . . and 1907 " . . .  were accentuated by . . . peculiarity 
of the national banking system." See Gilbert C. Fite and 
Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United States 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1959), p. 474.
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Maxwell Stamp Plans which respectively call for the exten­
sion of the IMF into an international reserve bank and 
extending the IMF into an institution creating reserves 
internationally are sufficient to demonstrate this. More 
recent examples are the differences between the stand-by 
credits under the Bernstein Plan or under the Jacobson 
arrangements. "Among economists," says Machlup, "there are 
many who regard these proposals as premature but certain 
of eventual acceptance. A few economists go so far as to 
regard them as the only real solution."^
Against such advantages, of course, there have 
been a number of questions, objections, and/or criticisms 
to centralization of world reserves, to the establishment 
of a world central bank, and to the types of arrangements 
necessary for the expansion of the IMF. These can be sum­
marized as follows :
l) A lending bank, or institution, may lend foreign 
exchange, possibly gold or its own currency. And what it 
receives for its portfolio may also vary since it may be 
in any of the following forms : medium or long term obli­
gations of the borrowing country, payable in gold or cur­
rency of another country, currency of the country in need 
2of help, etc. These are, of course, open issues which 
^Machlup, '̂ Plans for Jleform of . . . " op. cit. ,
p. 40.
2For further information see Machlup, op. cit.,
p. 31.
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have to be taken into account in the establishment of an 
international central bank. Needless to say, it is not 
easy for academic economists to agree on any practical 
solutions of the problems under debate.^
2) As far back as 1943, Keynes mentioned, in his proposal
for an international clearing union.
It may be doubted whether a comprehensive scheme will 
ever in fact be worked out, unless it can come into 
existence through a single act of creation made pos­
sible by the unity of purpose and energy of hope for 
better things to come.^
3) One can not ensure that drawing on the IMF--or the 
operation of any other international institution--would be 
of just the right magnitude to create the optimal supply 
of monetary reserves, to help troubled countries adjust 
their balance of payments disequilibrium, or to prevent 
inflationary or deflationary tendencies in the world 
economy.
4) There are other problems and disagreements in regard 
to the type of guarantee to be given to participating 
countries, the manner in which they should be stimulated 
to participate, the pattern and the magnitude of change 
in the present international monetary system, the politi­
cal and international implications of different proposals,
^Robert Triffin, The World Money Maze (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 19^6), pT 317•
2The Keynes Plan reprinted in George Halm, Inter­
national Monetary Cooperation (Chapel Hill: The Univer­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1945), P* 228.
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the different responses and reactions of countries, their 
attitude as to how serious they think the problem at hand 
is, how urgently it should be attacked, how much hope can 
be placed on practical solution of the problem, who should 
initiate and/or lead international negotiations and how 
conditions of membership, provisions for the functioning 
of the international agency should be established. In 
short, a large group of other relevant factors would have 
to be taken into account.
Such problems, however, should not discourage
practical men. Academicians and practitioners should not
despair even with the bombardment of suggestions developed.
There is reason to believe, in the light of advances
already made in the form of GAB and the like that
the lines of development pursued in the postwar period 
offer the best chance for further progress. The 
international financial machinery has proved to be 
flexible and adaptable. Within its terms of reference 
or with relatively small changes in them . . . This 
machinery is capable of further growth and adjust­
ment.^
There is a definite need for courage, patience, and will­
ingness to be practical--without trying to stick too much 
to theoretical considerations. As will be seen in a later 
chapter, it is only in this third category of proposals 
that one can dare place the most hope for a practical
^Oscar L. Altman, "Professor Triffin on Interna­
tional Liquidity and the Role of the Fund," IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol. 8, May I96I, Washington, D. C., p. 1Ô8.
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solution of the problems of the international monetary 
system.
One should also bear in mind that this third cate­
gory of proposals overlaps with the first category and 
relates to it in that those who support more international 
cooperation favor proposals which range from the case for 
reviving the gold standard and strengthening its position 
by some type of innovation (such as the Fund Unit in Roosa's 
plan) to the belief that no change at all is in order or 
even to the complete condemnation of gold (as in Lerner's 
plan, all to be analyzed in detail in the next chapters). 
Therefore, any classification of proposals involves some 
degree of arbitrariness, and there is no distinct and clear 
line to be drawn between each category.
CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL PLANS
The previous chapter attempted to examine the 
substance of proposals for reform and the possible forms 
of change without regarding the individual advocates or 
opponents of each system. This chapter supplements the 
previous one with a review of individual plans suggested 
in the 1960's. The same classification used in the previous 
chapter will be used. It must be added, however, that most 
of the plans suggested in the 1960's have focused their 
attention on the creation of international reserves and/or 
an international or supra-national bank, and very few have 
talked about gold or flexible exchange rate systems.
For the purpose of analytical classification then, 
all plans can be placed in one of the following categories: 
1} proposals related to gold, 2) proposals related 
to a flexible exchange rate system, 3) and proposals con­
cerned with international understanding and cooperation.
The group related to gold can, in turn, be broken down into 
three subcategories :
a) Those who are against adherence to gold assert 
that since on a domestic basis we have managed in some
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countries to control the volume of money according to 
economic needs, there is no reason for adherence to gold 
on an international basis. A. Lerner is one example iii 
this subcategory; his slogan is: "Let us Get Rid of our
Cross of Gold." In his estimation adherence to and the 
use of gold cannot by itself provide the international 
economy with enough liquidity.
b) Contrasting with this viewpoint is that of those 
economists who believe that the root of all the present 
disturbances in the international monetary system is a 
departure from the pure gold standard and its rules. Jack 
Rueff, the French economist, is a striking example of this 
school. He holds that the best way to cure the imbalances 
of the international monetary system is a return to a gold 
standard system, thus eliminating the exchange standard 
which has been added to it.
c) Between these two extremes one can find more 
moderate attitudes with respect to gold: that is, those
who neither completely oppose the gold standard nor favor 
its full implementation. The IMF lies within this subcate­
gory in that it asserts that a relatively fixed price of 
gold has provided some monetary discipline; that gold must 
be respected in order not to create monetary chaos by 
shaking international confidence; that gold has not pro­
vided the international economy with adequate liquidity, 
yet should not be rejected on this basis; and that
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supplements, such as more international reserves, must be 
provided in order to maintain the desired degree of inter­
national liquidity.
2) Proposals related to a flexible exchange rate 
system suggest basically that acceptance of this system can 
bring the desired adjustments in terms of the rates of 
exchange in different countries, hence reducing or elimi­
nating the need for reserves. James Meade is one example 
in this category.
3) Finally, many economists in recent years have 
focused their attention on increasing international under­
standing and cooperation. The plans of Bernstein, Roosa, 
Hansen, Zolotas, Maulding, Stamp, and Angell would fall 
under this category. Needless to say, the degree of their 
respect for the present institutions of the international 
monetary system varies (and review of their individual 
plans will attempt to evaluate this among other things).
It must also be pointed out that any classification 
is bound to have elements of arbitrariness. For example, 
the classification established here overlaps in this third 
category of proposals with the third subcategory of the 
previous category. Therefore, a separate treatment of sub­
category c in the previous category will be eliminated to 
avoid repetition. Lutz's proposal may be classified under 
the multiple-exchange standard category and plans requiring 
mere extensions of the present system. Yet, the analysis
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has to follow some order. Accordingly, the order presented 
above will be used in review of the plans.
Proposals Concerned With Gold
Lerner's Plan
Abba Lerner sees as the root of illness of the 
present international monetary system the belief in gold. 
The substance of his proposal advocates the abandonment of 
gold and admission of a dollar or dollar-sterling standard. 
Speaking of the U.S. loss of gold, he has the following to 
say:
The $9 billion decline in the U.S. gold stock since 
1948 is the least damaging result of our balance of 
payments problem. Indeed, it is a good thing for us 
to get useful goods and services in exchange for an 
idle stock of yellow metal. The evil is that in our 
hysteria over the gold outflow, we have resorted to 
damaging restrictionist policies, giving the lie to 
our declared devotion to freedom of trade.^
Lerner admits that gold was once an unquestioned
2standard of value for excellent reasons, but he believes 
gold is now no longer suitable as a basis for the world's 
monetary supply. He cites two reasons for this. First, 
the increase in the supply of world gold has. not been 
sufficient to keep pace with the needs for international
^Abba P. Lerner, "Let's Get Rid of Our Cross of 
Gold," Challenge, the Magazine of Economic Affairs, Vol. 12 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, April, 1964), pT 22.
2See above, pp. 15-16.
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moneysecond, the tremendous role of the U.S. economy in
the world trade is such that Lerner believes "gold is
valuable because it can be exchanged for dollars rather
2than the other way around." Lerner further specifies that 
an increase in the price of gold--a solution that some 
economists have suggested to cope with the problem of 
international liquidity--would mean a devaluation of the 
dollar in terms of gold, and in his opinion, the U.S., 
for a variety of subjective and objective reasons, is 
unwilling to accept such a devaluation.
The idea of "our gold hysteria over the gold out­
flow" is repeatedly mentioned in his article in different 
forms, and apparently his intention is to emphasize that 
one solution is to give up this attitude: "we could sell
our gold gradually, or we might simply stop trying to 
check our gold outflow and thank the buyers for giving us 
useful goods in exchange for our gold." The implication 
of this line of reasoning is obviously that gold is not, 
to say the least, as useful as it is commonly thought to 
be. It has been shown previously that people have sought
3for good reason to own gold, and such demand for gold is
^An assertion which could be supported by available 
statistical data, see above, p. 19; Ibid., p. 23-
2,'Ibid. , p. 23•
OSee above, pp. 15-16.
103
not simply a matter of "hysteria" as Lerner tends to main­
tain. In any case, he admits that "international confi­
dence in gold would necessarily he shaken by the policy 
which I have outlined. . . ." Whether one needs to disturb
the international confidence in attempting to reform an 
already somewhat unstable system remains an open issue, 
and certainly the alternatives which would not necessarily 
disturb this confidence should not be neglected.
In addition to abandoning gold, Lerner suggests 
that "we could increase the general acceptability of the 
dollar for international liquid reserves by combating 
inflation more energetically," and the final result of his 
proposed plan, as he sees it, would be "the establishment 
of an automatic dollar (or dollar-sterling) standard, 
working just like an ideal gold standard."^
Details of his plan, of course, need to be spelled 
out and a great many questions have to be answered before 
adoption of such program could be seriously considered; to 
this Lerner readily agrees. Perhaps he thinks it is too 
early to spell out the details of his plan before its 
principles have become acceptable.
^An ideal gold standard is, in his words, "one in 
which the supply of gold is never too scarce or too plen­
tiful, but increases sufficiently whenever a scarcity of 
gold tends to raise its value, and decreases sufficiently 
whenever a scarcity of gold tends to lower its value, so 
as to keep its value stable." Ibid., p. 23.
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Rueff's Plan
Jacques Rueff introduces his plan with the asser­
tion that every day the economy of the West more resembles 
the situation that turned the 1929 recession into the 
Great Depression and that the ingredients of another 1929 
are in the making. In his words, "the instability in our 
monetary system is such that a minor international incident 
or a small economic or financial disturbance could set off 
worldwide disaster."^
Fortune has summarized Rueff's prescription as:
"Get rid of the gold-exchange standard." In Rueff's opin­
ion, the proposals suggested for the reform of interna­
tional monetary system do not go "to the roots of what is
wrong" but "prolong for several months or years the erring
2ways that are responsible for the danger." Rueff asserts 
that during the decade 1951-1960 while the U.S. was piling 
up a balance of payments deficit totaling Sl8.1 billion 
(according to the figure he cites3), some $13 billion 
accumulated in the hands of people outside the continental 
U.S. money markets in the form of night deposits or short­
term investments. This, in his opinion, constitutes a
^Jacques Rueff, "The West Is Risking a Credit 
Collapse," Fortune, vol. 64, July I96I, p. 126. Evalua­
tion of Rueff's position in this section is based on his 




claim on the U.S. gold reserve that "could be called at 
any time--with catastrophic consequences." There is, of 
course, no doubt that dollars in foreign hands constitute 
a claim upon the U.S. gold reserves. But whether one 
should--as Rueff does--derive from this premise the con­
clusion that such claims, if called, could bring about 
"catastrophic consequences" is doubtful for the following 
reasons.
1. The U.S. has some short-term claims against 
other countries which could be used as a bargaining power.
2. The U.S. has significant drawing rights on the 
IMF which might be used to reduce pressures on the dollar. 
The U.S. could, by drawing on the IMF, acquire the foreign 
currencies that might be needed and then could exchange 
these foreign currencies for dollars with the objective of 
reducing or eliminating short-term claims against U.S. 
dollars.
3. Nowadays the range of international cooperation 
is greater than a decade ago. There now exist the General 
Arrangements to Borrow, standby credits, currency swap 
transactions, as well as the sale of Roosa bonds or some 
other such securities which could be used to protect U.S. 
dollars. The institution of further similar arrangements 
is also a possibility.
4. Even if the U.S. were to lose all of its gold, 
although the public's confidence might be temporarily
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shaken, and despite the probable undesirable consequences 
of this loss, one cannot necessarily expect "catastrophic 
consequences" as the dollar's economic strength in terms 
of the volume of domestic production would remain.
5 . The U.S. also has direct and portfolio invest­
ments which form claims for the U.S. against other coun­
tries .
In regard to the historical background of the gold- 
exchange standard Rueff believes :
Back in 1922, long before the U.S. went off the 
gold standard, the International Economic Conference 
in Genoa passed its famous Resolution 9» which recom­
mended . . .  some means of economizing the use of gold 
by maintaining reserves in the form of foreign bal­
ances . 1
Furthermore, the gold exchange standard, according to 
Rueff, "was neither created nor even expressly desired, by 
the U.S." Again Rueff's assertion in this respect is not 
perfectly plausible. Even if one accepts that the Genoa 
Conference gave the gold-exchange standard official recog­
nition, one must remember that the U.S. dollar had been 
widely used before the Conference, There are two condi­
tions which must be met before a country's currency could 
be used as international money. Such a country must be 
economically strong and maintain significant trade rela­
tions with other countries. Moreover, the country must 
provide banking facilities to give foreigners ready access
^Ibid., p. 126.
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to its currency. By 1922 the U.S. was already enjoying 
these conditions, and despite Rueff's assertion, it was 
not the International Conference of 1922 which gave this 
role to the U.S. dollar.
To the question of what the consequences of the 
U.S. deficit have been Rueff answers that the "losers get 
their marbles back"; more specifically, "the American 
balance of payments deficits were allowed to persist for 
the I95I-I96O period only because the U.S. was not really 
required to settle its debts abroad."^ Thus, in his esti­
mation, the built-in stabilizer is removed in the sense 
that had there been a gold standard, a deficit country 
would have had to lose gold; Rueff claims this loss would 
"tend to counteract the deficit, by releasing a greater
part of the national product for exports and inhibiting 
2imports;" however, Rueff specifically suggests that in 
the present system "the dollars that go abroad as a result 
of U.S. balance of payments deficits return to the U.S. as 
sight deposits or short term investment." Of course, Rueff 
is unwilling, on nationalistic grounds, to admit that it 
is the larger size of capital markets in the U.S. than in 
Europe that invites dollars back as sight deposits, or 
that expectations of liquid investments cause them to be 




Without questioning the validity of the argument 
that a gold standard system can provide monetary disci­
pline, Rueff needs to be reminded that in the short run 
disequilibria in balance of payments, whether in the form 
of surplus or deficit, is inevitable in a world in which 
goods and money can move from one country to others. And 
in the long run--which seems to be a more appropriate 
period for discussing the U.S. deficit--other factors such 
as the cost of international commitments, foreign aid, and 
grants all affect the balance of payments deficit. There­
fore, that America allowed a balance of payments deficit 
to persist for the 1951-1960 period "only because the U.S. 
was not really required to settle its debts abroad," as 
quoted above, is not a well-founded argument.
The process of double pyramid of credit, with which
Rueff does not agree, works this way:
When the U.S. has an unfavorable balance with another 
country (let us take as an example France), it settles 
up in dollars. The Frenchmen who receive these dollars 
sell them to the central bank, the Banque de France, 
in effect, creates these francs against the dollars.
But then it turns around and invests the dollars back 
in the U.S. Thus the very same dollars expand the 
credit system of France, while still underpinning the 
credit system in the U.S.^
Interestingly enough, Rueff derives, from the above quota­
tion, the conclusion that this process becomes "a powerful 
instrument of worldwide inflation" when there are large 
international movements of capital from countries with key
^Ibid., p. 262.
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currencies. To demonstrate his point further, Rueff 
asserts that this process was "tragically illustrated by 
the events that led up to and followed the 1929 depression." 
On this point it is sufficient to say that one can hardly 
believe the Great Depression was the result of any one 
factor. Moreover, the conclusion that the process of 
double pyramid of credit necessarily becomes a powerful 
instrument of world-wide inflation is not economically 
justified in view of the fiscal and monetary controls that 
countries can use to curb the undesirable effects of their 
own or others' deficits.
In addition to the first two consequences of the 
gold exchange standard already discussed--the removal of 
the built-in stabilizer, and the double pyramid of credit-- 
Rueff refers to a danger of collapse which in his opinion 
is the most serious consequence of the gold exchange 
standard. This he expresses as a double commitment of 
the U.S. gold reserves as pledged reserves that must under 
law (which can of course always be changed) be maintained 
as a backing for Federal Reserve currency and also as a 
guarantee against short term or sight assets held in the 
form of dollars by foreigners. Thus the "double mortgage" 
put on the U.S. gold stock is an unacceptable feature of 
the gold-exchange standard to the French economist, Rueff, 
and he thinks this is a real cause for concern. Needless 
to say the real cause for concern in the international
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monetary system is not so much the matter of gold holding 
of individual countries as it is of a long run appropriate 
and adequate rate of growth of world liquidity to fulfill 
growing needs.
What does Rueff recommend in the way of reform?
His thesis is a return to the "gold standard." Referring 
to the Genoa Conference of 1922 Rueff indicates "what one 
international conference ^id, only another international 
conference can undo."^ He believes, and rightly so, that 
whether in panic or in cool consideration, "the problem 
of the gold exchange standard will inevitably be resolved" 
but it is essential that the "undoing" occur without delay.
How should the danger be coped with? Rueff asserts 
first that a system must be introduced which "does not 
tend to favor prolonged balance of payment deficits in 
countries with key currencies"; second "we must liquidate 
the unstable and dangerously vulnerable situation resulting 
from the duplication of the credit structure built on the 
gold reserves of those countries with key currencies." 
Furthermore, the system must make it impossible for 
creditor nations to generate new internal purchasing power 
on their foreign balances. According to Rueff, a gold 
standard "takes care of this by requiring central banks 
to issue money only against gold or national credit."
^Ibid., p. 268.
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Rueff himself does recognize that the depletion of U.S. 
gold reserves is less serious than it looks because reserve 
requirements are subject to law and can be changed. He 
also recognizes that elimination of dollar holdings from 
the international reserves reduces the available supply of 
international liquidity; in this he clearly specifies that 
"such a consequence can not be permitted."^ Yet when he 
has to suggest a proposal for reform of the system, other 
than very briefly suggesting a return to a gold standard 
he does not make himself clear. He does specify that it 
would be imprudent from simple calculations to estimate 
how much the price of gold should increase or even to 
derive the conclusion that an increase in the price of 
gold is unavoidable. And in this way he implicitly rejects 
the idea of a change in price of gold. He also refers to 
Triffin's plan for creation of international money and 
holds that " . . .  in the complex system Professor Triffin 
imagines, the new international currency would be only 
partially convertible into gold, and in certain circum­
stances it might have to be made absolutely unredeemable 
2in gold." But he does not go further in the direction of 
suggesting how a return to the gold standard should be, 




Rueff himself recognizes that the liquidation of 
the gold exchange standard poses difficult questions that 
demand deep study and discussion. But evidently he does 
not undertake this study, and the only statement he makes 
is that "methods of international payment could be improved 
so that a smaller volume of cash balances would be required 
to meet the requirements of daily settlements." Precisely 
how this should be accomplished requires further elabora­
tion which he has not attempted.
Rueff's concern is mostly with the gold standard 
and abolition of the "exchange" from the present gold- 
exchange standard. Being an ardent advocate of the pure 
gold standard, the degree to which he believes in the 
efficacy of its classical rules of operation is not sur­
prising. Rueff has not gone into a constructive discus­
sion of how his objective--namely, a return to gold 
standard--can be accomplished. Even if he did, it is 
doubtful that all countries in the world would want to go 
back to the gold standard. Furthermore, the reader of 
Rueff gets the impression that he derives wrong conclusions 
from the acceptable premises that he presents, as was shown 
above with examples. A discussion of a return to the gold 
standard, its appropriateness or inappropriateness, lies 
outside the scope of this study.
The gold-exchange standard despite its recognized 
deficiencies has, in the words of Xenophon Zolotas, "proved
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to be a workable system calling for neither revolutionary 
change nor irreversible reformative measures."^ The same 
author's belief as quoted below might be considered as an 
answer to Rueff's ardent advocacy of gold standard.
Gold is too scarce a reserve asset to be assigned 
a quantitatively dominant role in international trans­
actions, while the presently existing key currencies 
have proven to be too useful and important to be 
demoted instead of reinforced in their key role.^
A Proposal Concerned With Flexible Exchange Rate;
Meade's Plan
3Meade starts his article with a statement of the 
need for reconsideration of present arrangements for inter­
national payments by the highly developed industrialized
countries; it is his purpose to suggest some improvements
4in the machinery for international payments. According 
to him
a financial system is only a means to an end; and, 
in order to decide what principles one wants to adopt 
for a payments system one must first know what are 
the basic objectives which one wishes to achieve by 
means of it.
^Xenophon Zolotas, Alternative Systems for Inter­
national Monetary Reform— A~Comparative Appraisal (Athens : 
Bank of Greece Papers and Lectures, No. l8, I965J, p. 17-
^Ibid., p. 32.
3James Meade, "The Future of International Pay­
ments" originally published in Three Banks Review, June 
1961, and reprinted in U.S. Congress, Factors Affecting 




Freer trade, more liberal foreign aid, and a higher rate
of domestic economic expansion are his objectives.
Meade cites the examples of the U.S. in the first
ten years after the Second World War and of Germany during
the 1957-1961 period to show that: 1) U.S. monetary
authorities refused to deflate its domestic incomes,
prices, and costs--which is the gold standard rule to
overcome a deficit in balance of payments--, and that
2) German authorities attributed higher priority to domestic
full employment, price stability, and economic growth, and
have shown "no signs of willingness to abandon these
domestic objectives for a domestic inflation which would
remove the surplus on her balance of payment."^
A system of international payments "must be such
as to enable them to press ahead with the removal of
2tariffs and other obstacles to imports." Meade supports 
a policy of "freer use of alterations in the rates of 
exchange" between national currencies of Western coun­
tries, and asserts that these alterations in exchange rate 
"will look after the balance of payments problem by a 
double mechanism."
1 ) The appreciation of the strong currency and the 
depreciation of the weak currency will make the 
products of the former country relatively more expen­
sive and the products of the latter country rela­
tively cheaper to all purchasers.
^Ibid., p. 243. 
^Ibid., p. 244.
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2) Since such adjustments will take time, they "will 
induce the private speculator to move funds from the former 
into the latter currency," and this will serve to finance 
the temporary deficit on the balance of payments of the 
deficit country until the exchange rate variations have 
had time to carry out their basic role of adjustment.
Such mechanism could work out if: "the products of the
countries concerned are competitive with each other," if 
speculators have a good understanding of what is going to 
happen, and if they operate at the right time in the right 
direction.
The substance of Meade's proposal is presented in 
the following scheme:
1) The IMF would be reformed, and all monetary authorities 
of the Western countries would get "gold certificates" in 
exchange for paying all their monetary reserves to the IMF.
2) They should then let the value of their currencies fluc­
tuate in terms of such gold certificates according to 
supply and demand forces in the foreign exchange market.
3) Having this enormous additional fund of gold and addi­
tional currencies, the IMF "could now act as a most impor­
tant supranational exchange equalization account." If the 
IMF finds that the pound is temporarily unduly depreciated 
in terms of dollars, it could buy pounds and sell dollars 
out of its holdings of these currencies.
4) Gold certificates would be held as the sole form of
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reserves, and the IMF could now purchase national curren­
cies for these certificates.
The reformed IMF in Meade's scheme becomes "a real 
supranational exchange equalization fund" which could give 
temporary support to one currency in terms of another if 
such support was desirable. This would relieve monetary 
authorities of each country from the pressure of concern 
over the balance of payment, and they could then concen­
trate, in Meade's opinion, on their domestic policy objec­
tives . He further argues that :
there is nothing absurd in modern conditions in having 
an international currency of this kind, controlled by 
a truly supranatural authority, and at the same time 
having a number of national currencies whose values 
may fluctuate in terms of each other and in terms of 
the international currency.^
Meade gives only a short account of how he personally hopes 
his suggested system would work in practice and readily 
admits that "such proposals raise, of course, the most 
far-reaching questions of the proper nature for the manage­
ment and governing body of an IMF that was transformed into 
so powerful a supranational instrument . . .," and does
not bother to discuss adequately the practical ramifications
2of his proposal. One point that he rightly mentions, 
however, is that " . . .  all Federal or confederal
^Ibid., p. 252.
2Closely related to this section is the discussion 
of Band Proposal and Bloc Flexibility in Chapter III above.
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arrangements rest upon a sensible division of functions 
between the 'central' and the 'local' governments, suitable 
to the practical problems of the real situation."^
Proposals Concerned with International 
Understanding and/or Cooperation
Extension of the Present System: Lutz Plan
Friedrick A. Lutz proposes a plan for creation of
a "Multiple Currency Standard." The essence of his plan
is that western countries now holding dollars
should in the future keep their international 
reserves not exclusively in one country's currency 
but in many, and that the United States too should 
follow a policy of holding other countries' curren­
cies in addition to gold.
Before discussing the Lutz plan any further, one should 
familiarize himself with why he proposes a Multiple- 
Currency Standard as a solution to the problem of inter­
national monetary system.
To begin with one may point out that Lutz does not 
think the scarcity of international reserves is a "very 
imminent problem"; nevertheless, in his estimation, "it 
is the economist's job to think in time about possible
3solutions for the dilemma. . . . "  Furthermore, he thinks
^Ibid., p. 252.
2Friedrick A. Lutz, "The Problems of International 
Liquidity and the Multiple-Currency Standard," Princeton 
University, International Finance Section, Essays in Inter­
national Finance, No. 4l (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, I963), p. 9-
^Ibid., p. 3-
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the U.S. "cannot afford to go on running a deficit indefi­
nitely." He starts his plan with an appraisal of the 
present international monetary system, and after mentioning 
the above points, he sets himself the task of thinking in 
terms of possible solutions.
The first is the adoption of a flexible exchange 
rate system which is, as he sees it, "a very neat solution 
inasmuch as it removes the problem of the adequacy of 
international reserves from the s c e n e . Y e t  he does 
recognize very clearly resistance of monetary authorities 
to a flexible rate system. Then, in spite of the fact 
that he advocates such a system "at least within certain 
rather broad limits," because he considers it an impractical 
solution, he does not discuss it.
A second possible solution is an increase in the
price of gold. He abstains from discussing this solution
in detail for two reasons. First, as soon as there is
serious discussion of an upward valuation of gold in terms
of dollars--which, in his opinion, cannot be kept secret
under present conditions--a "scramble for gold" and a
2"confusion in foreign exchange markets will occur."
Secondly, there is an "inflationary danger which the large 
increase in reserves of all countries with substantial 
gold stocks would entail."
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5 .
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Still a third solution consists in "widening the 
foreign borrowing potentials" of countries by having sur­
plus countries lend to deficit countries. Here one must 
credit Lutz with the emphasis that he has put on the "impor­
tance of a country's borrowing potential as part of its 
international liquidity," a point often neglected by some 
economists as well as statisticians. On this point, with­
out trying to criticize the nature of the statistics com­
piled, he says:
We cannot attach much significance to the customary 
calculation of the international liquidity reserves 
of the western world which equates them to the sum of 
the various countries' gold stocks plus the dollar 
balances of countries other than the United States 
plus the sterling balances of the outer sterling area. 
For such a calculation makes no allowance for the 
borrowing potential of the various countries. . . .  
There is no way of knowing the sum total of all the 
borrowing potentials.1
Lutz then thinks that the borrowing capacity of a 
country should be regarded as part of its international 
reserves. He cites examples to show that the shortage of 
international reserves can be overcome by international 
lending and borrowing. He further specifies that plans 
which have been devised to solve the international monetary 
problem are variations of this theme of international 
lending either by inducing or by forcing those in strong 




International lending may or may not, according 
to Lutz, create international reserves for the lender. 
Proposals such as the raising of IMF quotas and the granting 
of standby credits can, so he argues, be regarded as mea­
sures which merely provide for an increase in the borrowing 
capacity of deficit countries. But there are other pro­
posals, such as the Triffin Plan, which go further than 
this as they provide for lendings that create reserves for 
the lenders. From this type of distinction Lutz derives 
the following conclusion:
Through the IMF the borrowing potential of all par­
ticipating countries has been increased; and when any 
country borrows, the corresponding lending by other 
countries is of the 'neutral' type, which does not 
create reserves for the lenders. The United States, 
however, has in addition a borrowing potential which 
others do not have. It consists in the willingness of 
other countries to acquire dollar balances; and the 
acquisition of such balances is representative of the 
second type of lending, namely, that which creates 
international reserves for the lender.^
On the basis of this line of reasoning Lutz further adds 
that under the present gold-exchange standard system accumu­
lation of dollar balances may be accompanied by loss of
2gold by America and "leads in any case to a reduction in 
the United States ratio of gold to short-term liabilities."
As long as the present system exists, there are, in Lutz's 
opinion, pressures on "countries with strong foreign exchange
^Ibid., p. 7-
2It must be noted that private foreign dollar 
balances can quickly be changed into official balances, 
adding to the potential claims against gold.
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positions to 'lend more.'"
In order to support his argument further, Lutz has 
cited some figures. He finds that official dollar and 
sterling balances held by other countries have been respec­
tively $11.7 and $6.8 billion, making a total of $18.5 
billion roughly equal to the gold stock of the two coun­
tries combined ($l8.8 billion) in September I962. If the 
non-official holdings of dollar and sterling balances be 
included, says Lutz, the short term liabilities of the two 
countries would amount to 157 per cent of their gold stock. 
Then supposing that the currencies of Switzerland, France, 
W. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands were added as key 
currencies to U. S. dollars and U. K. sterling, and 
regarding the gold stock of these seven countries combined 
that amounted to $31«3 billion dollars in September of the 
same year, the short-term foreign liabilities of the U. S. 
and the U. K. would be spread over the seven countries and 
the ratio of short-term foreign liabilities to the gold 
stock of these countries would come from the present nega­
tive net reserves to 60 and 95 per cent for dollar and
2sterling respectively. The advantage of previous spread 
is, so Lutz argues, to remove the present danger of having 




or having negative net reserves which would affect the
degree of confidence in a key currency. "The desire to
spread the risk by distributing balances between several
countries should be sufficient motive for adopting the
multiple-currency standard."^
If a multiple-currency standard were adopted, it
would be desirable, and Lutz thinks necessary, for all the
key currency countries to stand ready to sell gold on
request to monetary authorities of other nations at a
2fixed price, just as the U. S. does. Moreover, he thinks 
that even if cooperation among the monetary authorities 
were to break down at one time with respect to one key- 
currency, "the impact on the foreign exchange and gold 
markets would be much smaller than if the same thing 
happened with respect to a country that was the only one
3in which foreign balances were held."
Thus Lutz claims the following advantages for his 
proposed "multiple-currency standard." Its introduction 
"neither requires the creation of new international insti­
tutions nor the assumption of new functions by the existing 
ones." Moreover, it does not compel a surplus country to 
lend in order to equilibrate its balance of payments. 
Further, Lutz claims that upon the acceptance of his pro­





international reserves until a time so far distant in 
future that no reasonable man would think it necessary to 
make preparations for it n o w . I n  addition to these 
factors the growth of international currency reserves 
would not be at the cost of a deficit in the U. S. balance 
of payments and would thus encourage monetary discipline 
instead of monetary laxity.
There are, of course, several flaws in Lutz's 
arguments. For example, when he adds the currency of 
five other countries as key currencies to dollars and 
sterling, in taking the ratio of official holdings of 
these two currencies to gold, he neglects the fact that 
other countries have, from time to time, official holdings 
of currencies such as the German mark, etc. As a result, 
such a ratio is not very accurate. This is, however, a 
rather minor point. The basic flaw of his argument lies 
in the fact that his whole system is based on an iffy 
question. If other currencies are accepted as supplemen­
tary reserves, the international monetary problem would be 
solved. This is a possibility not too far removed from 
reality, and one might someday observe the adoption of 
these currencies as supplementary reserves. Yet this 
adoption cannot be imposed on countries. The monetary 
authorities of many central banks may not desire to keep 
any currency on their international reserves unless they
^Ibid., p. 16.
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are fairly sure that it would be relatively stable. This
is, of course, something of which no one can be sure, but
one factor which does affect it is the experience of the
central bankers with the past devaluations. One needs to
remember that, in the words of Robert Roosa,
In terms of equivalent gold content, following the 
general wave of currency adjustments in the 1930's, 
the deterioration in all currencies except the dollar 
has been striking. On a percentage scale, in rela­
tion to 1934, while the dollar remains at 100, the 
French franc works out, for example, at 3 per cent, 
the German mark at 4 per cent, and the Belgian franc 
at 9 per cent; although the Dutch guilder and the 
Swiss franc have held close to 40 per cent and 70 per 
cent, respectively.!
It is not surprising, in view of the above stability of
dollar value in terms of gold, that central bankers have
put their confidence in dollars as international reserves.
Furthermore, there is nothing wrong about the 
acceptance of new functions by the existing international 
institutions or even creation of new institutions if one 
could be confident that such arrangements would solve the 
problem. A plan that suggests radical changes may, in 
practice, prove to be better than one which requires no 
change or only minor modifications to the present system. 
Yet, in his plan Lutz is specific in saying that "the 
introduction of the multiple currency standard neither 
requires the creation of new international institutions
^Roosa, op. cit., p. 84.
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nor the assumption of new functions by the existing ones."^ 
From this one can see that Lutz does not see any necessity 
for creating new international institutions.
Last but not least is the question of how much the 
U. S. or U. K. would want to allow other countries to make 
their own currency a "key" one. It may be true that both 
of these countries seem to be interested in reform of the 
system, but it is somewhat questionable if they would want 
to accept any reform which might endanger their present 
position. Acceptance of other currencies as "key" may well 
be interpreted as a radical change--what Lutz claims not 
to introduce in his plan.
Creation of an International Central Bank 
Pioneers :
Keynes' Plan
The basic purpose of this study as mentioned in 
the introduction is to review plans suggested in the 1960's, 
yet due to the pioneering significance of proposals devel­
oped by Keynes and Triffin, it was felt that they deserve 
to be mentioned in this study.
The Keynes Plan proposes
to establish . . .  an International Clearing Union, 
based on an international bank money, called (let us 
say) bancor, fixed (but not unalterably) in terms of 
gold and accepted as the equivalent of gold by the 
British Commonwealth and the United States and all the
^Lutz, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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other members of the Union for the purpose of settling 
international balances. The Central Bank of all mem­
ber states (and also of non-members) would keep 
accounts with the International Clearing union through 
which they would be entitled to settle their exchange 
balances with one another at their par value as defined 
in terms of the bancor. Countries having a favorable 
balance of payment with the rest of the world as a 
whole would find themselves in possession of a credit 
account with the Clearing Union, and those having an 
unfavorable balance would have a debit account.^
Each member state's quota would determine the
extent to which it could enjoy credit facilities provided 
2by the Union. The Keynesian Plan, unwisely used, could 
result in an excessive expansion in international reserves
3and cause world-wide inflation. Wisely used, however, it 
could free the world economy from an inadequate supply of 
liquidity. Keynes himself had this point in mind when he 
specified measures that would be necessary "to prevent the 
piling up on credit and debit balances without limit," and 
admits that "the system would have failed in the long run 
if it did not possess sufficient capacity for self- 
equilibrium to secure this."
Keynes has permitted the use of overdraft facili­
ties which is, to follow his own description, a British
^D. H. Robertson, "Post-War Monetary Plans," 
Economic Journal, Vol. 53 (December, 1943), p. 359*
^Ibid., p. 359.
3The possible inflationary impact of the Keynes 
Plan stems as much from the manner of determining quotas 




"practice of economizing the amount of cash deposits." 
Overdraft is a type of arrangement with a bank whereby the 
customer draws a check against his account for more than 
his deposit, and the bank agrees to debit his account to 
an amount not exceeding an agreed figure. This, in effect, 
is a credit that banks may extend to their customers. 
International money, said Keynes, would come into life 
whenever a country makes use of its overdraft privileges. 
The potential supply of international money which could be 
created under the Keynes Plan would be equal to the sum 
of the overdraft privileges of the deficit countries, 
which is identical with the potential credit balances of 
the surplus countries. Furthermore, any member state in 
debit could borrow bancors from the balance of any other 
member in credit.
Keynes made provisions as to deficit countries, 
surplus countries, and the equilibrating mechanism, and 
from these standpoints there is a striking similarity 
between the provisions of the Fund and the Keynes Plan.
For example, if exchange depreciation is added to the 
equilibrium mechanism one can note that the IMF allows 
changes in the par value of the currency of a deficit 
country "if it is satisfied that the change is necessary 
to correct a fundamental disequilibrium."^ As in the
^See: Halm, International Monetary Cooperation,
op. cit. , pp. 79-85.
128
Agreement, the nature of Keyne's recommendations concerning 
internal measures remains vague. Furthermore, the provi­
sions of the Keynes Plan which are addressed to deficit 
countries are similar to those of the Agreement, as can be 
seen from the following:
A member state may not increase its debit balance by 
more than a quarter of its quota within a year without 
the permission of the Governing Board. . . .
The Governing Board may require from a member state 
having a debit balance reaching a half of its quota 
the deposit of suitable collateral against its debit 
balance. . . .
If a member state's debit balance has exceeded three 
quarters of its quota . . .  it may, in addition, be 
asked by the Governing Board to take measures to 
improve its position.1
Professor Williams asserts that a weakness of the
Keynes Plan would be that "it might well seem to many of
the member countries like getting something for nothing,
since nothing has to be put up," and that "there might
easily develop a strong urge for bigger and better quotas 
2all around." Furthermore, by looking at the Keynes Plan, 
one gets the impression that the creditor country is told 
to expand credit domestically, to appreciate its currency, 
to lower its tariffs, to increase wages, and to lend on 
long term at a rate equivalent to its surplus in order to 
restore equilibrium in its balance of payments, while 
equally precise rules of behavior--such as credit
^Robertson, op. cit. (Keynes Plan, II), pp. 355-356.
2John H. Williams, "Currency Stabilization: The
Keynes and White Plans," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 21 (July
1943), p. 649.
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contraction, etc.--are not given to debtor countries.
It is, in fact, at least partially because of the 
influence of Keynes on the Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference--held in 
July 1944, that one can see new international institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the Interna­
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been 
created to provide a framework for freer and greater 
volume of international trade, investment, and exchange 
rate stability.
Triffin's Plan
In reviewing plans for reform of the international 
monetary system, the names of Professors Triffin and Machlup 
strike the reader. Both of these economists, as is obvious 
from their writings, have a very deep interest in the prob­
lem and deserve the position of outstanding contributors. 
Professor Hansen believes:
Triffin's brilliant contributions have become world 
famous, and have aroused an immense amount of useful 
discussion. While future monetary reforms may well 
prove to be substantially different from Triffin's 
proposals, much credit should nevertheless be given 
to his provocative, original, and highly educational 
writings.!
Triffin's views have been expressed in his numerous writ­
ings but are conveniently pulled together in Gold and the 
Dollar Crisis.
^Hansen, op. cit., p. 31.
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The basic and main features of the Triffin Plan 
can easily be condensed into three categories:
1) displacement of national currency reserves--as already 
pointed out he is against the use of national currencies 
such as dollars and pounds sterling as international money 
on the grounds that they are always exposed to devaluation, 
inconvertibility, blocking, or even default by the debtor 
country;
2) creation of additional reserves;
3) limitations and restrictions on the deposit creating 
power in international economic relations.
Before elaborating on the latter two features one 
needs to be reminded of two points.
1) The optimism of Triffin can be seen very clearly from
the following quotation:
Let me affirm in no uncertain terms that I do not 
believe for a minute that our present difficulties 
are either permanent or untractable. The strength 
and resiliency of our economy and of our policies make 
it certain that they can, and that they will, be 
solved.1
2) Our main problem is not to retrench, but to advance, 
not to cut out imports and our capital contribution 
to economic development abroad, but to restore our 
exports to levels sufficient to enable us to pursue 
in the future, on a sounder and more durable basis, 
policies which have abundantly proved their worth and 
which are indispensable both to our own internal 
growth and to the maintenance of our economic and 
political position in the world of tomorrow.2
p . 3 •
^Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, op. cit.,
^Ibid., p. 7•
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In order to create additional reserves, central
banks should put some of their foreign exchange reserves
into the IMF where they would become an international
money, and all countries should, according to Triffin,
"undertake to hold in the form of Fund deposits a uniform
and agreed proportion of their gross monetary reserves."^
A minimum deposit of 20 per cent is considered to be
"ample to initiate the new system." Triffin is quite aware
of the fact that his proposed system would endow the Fund
with a lending capacity that if used inappropriately,
might impart a strong inflationary bias to the world
economy. Therefore he has gone a step further to think of
some limitations on the Fund's annual lending capacity;
this, in his opinion, would be necessary to assure just
the right amount of international liquidity. Triffin
maintains that various alternative criteria could be used
for these limitations. The simplest one might be
to limit the Fund's net lending, over any twelve 
months period, to a total amount which would, together 
with current increases in the world stock of mone­
tary gold, increase world reserves by, let us say, 3 
to 5 per cent a year.^
A reasonably conservative solution would be to retain a
3 per cent figure as "definitely non-inflationary."
What is presented above is basically Triffin's 




economists, by Congress, by the Administration, and even 
in the daily press here and abroad. With all due respect, 
one should try to see to what extent Triffin's claims are 
well-founded. From this standpoint one might cite the 
following points, not necessarily as inadequacies of his 
plan, but rather as points which should be considered more 
carefully.^
1) His discussions of future international liquidity point 
out that the total of international liquidity should 
increase at the same rate as world trade if exchange crises 
and contractionary forces are to be avoided. Behind this 
there is the idea of the quantity theory of money applied 
to international money. If this be true, the least one 
can say is that the quantity theory of money is a contro­
versial issue.
2) Furthermore, the risks of exchange instability, in all 
probability, have been over-stated by Triffin due to his 
fears in regard to the U.S. balance of payments deficit. 
Besides, one gets the impression that, in his mind, the 
ability of the key currency countries to meet these risks 
has been understated but not completely denied.^ The
^Due credit should be given to Oscar L. Altman's 
brilliant article, "Professor Triffin on International 
Liquidity and the Role of the Fund," IMF Staff Papers, 
op. cit. , pp. I5I-I9I for reliance on his contributions.
p. 3. ^Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, op. cit. ,
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U.S., consistent with IMF policy, could support the dollar 
not only by its gold reserves but also by paying dollars 
to the IMF to draw other currencies from the IMF which 
could then be used to buy dollars in the foreign exchange 
markets, hence reducing any undue pressures on the dollar. 
Although the U.S. has rarely drawn on the Fund, there is 
no reason why it should not do so. The net creditor posi­
tion of the U.S. in the Fund at the end of I96O was 
$1.6 billion; even after exhausting this the U.S. could 
draw an additional $4.1 billion before IMF dollar holdings 
would reach 200 per cent of the U.S. quota.^ Furthermore, 
if there were need for more resources, the IMF could obtain 
these through borrowing. It would, in fact, be very 
unlikely that U.S. gold sales coupled with sales of foreign 
currencies against the dollar up to as much as $6 billion 
and the determined attitude of the IMF to support the 
dollar could fail to halt a run on the dollar.
3) True, the adequacy of the reserve position of any 
country is influenced by its growth of trade, but a number 
of other factors such as the amount of its overdue short­
term debts, the size of its short and long term borrowing, 
gold pledges, bank and private holdings of foreign exchange,
^See U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
International Effects of U.S. Economic Policy, 86th Cong., 
2nd Sess., Study Paper No. 16, January 25, I960, pp. 84-86.
^Ibid.
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the size of its unused Fund quotas, the attitude of the 
IMF, and the like would have to be taken into account in 
computing future reserve requirements. Any general rule 
that reserves should grow at some given rate may well be 
arbitrary, leading to inflation or lowering of credit 
standards.
4) Looking at a domestic economy and the role of a central 
bank, one may assert that such banks have not shown any 
willingness to adopt a policy of automatically and con­
sistently adding to the supply of money in line with pro­
duction. It is, in fact, quite possible to point out 
periods in which central bankers have thought that increases 
in money supply were not necessarily required for high 
levels of economic activity. Such a situation in which 
central bank authorities were convinced that there was 
adequate increase in the velocity of the circulation of 
money resulted in no injection of money into the economy.
To assert that the supply of international reserves should 
increase at an annual rate of three per cent (which is 
considered by Triffin as non-inflationary) would be to put 
the IMF in the position of doing what no central bank has 
been willing to do nationally.
Even Triffin's strong objections to the use of 
dollars as an international money is not plausible. Robert 
Roosa says:
It is also important to weigh, and to weigh heavily,
the positive consequences for the prestige and
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influence of the United States throughout the world 
that arise from the thousands of individual relation­
ships necessarily created in the day-to-day uses that 
are made of dollar facilities.1
At best, Triffin's belief in serious deficiency of reserves 
is unproven; at worst it may be wrong, and in any case, 
the political as well as international implications of his 
proposal and the matter of central bankers' willingness to 
adopt such a plan would have to be taken into account. 
Apparently, Triffin himself recognizes that his proposal 
may have to be modified in the process of any actual nego­
tiations for its implementation.
As this is a very brief presentation--and to some 
extent, evaluation--of Triffin's original plan--one final 
note is needed from his later thoughts. Even as late as 
1966, the publication date of The World Money Maze, he 
says :
We all recognize the existence of three separate, but 
inter-related problems in this area [international 
monetary systei^ ; (a) the need for relatively prompt
inter-country balance-of-payments adjustments, so as 
to avoid the growth of cumulative disequilibrium;
(b) the need for long-term adaptation of the over-all 
volume of world reserves to the full noninflationary 
possibilities of economic growth; (c) most urgently, 
the need for reduction of the vulnerability now imparted 
to the system by an excessive overhang of international 
short-term dollar and sterling indebtedness resulting 
from past reserve accumulation by central banks (i.e. 
for the liquidation of the so-called 'reserve currency 
system').^
^Roosa, op. cit. , p. 25-




In Angell's opinion, a "drastic" and extensive
reorganization of the present international monetary system
is not only urgent but also imperative.^ Furthermore,
"the most comprehensive plan hitherto proposed" is, in his
opinion, that of Triffin, whose major objectives "are the
right ones as far as they go"; yet Angell believes that
Triffin's plan not only contains "serious internal defects,"
but also, with respect to gold, "does not go to the real
2heart of the problem." Accordingly, Angell's objective 
is to offer an alternative plan to that advanced by Triffin. 
Because of this objective, Angell has used Triffin's plan 
as a preliminary framework for his analysis. The Angell 
Plan consists of two parts. First, he briefly describes 
what seems to him to be the "principal actual or alleged 
defects in Triffin's original proposals." Second, he pro­
poses an outline of an alternative program which he believes 
is a workable and safe way that can effectively solve the 
problems of the system. Except with respect to gold,
Angell presents a series of modifications to the Triffin 
Plan, rather than a departure in some wholly new direction.
^James W. Angell, "The Reorganization of the Inter­
national Monetary System: An Alternative Proposal," The
Economic Journal, vol. 71, December I96I, p. 70?.
^Ibid.
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In the following discussion, the basic issues of his plan 
will be brought up.
1. As indicated before, Triffin's principal pro­
posed remedy for the system is to provide for increases 
in international liquidity when it is needed through an 
"expanded IMF." It attached to the XIMP a function of 
coping with the balance of payments deficit without differ­
entiating between the types of deficits. Angell differen­
tiates between different types of balance of payments 
deficits and maintains that the IMF should not try to 
handle all of these deficits. He outlines deficits in 
balances of payments caused by defective internal monetary 
or fiscal policies, inability to maintain the costs of 
exports (or import substitute) at fully competitive levels, 
excessive programs of investment and aid abroad, secondary 
inflation in the countries receiving such funds, collapse 
of a primary-producing country's exports, too large or too 
rapid development programs and political upheavals as 
situations that are to be considered to be deficits. "If 
Triffin's IMF were to try to take effective counteraction 
in any of these latter cases it would merely load itself 
with burdens which could easily threaten its liquidity 
and even its solvency."^ There seems to be some element 
of truth in this assertion.
^Ibid., p. 693.
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2. According to Angell, there is no differentia­
tion between convertible currencies in Triffin's proposal 
and increases in IMF holdings of member currencies designed 
to relieve serious deficits of balance of payments.
Angell believes:
If the financial world comes to feel that the IMF's 
holdings of inconvertible currencies are excessive, 
. . .  the result may easily be the creation of doubts 
(under Triffin's plan) about the IMF's own liquidity 
and even its solvency.!
This is, of course, an iffy question, and in order to 
prevent the IMF from becoming a source of inflation,
Angell specifies that "its holdings of both types of cur­
rency should be specifically limited, and the limits on
2inconvertible currencies should probably be more severe."
3. Triffin's requirement for the members of the 
IMF to keep a stated minimum proportion of their own 
monetary reserves in the form of IMF deposits in order to 
provide the IMF with additional financial resources is, in 
Angell's opinion, an objective which can better be achieved 
in other ways. Angell does not mention what specific 
other means he has in mind, and so long as these are not 
tested in practice, their relative standing remains a 
"value judgment."
4. Triffin was concerned with the utilization of




economic development.^ This concern, so Angell argues,
has aroused misgivings. He argues that perhaps a small
proportion of the IMF's resources "might be used, if only
for political purposes," and goes on to say that "the
assets underlying an international monetary system should
not consist of any large quantity of long term placements,
2and still less be used directly to promote development."
It is needless to point out that this, again, is a value 
judgment, and Triffin's concern with the economic develop­
ment of underdeveloped countries on economic as well as 
political grounds is more plausible than Angell's view of 
utilization of a small fraction of the IMF's resources and 
"only for political purposes." The reasons can be seen 
from a subsection in Chapter II above which deals with the 
economic concern of developing countries and need not be 
repeated at this point.
5. Angell holds that the limits Triffin proposes 
to set on the total volume of IMF deposits are "at best 
loosely defined." Those who have criticized the Triffin 
Plan on the ground that it is an engine of potentially 
disastrous inflation have, in Angell's opinion, exaggerated 
the case, but he thinks the criticism is "substantial
3enough to debar adoption of the plan in its present form."
^Triffin, op. cit., pp. II7-II8 .
^The Economic Journal, op. cit., p. 6g4.
^Ibid.
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This assertion can easily be rejected in view of another 
sentence that Angell himself has included in his plan:
"One is always compelled to rely, to some extent, on the 
integrity, judgment and willpower of competent adminis­
trators .
6.
Finally, what seems to me the most serious defect 
of all in Triffin's plan is something which others may 
regard as its saving grace; its treatment of gold. 
Triffin makes a convincing demonstration of the total 
inadequacy of the free world's supply of monetary 
gold, yet he proposes to retain gold as one of the 
important and normal means for making international 
settlements; and the adoption of his plan could well 
increase rather than decrease the demand for gold.^
In view of the reasons discussed in a previous 
chapter, one can hardly find this argument convincing. 
Furthermore, the fondness of people for gold is a "value" 
that they presently adhere to, whether one likes it or 
not. Angell believes the difficulties in Triffin's pro­
posal as mentioned above are substantial. He agrees, how­
ever , that
some of them, it is true, could be materially reduced 
by a series of obvious modifications, of the plan 
itself. I think that even with these modifications, 
however, neither Triffin's plan nor any of the other 
proposals for reform that have been advanced to date 
qy^te gets to the heart of the matter.3





notice that he is against the reliance on gold. It is 
true, as Angell mentions, that gold serves as "part or all 
of the internal central reserves of many free-world coun­
tries" ; it is also true that it is used as "the last 
resort means for making international payments" and as a 
means of meeting demands of private and governmental gold 
hoarders all over the world. Yet Angell maintains:
"This, then, is the contradiction: we have no way of
making the supply of gold equal to the upper reaches of 
the probable aggregate demand, yet we cling tenaciously 
to the system. . . ."^ One can pose the question: With
the possibility of making use of reserves as a supplement 
for gold, is there really a need of equalizing the supply 
of gold with its demand? The answer that this question 
has received in practice appears to be negative.
The remainder of Angell's plan deals with some
proposed details which will be but briefly presented here
on the ground that what has already been presented shows
adequately his values (and perhaps biases). One might add
his interesting analogy:
Our present system is a moderately good fair-weather 
craft when managed skillfully, but in storms it leaks 
_ badly and could easily founder. No mere patching or 
caulking will strengthen it sufficiently. It is hence 
imperative to devise some better set of arrangements 




Needless to say a better set of arrangements in his opinion
is one that would almost allow us to get rid of gold. In
this respect, his idea is similar to Lerner's.
Angell's plan is based on two alternatives. First, 
monetary gold can be used for the settlement of all inter­
national transactions, discarding its use as an internal
national reserve. The disadvantage of this proposal, 
according to Angell, is that it may not assure the system 
an international balance. Secondly, monetary gold can be 
used to enlarge national internal reserves. If this second 
alternative were accepted, IMF deposits can be used as a 
means of last resort settlement. According to Angell the 
latter alternative seems to be the most practicable one 
as it permits a gradual reduction or elimination of the 
part that gold now plays (the use of gold as backing for 
domestic money in many countries, its use as a means of 
speculation and international settlements) without exposing 
the system to a danger of collapse.
If the proposed plan were to be accepted, the need 
and the demand for gold for use as a means of interna­
tional settlements would be eliminated, and IMF deposits 
would take the place of gold. Under this plan gold can 
still be a symbol of financial strength in all countries 
that so desired; however, its role as a means of inter­
national settlement would no longer exist.
In order to reconstitute the international monetary
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system, Angell thinks a set of provisions are necessary.
The IMF should be reorganized as an international central 
bank for its members. Initially the IMF should design its 
own gold-denominated deposit balances for each member in 
an amount equal to the subscription minus net debt of the 
member. From the standpoint of initial creation of IMF 
deposits if the plan is to work, members of the IMF should 
agree not only to accept title to IMF deposits in payment 
for any debt but also to count IMF deposits they own as 
part of their central monetary reserves. After the IMF 
original deposits are set-up, the members could increase 
their deposits with the IMF by selling either gold or 
domestic and foreign currencies to the IMF, thus making 
subsequent expansion of IMF deposits possible.
The members of the newly established international 
central bank under Angell's plan should agree that:
a) any member and the IMF are free to buy gold that any 
holder wishes to sell; b) no member will request gold in 
settlement of due payments; c) the IMF will not request 
gold from members; d) the IMF may sell or lend gold to any 
member country but neither the IMF nor any member will sell 
gold to a private individual.
Limits on IMF holdings of currencies must also be 
established in order to prevent undue expansion of inter­
national liquidity. This maximum is set at 10 per cent 
during the first year or two of the new system; that is.
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IMF holdings of either convertible or inconvertible cur­
rencies may not increase more than 10 per cent of the IMF 
holdings of the currencies. To remove temporary pressures 
the IMF should be permitted to increase this limit to 
20 per cent temporarily, provided that this would not 
cause too much deposit expansion.
From the standpoint of sanctions Angell holds that 
the IMF should be given new powers to prevent excessive 
holding of a member's currency. This power may be provided 
for the IMF by giving it the right to consult the member(s) 
involved, to recommend measures that the member should 
take, to require the member to repurchase its currency, 
to refuse acceptance of a currency until appropriate mea­
sures recommended by the IMF are taken, or finally to expell 
the member if necessary.
Angell suggests special provisions for primary- 
product exporters since their balance of payment pressures 
are different from industrial nations; he proposes that 
medium and long term loans should be applied to them 
during periods of decline in their export proceeds. How­
ever, international monetary assistances should be limited 
to temporary assistance; otherwise their resources might 
become committed to illiquid situations.
Angell's plan focuses on the creation of an inter­
national central bank. His plan does not deal with various 
types of balance-of-payments pressures which may frequently
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occur. It is also possible that the IMF may facilitate 
inflation on an international scale unless there is uni­
formly competent administration and wise judgments by IMF 
authorities. Angell's detailed plan also depends on many 
conditional provisions: i.e. if the IMF is reorganized,
if it is given the additional safeguards, if the gold pro­
visions are agreed to, if liquidity and soundness of the 
IMF be beyond question, if deposit balances of the members 
be equal to their total subscription. Of course, members 
of the IMF may not be especially amenable to some of these 
ifs; this raises questions about the feasibility of his 
proposals.
Stamp's Plan
Maxwell Stamp's original plan is as follows:
The IMF, upon the permission of its Board of Governors, 
would issue "Fund Certificates" of about $3 billion a 
year. Such certificates would not be convertible into 
gold, yet their value would be expressed in its terms. 
Then, if and when the currency of a country is needed, 
the IMF certificates with their general backing would be 
accepted in exchange for a country's domestic money. 
Members of the Fund would further be able to exchange such 
certificates on the basis of known and agreed rates.^ The
^Hon Maxwell Stamp, "The Stamp Plan--1962 Version" 
in Moorgate and Wall Street (Autumn I962) reprinted in 
Robert 6 . Hawkins (ed.), Compendium of Plans for Inter­
national Monetary Reform," The Bulletin, No. 37-38 (New
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scheme is also meant to reduce the pressure of conversion 
into gold to which some countries such as the Ü.S. are 
presently obligated. Henceforward, the U.S., and others, 
would have the "option of selling gold or tendering any 
Fund Certificates in their possession."^
2According to Stamp the Fund would "give away" 
its certificates to an aid coordinating agency which would 
in turn allocate them among underdeveloped countries on 
the basis of an agreed program. The receiving countries 
would use such certificates in payment of their purchases 
from industrialized countries "by tendering them to the 
central bank" and acquiring Dutch marks, dollars, sterling, 
etc. If a country were in overall deficit it could, if 
it so desired, use these certificates instead of losing 
gold. If, on the other hand, a country were in overall 
surplus, such certificates could be added to its reserves. 
In this manner the Certificates would eventually end up 
with the surplus countries and in the words of Stamp "would 
have automatically lent part of that surplus to the rest 
of the world.
York: New York University, C. J. Devine Institute of
Finance, December 196$), pp. 60-68.
^Ibid., p. 60.
2The words "give away" are taken from Stamp him­
self, and later he himself has realized that he should not 
have used them. Ibid., p. 66.
^Ibid., p. 60.
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The reader of the Stamp Plan is impressed very
early by the attention which he has devoted to developing
countries. Stamp has a strong reason to believe that this
is necessary. In his estimation the world, despite its
"great unused capacity," cannot find "the mechanism to
produce the goods which the poorer nations so urgently
need." Perhaps the world can find this mechanism, but it
has not exhibited much willingness to do so.
There have been two types of objections to this
original Stamp plan. First, there are those who deny the
existence of any shortage of international liquidity;
second are those who, accepting a shortage, claim that
there are better ways of curing it. In response to such
criticism Stamp holds:
I think one can admit that there may be no immediate 
shortage of international liquidity and yet believe 
that an annual increase in world reserves (beyond the 
supplies of new gold) is desirable, even essential, 
if the optimum performance from the world's economic 
system is to be obtained.^
This argument is in line with the idea held by some other
economists of the necessity of some annual increase in
2reserves regardless of their magnitude.
Stamp sets up an interesting hypothesis by saying, 
"Countries do not like going to the Fund to borrow, and I
^Ibid., p. 61.
2See, for instance, Machlup's analogy of "My 
Wife's Wardrobe" which has become known as The Mrs.
Machlup's Wardrobe Theory of Monetary Reserves, in Machlup, 
"The Need for Monetary Reserves," op. cit., p. 27.
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think it would be true to say that most developed countries
would like to have higher reserves."^ He further adds
that "if Russia were to put a considerable quantity of
gold on the world market there is no reason to believe
2that countries would not be glad to absorb it." It is 
also added that the developing countries cannot afford the 
luxury of keeping more resources in an idle form of gold 
or dollar balances. His original plan then does not 
necessarily rest on a hypothesis of adequacy or inadequacy 
of international liquidity; it rather rests on the follow­
ing hypotheses: a) existence of a "constant struggle by
all advanced countries to achieve an export surplus;
b) world capability of producing more goods and services 
that are urgently needed by underdeveloped countries;
c) and finally that this extra production may need extra 
reserves or extra credit. . _
Referring to Triffin's plan, Stamp indicates that 
"the need is not to give the Fund bigger resources to lend 
to members in trouble"--which seems to Stamp to be the 
crux of the Triffin Plan--but is "to create conditions 
under which the members are less likely to get into
3trouble." Thus one gets the impression that one of the 
main objectives of Stamp in his original plan is to prevent




troubles in terms of balance of payment deficits for cer­
tain countries, rather than to cure the illness once it 
is allowed to develop. This interpretation seems to be 
in line with his own comments as follows:
The injection of the new purchasing power into the 
pockets of the underdeveloped countries would mean 
that fewer advanced countries would run deficits and, 
therefore, the probable calls on the Fund to cover 
ordinary balance of payments crises would be lessened.
Stamp's original plan has been criticized on several
grounds, and in response to such criticism he has made a
number of modifications in his original plan as outlined
above. Such modifications can be presented in the following
form:
1. "Instead of being given away to the underdeveloped coun-
2tries, the Fund Certificates or Fund Credit could be lent."
2. Some backing might be given to the Certificates, and 
some limits (equal to their quotas) might be put to the 
extent of obligation of central banks in accepting them.
3. It would be desirable, according to.Stamp, for the Fund 
Certificates to carry a modest interest rate, but in prac­
tice it may not be possible.
4. If the extra purchasing power created by Fund Certifi­
cates were to be used only in deficit countries, it would 
be fine. But there is an equal chance for them to be 




employment. Therefore, there is a fear that this might 
add to present difficulties in controlling inflation.
Stamp tries to overcome this criticism by suggesting that 
"proper provision must be made to protect the interest of 
those countries which are in surplus or very fully employed 
by allowing them, in whole, or in part, to 'opt out.'
In short, the new version of Stamp's plan not only tries 
to remove the objections raised against his original plan, 
but also sets limits on both the amount of Certificates 
any one country is obliged to accept and what the Fund 
can create in the way of credit.
The criticisms raised against the Stamp Plan--such 
as the questionability of giving away some extra purchasing 
power to underdeveloped countries which may already be 
under inflationary pressures, the controversial nature of 
setting no limits on the credit creating ability of the 
Fund, etc.--can be read from Stamp's defenses as enumerated 
above; for this reason they have not been discussed sepa­
rately here. There seems to be, however, one basic flaw 
in his plan which should be discussed here. According to 
Stamp, as indicated above, if a country were in overall 
surplus, it would add the Fund Certificates to its reserves. 
In his estimation, the reserve would eventually end up 
with surplus countries and would be automatically lent to
^Ibid., p. 65•
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the rest of the world. Stamp does not go a step further 
to see what would happen if a surplus country does not add 
the Certificates to its reserves. Stated differently, his 
whole analysis of "Fund Certificates" is based on an assump­
tion of automatic lending which may not always hold true.
It is perhaps in view of such an automacity that the Fund 
believes: "Countries that are tending to run into persis­
tent surpluses should be willing to pursue, within limits, 
a more expansionary policy than they would have been 
inclined to adopt for purely domestic reasons."^
Creation of International Reserves
Bernstein's Plan
It will be helpful if Bernstein's plan is reviewed
in the light of the value premises that he sets out at the
beginning of his plan. It is sometimes said that reserve
centers tend to generate inflation in their own economies
and to transmit it to other countries. This is further
taken as a token of weakness of the present gold-exchange
standard system. Bernstein thinks the U.S. is not generat-
2ing inflation in other countries. Further, it is not
^1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 27- 
2Edward M. Bernstein, "Further Evolution of the 
International Monetary System," in Moorgate and Wall Street 
(Summer 1965) reprinted in Hawkins (ed.), op. cit., p ^  83- 
95* In Bernstein's opinion, the U.S. has had unused 
capacity, unemployed labor; its money supply has increased 
at an average annual rate of 2.2 per cent since 1958; its 
wholesale prices were about the same in I965 as they were 
in 1958; and the rise in cost of living has been minimal. On
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encouraged to nelgect corrective measures, although its
deficit does create certain monetary problems for some
other countries. These problems, on the basis of which
the present system of providing international monetary
reserves "can be properly criticized" are, according to
Bernstein: a) the growth of monetary reserves depends on
the U.S. balance of payments deficit; b) dollars and
sterling expose reserve centers to a danger of massive
conversion of their currencies into gold; c) reserve
holdings "make it possible to delay measures" for their
deficits; d) and finally, so long as gold is the ultimate
reserve asset, the amount of monetary gold is too small for
a convertible currency world. Bernstein also asserts that
if the U.S. deficit is eliminated, "the growth of monetary
reserves will be very small, consisting almost entirely of
gold," which has a declining proportion in terms of total
monetary reserves.^
As can be seen from these value premises, the focus
of Bernstein's attention is basically upon reserves which
in the present system "are linked to gold and are intended
2to be convertible into gold, directly or indirectly." 
Referring to the fact that the Group of Ten and Switzer­
land hold 86 per cent of the total gold reserves of all
these bases, Bernstein concludes this is not the behavior 




countries outside the Communist bloc, and pointing out
that the growth of gold reserves cannot be adequate for
future needs, Bernstein maintains that the best way to
cope with the difficulties of international liquidity is
to have these eleven countries establish "a composite
standard consisting of gold and currency reserve units for
transactions with each other.
A "Reserve Unit," according to Bernstein, would
be equal to one U.S. dollar with its present fineness and
weight in terms of gold. It would, however, not consist
entirely of U.S. dollars; Canadian dollars, German marks,
Swiss, French, and Belgian francs, Swedish kronors, pounds
sterling, lire, yen, and guilders could all be included in
the Reserve Units as well. To accomplish this, Bernstein
specifies that each participating member would "undertake
to hold reserve units in an agreed ratio to its holding
of gold" and also agree with the conversion of its currency
2into Reserve Units, just like into gold, in this ratio.
Bernstein has given a role of "trustee" to the 
IMF; participating countries (the Group of Ten and Switzer­
land) would deposit their own currency with the IMF acting
3as trustee for them. Thus if the U.K. deposited 100 million 
in sterling, it would be credited with 280 million Reserve 





reserve unit would be equal to one U.S. gold dollar. 
Similarly if the U.S. deposited a hundred million dollars, 
it would be credited with a hundred million reserve units. 
The process of obtaining reserve units would be the same 
for other participating countries. Thus the distribution 
of reserve units among countries would depend on how much 
of its own money a country would be willing to deposit 
with the IMF. As the IMF members deposited their curren­
cies with the IMF, they would be credited with an equiva­
lent amount in reserve units. What if all countries 
wished to deposit with the IMF a large proportion of their 
currency? Would there be any excessive increase in inter­
national liquidity due to too much reserve units? Bern­
stein thinks there will not be a sudden and excessive 
increase in international liquidity as the creation of 
reserve units would take place gradually. He further 
specifies in this context that in general the creation of 
reserve units in each year should be based on the rate of 
growth of gold and foreign exchange in order to secure "a 
growth in aggregate reserves at a moderate rate, about 
3 to 4 per cent a year."^ Bernstein would seem to limit
his composite standard (reserve unit) to the Group of Ten
2and Switzerland, and in this context he does not mention 




plan he remains silent on the share of the reserve units 
that would possibly go to the underdeveloped countries.
Thus from what Bernstein has said one gets the impression 
that the underdeveloped countries could not hold the 
reserve units directly; they could, however, take advantage 
of them indirectly, due to the fact that the process of 
reserve unit creation would add to international liquidity, 
and they would not be suffering as much from illiquidity 
as they would otherwise have to.
One can safely hold that Bernstein, just like 
Triffin, shows his awareness of the possible dangers of 
excessive international liquidity by pointing out that : 
a) the creation of reserve units would take place gradu­
ally, and b) the objective would be to secure a moderate 
rate of growth of reserves about 3 to 4 per cent a year.^ 
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the Bernstein Plan 
is based on the sole participation of the eleven countries, 
underdeveloped countries are not completely forgotten in 
his scheme. What such countries need is "better access to 
a larger pool of reserves held by the IMF." This need, 
in Bernstein's opinion, is based on the assertion that 
underdeveloped countries "do not hold large reserves of
their own because they cannot afford to invest real




There are a number of difficult questions that 
would have to be taken into consideration if the estab­
lishment of a composite gold standard is to work. First, 
there is the problem of the composition of reserve units, 
that is, "the proportion of the Reserve Unit that would 
be comprised of each national currency." Different cri­
teria can be used for this purpose--such as the importance 
of each country in international trade and/or investment, 
their share in international payments, etc. Yet, their 
quotas in the IMF seems to Bernstein to be a reasonable 
starting point^ in order to determine the relative propor­
tion of each currency in the reserve units. This criterion
suffers from the fact that the IMF quotas of some coun­
tries, especially in continental Europe, may not reflect 
their increased role in the international economy. Secondly, 
the ratio of gold to reserve units in converting the curren­
cies of the participating countries should be determined.
This should be high enough to maintain the "disciplinary 
effect of gold as the ultimate reserve asset," yet it 
should not be so high to make the already sensitive present
system more sensitive to gold.
One advantage of the Bernstein Plan is that par­
ticipating countries would be free to hold reserves in 
whatever form--gold, dollars, sterling, and reserve units 
--they wish. They are already obliged, under the IMF
^Ibid., p. 87.
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agreement, to convert into gold balances of their curren­
cies held by others. The only modification that Bernstein 
suggests is that the conversion would hereafter be not 
only in gold, but also in reserve units in the prescribed 
proportion (2/3 gold and 1/3 reserve units). Because of 
the similarity of his conversion arrangements to already 
existing obligations under the IMF arrangements, Bernstein 
asserts that "the adoption of the composite gold standard 
would involve a minimum change in the present international 
monetary system." Furthelrmore, as Bernstein prescribes, 
countries would enjoy the further freedom of lending or 
selling--whichever they wish--their excess reserve units 
to other countries. From these standpoints, then, his 
plan can be considered voluntary in nature.
The big disadvantage of Bernstein's plan is, how­
ever, limiting the role of IMF to that of a trustee only-- 
it is capable of fulfilling more functions. It can be 
inferred that Bernstein himself has noted such a disad­
vantage as he says at a later point: "It may be desirable
to give the IMF a more positive role in the composite gold 
standard than merely that of a trustee."^ A solution that
he has suggested in this connection is to assign the IMF 
2a 25 per cent participation in the reserve unit account
^Ibid., p. 93.
2Why 25 per cent, and not more or less, is not 
clear from Bernstein's writing. Ibid.
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meaning that the reserve units could each consist of 
25 cents in notes of the IMF, and 75 cents in the curren­
cies of the eleven participating countries.^
Exclusion of the underdeveloped countries from
participation in the establishment of the reserve units,
though an inadequacy of his plan, is not without reason.
The special position of these currencies of the Group 
of Ten and Switzerland in international trade and 
payments is evident in the operations of the IMF.
Of the more than $10 billion of currencies drawn from 
the IMF in the past seventeen years, 98 percent has 
been in the currencies of the Group of Ten. The IMF 
is aware that its liquidity, its capacity to extend 
reserve credit to its members, depends essentially on 
its resources in the form of the currencies of the 
Group of Ten. That is why the IMF has entered into 
the Special Arrangements to Borrow an aggregate of up 
to $6 billion from these countries. The Group of Ten 
is aware that when there is pressure on their curren­
cies the problem can be met only by using the curren­
cies of the other participants. That is why they have 
made arrangements for reciprocal swaps of more than 
$5 billion with each other.^
In spite of the undemocratic nature of the Bern­
stein Plan in the sense that it confines the creation of 
the reserve units to eleven countries, the position of 
dollars and sterling would not be inferior to that they 
now hold. Another advantage of this plan is that it would 
allow countries to whom the dollar and sterling are more 
attractive reserves than gold to fulfill their desire of 




another advantage is that the U.K. and the U.S. would 
benefit as would every other country from the establish­
ment of an orderly pattern of international payments. It 
should also be notëd that the assumption upon which his 
plan is based is that the large industrial countries can 
and will succeed in maintaining a strong balance of pay­
ments . ̂
In opposition one could argue that, from time to
time, some of the assertions in the Bernstein Plan are
not necessarily plausible. For example.
For nine-tenths of the 102 members of the IMF such 
measures to give them greater and more assured access 
to reserve credit would be far more valuable than par­
ticipation in composite gold standard of which they 
would in any case make very little if any use.^
As another example, "It should be emphasized that the
composite gold standard is intended to deal with a problem
that is peculiar to the large industrial countries." This
may be true, at one level of analysis, but it may riot be
correct if such assertions are generalized at the expense
of complete neglect of the concern of any other country
(other than the eleven) in the smooth functioning of
international monetary system. These are all minor points;
the major issue, however, is whether the countries could




different attitudes, national, and political feelings, 
and also whether they would give top priority to reserve 
creation.
It can be said that Bernstein was not trying to 
present a complete plan, but, instead, an outline from 
which negotiation could take place. This can be supported 
in view of the fact that after making his comments on the 
problem of the present international monetary system (as 
explained earlier at the beginning of his plan) he immedi­
ately adds: "These are some of the problems that must be
dealt with in any program for strengthening the interna­
tional monetary system."^
Roosa's Plan
According to Robert Roosa, Under Secretary of the
U.S. Treasury for Monetary Affairs from 1961 to 1965, the
international monetary system has "functioned remarkably 
2well," but the real trouble, ex ante, is
whether, under the evolving conditions of converti­
bility, the monetary system can amply fulfill its 
potentials over the years ahead of the primary respon­
sibility for supplying added reserves continues to _ 
rest upon a reserve currency created by one country.
It is important to note that Roosa has brilliantly based
his "Agenda for Future" on the following assertions:
^Ibid., p. 85.
2Roosa, op. cit., p. 73*
^Ibid.
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There are no economic needs that I can visualize for 
which facilities or potentialities within the system 
as it exists today are not at least minimally adequate, 
taking into account the innovations of the past few 
years. . . .  I do agree with those who wish urgently 
to pursue the search for new methods of broadening and 
adding to the facilities now available.^
The agenda that Roosa proposes for the future is centered
around "developing some sort of standards for determining
what the aggregate increase in international monetary
2reserves ought to be." This, in his opinion, must be 
developed in such a way that the positions of gold, dollars, 
sterling, and the IMF in the present system not be
3impaired, and that newly created reserves should not 
interfere with the "performance by the IMF of all its 
existing monetary and credit functions." Finally, new 
reserves, "should not interfere with the services performed 
by the vehicle currencies." The Roosa Plan can further 
be characterized as voluntary in nature since he has 
emphasized that "the holding and use of any new reserves 
should be subject to the free choice of individual sovereign 
nations." Moreover, his premises are cautious in that he 
thinks new reserves "should not alter or disrupt any coun­






own currency."^ Finally, one should bear in mind that 
"confidence is essential for the survival of any monetary 
system." In order to assure such confidence, attempts 
should be made to make new reserves and new credit facili­
ties "fit as closely as possible into familiar patterns of
experience and assure the continuity of existing methods
2for making payments or employing balances."
Comprehension of these value premises upon which 
Roosa bases his proposal is a necessary and an integral 
part of his plan. In fact, many parts of his proposal are 
another way of expressing these same value premises. After 
setting forth his own diagnosis of the international 
monetary problem, Roosa proposes workable ways of improving 
the present system. Most of his attention is focused on 
the creation of a new international unit, which might be
3called a "Fund Unit Account," that countries could add to 
their foreign exchange reserves. Whether his whole reli­
ance on the creation of new reserves (with no comments on 
what the position of new gold production should be) can be 
defended remains an open issue. There is no doubt in his 
mind that "the area that most needs to be probed in explor­
ing the potentials for major innovation is that of creating
^Ibid., p. 69.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 76. '
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additional reserve assets through group action.”^
One can go further into an orderly discussion of
Roosa's proposal with a glance at the crucial questions
that he has posed, and also at the answers he gives. The
following discussion follows the general pattern found in
Roosa's work.
The first question he poses is: "Where should the
new unit be created?" His answer is "within the IMF,"
with the further comment that the proportionate shares of
each country in their contribution would be determined by
taking into consideration the extent to which their 
currencies had been used for these other international 
purposes (as reserve currencies or through drawings 
of their currencies from the IMF) over recent years.
. . . In turn, each contributing country would receive 
a corresponding 'checking account deposit' in the Fund 
Unit Account. This it could spend, lend, invest, or 
use to make grants at its own discretion.2
In this way he claims that present reserve currencies
3would be supplemented but not supplanted. In order to 
carry out reserve creation, an "issue department," Roosa 
urges, should be created within the IMF as a new entity
4for the distinct purpose of creating monetary reserves.
The second question is : "Who will contribute to
the new unit, and in what proportions?" Answering this
^Ibid., p. 74.




question, Roosa asserts that the "new unit" will be formed
by the contribution of various national currencies. In
this respect, he takes the attitude that not only countries
whose currencies have already been used for international
reserve purposes should be qualified, but also "countries
whose currencies have been used in drawings at the IMF
should be eligible."^ As to the proportionate share, Roosa
goes on to specify that it too could be resolved on the
basis of the extent to which each currency has been used
for international reserves. An agreeable criterion could
be to give "great weight to the ratio between the use made
of each currency over, say, the preceding five years, both
2as reserve currencies and through drawings from the IMF."
The next question is: "Who will receive the
original contribution and in what proportions?" A simple
answer is given to this question by Roosa:
Once a Fund Unit is established, it is a virtually 
inevitable consequence of the elements of double entry 
bookkeeping that the original distribution of the new 
units (that is, the 'checking account' claims on the 
Fund Unit Account) will have to be made to the coun­
tries whose currencies are contributed to the account.
Moreover., the contributing countries should obtain a share
in the Fund Units "corresponding exactly with the propor-
3tion of their own currency contribution to the total."
^Ibid., p. 80. 
^Ibid., p. 8l. 
^Ibid., p. 86.
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It seems to Roosa that a rate of interest of about
"3 per c e n t s h o u l d  "be payable in the currencies put
into the Fund Unit Account by each contributing country,
although no interest should be paid by the Account in turn
2to holders of Fund Units." This, of course, may reduce 
the practical attractiveness of the Roosa Plan; however, 
Roosa believes that it is a necessary feature. He holds 
that since member countries could employ these Fund Units 
in settlement of their external commitments, they have, in 
effect, borrowed an internationally usable asset through 
the use of their own currency; thus they should pay a 
charge for this service. Such interest rates would, 
according to Roosa, provide the IMF with sufficient income 
"to cover all administrative expenses and permit a modest
3annual transfer to a surplus account." Roosa further
maintains that countries contributing to the Fund Units
4should maintain the gold value of their contributions. 
Because of this, he thinks "the Fund Units would, or 




4Ibid.; this would mean that if, for some reason, 
a contributing country should devalue, ". . . it should 
'pay-up' an additional amount of its own currency to fully 
offset the decline in the value of the amount already con­
tributed to the Account. . . .," p. 80.
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comparable to gold, as a reserve asset.
Still another question is : "Who will use the new
unit, and how?" To this Roosa answers "the Fund Unit
should be exchangeable at any central bank for its own 
2currency." Such units would ordinarily be expected, so 
Roosa argues, to "flow out as a result of increased imports, 
or paying past debts, or an increased granting of credit,
3or increased investment, or increased aid." Furthermore, 
since there is an obligation on the part of contributing 
countries to maintain the gold-dollar value of their con­
tribution, and since there is the possibility of converting 
these Fund Units into gold, the monetary authorities of 
every country "would thus be free to acquire and use such 
units in their own reserves, in payments to other monetary 
authorities, and in payments to international financial
4.institutions."
Last, but certainly not least, is a question that 
Roosa raises against the above background. The question 
is: Who will decide upon the amounts (of reserves), and
how? As can be seen from the following, Roosa's suggestions 






of sovereignty and present institutions; yet, he fully
realizes that:
It is on these questions of representation and of the 
possible infringement of sovereignty, as the amount 
and extent of national commitments were to be deter­
mined, that all proposals for international monetary 
reform have encountered their gravest difficulty.
In his opinion, the management of the Fund could be readily
delegated to the IMF's Managing Director and his Staff,
"operating in conformity with the general rules and
2specific decisions reached in the Executive Board."
Evaluation of such a neat and clearly defined pro­
posal is not an easy task, yet it is relatively easier 
than those which have been spelled out only in terms of 
general outlines. As can be seen from what has been pre­
sented so far, one can safely hold that the basic ques­
tions related to Roosa's proposed system as well as his 
value premises are very clearly defined. Furthermore, he 
readily admits that details can always be "resolved more 
effectively in the full light of considerations evoked by
3actual negotiation." Thus he should be given full credit 
for his flexibility of thought and also for a firm pro­
posal. Indeed, his plan can be proclaimed as a practical 
one, and at the same time it is based on well-founded 





the standpoint of* the least radical changes he proposes 
and the most respectful attitude to the IMF, dollar, 
sterling, and even to other countries whose currencies 
have been used as international reserves or drawn from the 
IMF.
Nevertheless, there are no practical limitations 
imposed on the maximum amount of reserves to be created; 
all is left to the discretion of the IMF. The great degree 
of discretion given to the IMF is not necessarily objec­
tionable, but hasty evaluation of a situation could lead 
to inappropriate actions. The big question on which Roosa 
is apparently silent is : Would there be any excessive
liquidity created in the world monetary system? At the 
same time, the question. What would, or should, happen to 
the annual increase in the production of gold?, is not 
dealt within the Roosa Plan.
Hansen's Plan
Professor A. H. Hansen proposes a plan for which 
he claims no particular originality.^ In his opinion a 
new monetary mechanism should be built around the Group 
of Ten. The General Arrangements to Borrow is, according 
to him, a new dimension to the international monetary
2system as it introduced a new approach to the system.
^Hansen, op. cit., p. 111.
^Ibid.
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He asserts that an international medium of exchange must 
be founded on strong currencies in order to be supported 
by the "financial security of the ten leading industrial 
countries."
Hansen asserts that "we need an 'international 
dollar'" to be managed under "a new governing board con­
sisting of the managing director of the Fund and delegates 
representing the monetary authorities of the Group of Ten."^
He further reasons that "we already have a U.S. dollar and
2a Canadian dollar. Why not an international dollar?" 
Hansen's plan consists of two steps: "a modest first
step" and "a bolder next step" as he has named them. Such 
steps are built upon established institutions. His pro­
posal is basically as follows:
Let the IMF adopt as an appropriate goal for a _ 
workable gold-exchange standard a maximum gold ratio 
of 60 per cent. Such declaration would give recogni­
tion to the fact that the current wide differences in 
gold ratios do not reflect 'an equitable distribution 
of the.burdens of international monetary coopera­
tion.
One implication of this proposal, as Hansen readily admits, 
is that high-gold-ratio countries should accept "a gradual 
evolution toward a genuine gold-exchange standard in place
^Ibid., p. 111.
^Ibid., p. 112.
3The ratio of gold to total reserves of a country, 
i.e., gold, foreign exchange, borrowing potential, etc.
4Ibid., p. 113.
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of their current heavy reliance on gold." Realizing that
this is highly improbable for such countries, Hansen seeks
a way out of this difficulty. His solution is to
permit the holders of reserve currencies to deposit 
their dollar (and sterling) balances in exchange for 
new international units with a new division organized 
within the IMF. We might call it the International 
Reserve System, the 1RS. The 1RS would then hold the 
dollar and sterling balances, which under the Fund 
Articles of Agreement would carry a gold-value guaran­
tee. The 1RS would then invest the dollar and sterling 
balances in longterm, interest-bearing U.S. and U.K. 
government securities. The 1RS would have monetized 
the long term securities in question into new inter-^ 
national units denominated as international dollars.
At the beginning the 1RS is not given permission "to play 
the role of a full-fledged international bank." Later, 
however, it could accept "deposits of reserve currencies 
and issue international dollars in exchange." Such inter­
national dollars would be regarded "as good as gold, and
2in fact, as an interest-bearing asset, better than gold."
Hansen's "bolder next step" is "to permit the 1RS 
on its own initiative to invest in long term government 
securities of any of the ten leading countries," with their 
consent, if and when it becomes clear that more interna­
tional liquidity is needed. At this stage, the 1RS is 
expected to play the role of a full-fledged international 
credit-creating bank under the control of a governing board 




asserts, a danger of bureaucracy; however, he thinks this 
could be overcome through informal methods of international 
collaboration such as telephone consultations if necessary.
Hansen's plan, though interesting, has many features 
similar to those presented in the plans suggested by Edward 
M. Bernstein and by Maudling with some differences which 
will be cleared after the review of these plans. Further­
more, countries are, under his plan, free to accumulate 
foreign exchange on their own. This plan, however, suffers 
from the standpoint of its lack of appeal to underdeveloped 
countries, the lack of readiness of the ten industrialized 
countries--or at least some of them-4to accept a maximum 
gold ratio of 60 per cent, the danger of bureaucratic pro­
cedures if and when some countries of the Group of Ten 
are not anxious for over-the-phone consultations, dangers 
of haste in evaluating circumstances of time in terms of 
realization of the quantitative needs for international 
liquidity, and leaving underdeveloped countries with the 
universal problems of short-term balance of payments dis- 
equilibria.
Zolotas' Plan
An incisive view of the plan of Xenophon Zolotas, 
Governor of the Bank of Greece, may be obtained if atten­
tion is directed to the following quotation:
In the last two years the annual outflow of long-term 
capital alone accounts for more than the corresponding 
overall deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. The
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still existing restrictions on capital exports in 
several industrial countries, and, more significantly, 
the organizational and institutional shortcomings of 
capital markets outside the U.S., impose on her, in 
addition to the responsibilities of a reserve center, 
the task of satisfying capital requirements in the 
rest of the world, including the highly developed coun­
tries. This situation is incompatible with the smooth 
functioning of the gold exchange standard, which 
requires some measure of correspondence in the availa­
bility and freedom of movement of capital among major 
trading countries. The resulting strains from this 
lopsided operation of the international financial 
mechanism are being accentuated by the movement of 
short-term funds, partly in reference to interest rate 
differentials.^
Zolotas has formulated his plan with the objective 
of reinforcing the present gold-exchange standard against 
the dangers of hot-money and speculative movements. His 
plan, like those of E. M. Bernstein, Roosa, and Hansen, is 
based on the idea of mutual assistance among central banks 
as well as between central banks and the IMF. Realizing 
that some countries are subject to short term capital flows 
(in and out) and to balance of payments disequilibria, 
Zolotas proposes that the IMF should undertake to borrow
^IMF, Summary Proceedings, Annual Meeting, I963, 
p. 93* Zolotas scheme has been outlined and developed in 
the following speeches and papers : Xenophon Zolotas,
Statement at the I962 Annual Meeting of the IMF, Summary 
Proceedings, I962, pp. IO8-II6; International Monetary 
Order, Athens, 1962; The Multicurrency Standard and the 
International Monetary Fund, Athens, 1963; Statement at 
the 1964 Annual Meeting of the IMF, Summary Proceedings, 
1964, pp. 86-93; Remodelling the International Monetary 
System, Athens, 1965; and more recently in his: Alterna­
tive Systems for International Monetary Reform (Athens:
Bank of Ghreece--papers and lectures. No. 18, Ï965). This 
last source will be the source upon which this section is 
based, unless otherwise mentioned.
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from the central banks in countries that are receiving 
capital inflows and lend the funds so acquired to the 
central banks of the countries suffering from the capital 
outflows
In essence, then, Zolotas aims at providing the
international economy with more liquidity. In his opinion
"gold is too scarce a reserve asset to be assigned a quan-
2titatively dominant role in international transactions," 
and the reform of the international monetary system "must 
provide for rational creation of international liquidity 
promoting the rapid non-inflationary expansion of world
3production and trade."
Zolotas also aims at enabling the IMF to reduce
the undesirable effects of destabilizing capital outflows
4on the balance of payments of countries. For this to be 
achieved the IMF is given, in addition to its present roles 
and authorities, the role of a guarantor or intermediary; 
it fulfills this role through borrowing international 
means of payments from central banks in the capital 
receiving countries and passing them on to the financial 
authorities of central banks stormed by capital outflows.
^Xenophon Zolotas, in International Monetary Fund, 
Summary Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the 
Board of Governors (Washington, D% C ., 195?)j p . 42.




It should be noted that Zolotas has a much broader 
outlook than simply dealing with undesirable effects of 
capital movements. He establishes a "Multi-currency Inter­
national Standard,"^ and his recommendation in this respect 
is that the reserve currency countries should, through 
cooperation, "build up sufficient balances of major, con­
vertible currencies to be used as 'masse de manoeuvre' in
the foreign exchange market and to serve as the first line
2of defense of the key currencies."
There are three significant features of the Zolotas 
Plan that are worth mentioning. First, to provide security 
against possible devaluation, Zolotas thinks that every 
country whose currency is used as international reserves 
within the pool of multi-currency international standard 
should provide other central bankers with a gold-value 
guarantee so that they need not fear devaluation. This, 
in Zolotas' opinion, need not necessarily be brought about 
by a gold guarantee; provision of a gold clause may be 
sufficient to reduce or eliminate devaluation fears.
Second, Zolotas thinks that central bankers have a prefer-
3ence for keeping gold rather than reserves. In order to
^Ibid., p. 25.
2Xenophon Zolotas, Towards a Reinforced Gold 
Exchange Standard (Athens: Bank of Greece--papers and
lectures, no. 7» 196l) , p. 11 reprinted in Machlup, '4»lans 
for Reform of . . .  op. cit. , p. 24.
3This should not be generalized and Zolotas cer­
tainly knows that, in recent years, some central bankers
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overcome this tendency, he suggests that preferential 
arrangements such as an interest rate should be created 
to make it attractive for central bankers to hold a greater 
part of their international reserves in the form of foreign 
exchange or reserves (rather than gold). Third, the key 
currency balances received by surplus countries and 
deposited in the Fund should be made repayable on demand 
to the depositor country whenever it is in balance of pay­
ments difficulty.^
The purposes for which loans are to be made under 
the Zolotas Plan reflect an important change from official 
thinking since the time of the Bretton Woods agreements. 
International loans then were to be made to countries 
experiencing balance of payment deficits and not too much 
attention was paid to disequilibria caused by capital move­
ments. Zolotas is concerned specifically with helping 
balance of payments disequilibria and has designed the loans 
to be given to the countries suffering from capital out­
flows. There are possible advantages for both the borrowing 
and the lending countries under a system of multi-currency 
standard as Zolotas has envisaged. The deficit country 
will have a part of its sight liabilities funded through 
replacement by deferred debt of a longer maturity. The 
lending country can take advantage of holding part of its
have shown their preference for interest earning assets 
such as U.S. securities.
^Alternative Systems for . . ., op. cit., p . 26.
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international reserves in the form of foreign exchange, 
rather than gold, thus benefiting from the interest rate 
and/or gold guarantee that without the plan it would not 
have had.
What is the primary source of liquidity under this
plan? Zolotas claims that the multiple currency standard
"renders possible for the alternating deficits of several
reserve centers--rather than the persistent deficit of a
single country--to become the primary source of liquidity."^
As many economists tend to discourage deficits Zolotas'
position provides an interesting contrast:
Deficits would be necessary for reserves to circulate 
rather than come to rest after a quick first round in 
the tills of surplus countries. Without interchange­
able deficits of the reserve centers, it is hardly 
likely that any kind of reform of the international 
monetary system would be operative.^
The mechanism by which support action takes place 
under Zolotas' plan may be demonstrated in the following 
example; it shows the way in which support action is pro-
3posed under Zolotas' plan. Suppose that a short-term 
capital outflow occurs from the U.S., and that regardless 
of what nationals have withdrawn the funds, they are offered 
to German banks. Then if the Deutsche Bundesbank (D.B.Bo) 




3This mechanism would also apply to Bernstein
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can undertake to purchase the dollars offered to the 
German banks. If the U.S. wishes to reduce its demand 
liabilities to the D.B.B., she can draw German marks from 
the IMF. The IMF, in turn, would have to call on the 
D.B.B. (if it does not have enough marks to meet the U.S. 
demand), and under credit arrangements lend German marks 
to the IMF, receiving in exchange non-negotiable instruments 
evidencing the IMF indebtedness. The IMF would then lend 
the marks so acquired to the U.S. which could, in turn, 
use them to buy back in whole or part its liabilities to 
the D.B.B. The main idea behind such provisions and facili­
ties for the country suffering from capital outflows is 
to prevent the pursuit of unsound and retaliatory policies 
which might be destructive to free flow of trade and invest­
ments internationally.
What is the IMF supposed to do with deposited 
currencies? And what form should its operations take? 
Partial answers have already been given to these questions. 
It was mentioned before that the Fund would lend the key 
currencies deposited with it in the respective deficit 
countries. Thus the Fund invests its acquired funds in 
the deficit countries; these investments take the form of 
"special, gold-value guaranteed obligations of the monetary 
authorities of the investee country and they would also be 
interest earning."^ These investments, according to
^Ibid., p. 27.
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Zolotas, could eventually be made negotiable in the capital 
markets of the investee countries, yet he feels that in 
view of the "presently insufficient development of the 
capital markets of the new reserve centers" and the require­
ments of national sovereignty in domestic monetary policies 
it would be advisable to make them non-negotiable at the 
early stages of the implementation of the program.^
Several other features of the Zolotas Plan are sig­
nificant .
First, Zolotas has exhibited full respect for the 
IMF. In his opinion the role that the IMF now plays should 
be expanded to include authority "to accept from the mone­
tary authorities of all member countries reserve deposits
2in convertible currencies other than their own and gold."
Furthermore, Zolotas clearly mentions that
the wide and long experience, the established prestige 
and the universal character of the Fund provide a 
most suitable framework for the implementation of evolu­
tionary measures-to supplement the present international 
monetary system.
Second, under the Zolotas Plan gold will continue 
to be used in the international monetary system; he does 
not speak about changing the price of gold. Also the 
present key currencies will continue to function in con­





currency infrastructure calls for "the creation of inter­
national liquidity by attributing to a number of major 
trading countries the role of reserve centers."^ Even 
when additional currencies are accepted as "key curren­
cies ," the dollar and the pound would still carry the
2function of working balances. Essentially Zolotas wants 
to allow a number of mature economies "to use their own 
currencies in settling their accounts among themselves as 
well as with the rest of the world." Hence Zolotas is 
calling for a liquidity-generating process which, despite 
the present system, will no longer rely only on one or 
two countries.^
Third, Zolotas is not a radical reformer; he does 
not introduce a scheme abandoning gold and/or raising its 
price, and he also appears to be against the establishment 
of a rival center for reserve creation and regulation. In 
his opinion, "to establish a rival center for reserve 
creation and regulation would be a backward step in the 
process of integrating the world economy."^
Fourth, Zolotas does not foresee massive conver­







on the Fund since it
would regulate the amount of deposits acceptable from 
each member country and that ceilings on deposits 
acceptable from each member country should corre­
spond to a certain percentage of its official key 
currency balances.^
Precisely how this regulation should be achieved and what
percentage must be used cannot be seen from Zolotas'
articles.
What can be said about Zolotas' plan? Undoubtedly, 
Zolotas' suggestions should be regarded as one of the most 
valuable recent plans under consideration for reform of 
the international monetary system because the proposed 
scheme is in his view "simply an organic outgrowth of the 
present institutional setup and secures the continuity of 
time-tested methods of operation."^ Furthermore, in 
linking the creation of liquidity to the deficits of key 
currency countries--an objectionable point to be discussed 
at a later point below--the plan provides for across-the- 
board reserve creation on a selective or general basis.^ 
Moreover, already existing key currencies, and even the 
ones to be established, "would most likely find no diffi­
culty in settling the major part or all of their deficits 
in their own currencies."^ The author of the plan must 






with respect to present institutions. It should also be 
added that the plan provides for future expansion of 
liquidity and more even distribution of its burden among 
countries. Last, but certainly not least, Zolotas has 
proposed a plan which is flexible in both directions: 
reduction and expansion of international liquidity depending 
upon the circumstances of the time. For example, he 
asserts :
Destruction of liquidity by the Fund can occur when­
ever it realizes its investments by asking the investee 
countries to pay in convertible currencies other than 
their own. This would and should happen in cases where 
the Fund deems necessary to proceed to a selective or 
general curtailment of reserves.^
Besides, the Fund could lower the limits on key currency
2deposits it would consider acceptable. If, on the other 
hand, a need for more international liquidity develops, 
the IMF is given the authority to create more liquidity 
through partial deficits of a reserve center. Zolotas is 
certainly right when he says that unemployment and stagna-
3tion are not tolerated in today's economies. He is also
right when he asserts that "the expansion of international
liquidity is by no means a panacea to world economic 
4problems.
^Ibid., p. 31.




With all due respect, however, the plan suffers 
from the following standpoints:
1. The plan is so much based on international 
cooperation that its reader gets the impression that 
Zolotas has taken this for granted. However, international 
cooperation to the extent that Zolotas' plan would require 
in order to function adequately is not now the rule. It
is true that in recent years more international coopera­
tion between financial authorities and central bankers of 
the world has been achieved, however, "new international 
agreements are not easily reached."^ The whole scheme essen­
tially depends on one big "if": If cooperation--and a high
degree of it--can be obtained in practice. Zolotas himself 
realizes this, as he says:
The acceptance of the scheme by the countries to 
receive Fund investments and the provision on their 
part of a gold-value guarantee on the balances in­
vested in them by the Fund are, of course, indis­
pensable. ̂
He does seem, however, to be much more optimistic than 
many other economists on the prospects of international 
cooperation.
2. The scheme of a multi-currency standard is 
based on the premise that other countries would, or should, 
be content to become reserve centers. This is, however, 
exactly opposite to IMF experience:
^Hansen, op. cit. , p. l4«2.
^Alternative Systems for . . ., op. cit., p. l6 .
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There has been no significant tendency for countries 
to transfer their reserves to potential new reserve 
centers; nor has there been any inclination on the 
part of any country whose currency might be thought 
of as an alternative reserve currency to welcome or to 
encourage any such development.^
3. Despite the fact that Zolotas has set univer-
salism as one of his objectives, and in spite of the fact
that he defines his idea of universalism as sharing by all
members of the international community the obligations and
2benefits deriving from the international monetary reform, 
he fails to fully take the underdeveloped countries into 
account and establishes the rule that "the deficits of the 
reserve centers are the primary source for liquidity expan­
sion in the proposed scheme"^ thus implicitly excluding - 
the deficits of underdeveloped countries from having any 
effect on the expansion of international liquidity. Per­
haps he is concerned with non-inflationary expansion of 
the need for liquidity, and on this basis excludes the 
deficits of underdeveloped countries from consideration as 
a source of international liquidity. Even if he has a 
point in thinking this way, he should realize that he has 
not allocated a fair share to the underdeveloped countries. 
It is surprising that in the last section of one of his
^International Monetary Fund, I965 Annual Report 
(Washington, D. C.), p. l4.
2Alternative Systems for . . ., op. cit. , p. 17* 
^Ibid., p. 31.
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articles devoted to the "international Liquidity and the
Developing Countries"^ he fully realized their need,
emphatically stating that "the success of the development
efforts of lower-income countries is critically dependent
2on the level and growth rate of world reserves," yet when
3he discussed the sources of international liquidity, he 
completely dismissed underdeveloped countries.
Zolotas himself criticizes his own plan by saying
that
Adding to the reserves of the countries with the 
highest per capita income is grossly inequitable to 
the rest of the countries which are left to earn 
through balance of payments surpluses such reserves 
as they feel they need for their economies.
One may notice that this criticism is very much in line
with the previous one.
4. Whether or not the best means for the specific 
interpretation and implementation of the general rules of 
conduct is "multilateral surveillance" is a matter of 
value judgment and perhaps subject to improbable success. 
This may create some discipline problems.
5. Under the plan the funds that the IMF acquires 
come from countries having capital inflows rather than 
from credit creation on the initiative of the IMF. Thus 





in the full sense of the word, but only that of an inter­
mediary. That is, a central bank can create credits on 
its own initiative and authority without having to borrow 
from commercial banks; the authority proposed for the IMF 
is not that of a credit creation. More specifically, the 
IMF is assigned a role of "credit transferer" rather than 
"credit creator" in that all it is assigned to do (under 
the plan) is to borrow international means of payments 
from the central banks in the capital receiving countries 
and to pass them on to the financial authorities of central 
banks stormed by the pressure of capital outflows.
Finally, Zolotas asserts that lower income coun­
tries "maintain a high ratio of key currencies to gold in 
their total reserves," without providing evidence for this 
assertion and without stating what he means by "high." To 
evaluate the validity of this assertion the following test 
was applied. A sample of 22 countries outside the group 
of eleven were chosen by random from the International 
Financial Statistics. The list of these countries can be 
seen in Table 17 in Chapter VII below. As an example, 
upon taking the percentage ratio of their foreign exchange 
to their gold holdings as of the end of 1966 it was found 
that not all of them maintain a high ratio of foreign 
exchange to gold in their total reserves if "high" be 
defined as more than one hundred per cent. This can be 
seen from Table 5 which shows that at least six out of
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twenty-two countries did not have high ratios. The same 
test was applied to the selected countries for every other 
year starting from 1951 to 19&5 , and the same conclusion 
was observed.
TABLE 5
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE PERCENTAGE RATIO OF 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO GOLD HOLDINGS FOR SELECTED 
COUNTRIES AS OF THE END OF 1966
Percentage Ratio Frequency
Less than 100 6 Countries
Between 100 to 200 5 Countries
Between 200 to 300 3 Countries
Between 300 to 400 2 Countries
Between 400 to 600 0 Country
Between 700 to 800 1 Country
Between 800 to 900 1 Country
Between 900 to 1000 1 Country
More than 1000 3 Countries
Source: Derived on the basis of data in Table 17,
Chapter VII below.
In connection with the Zolotas Plan, it must be 
pointed out that his plan is very similar to that of 
Maudling in that both propose the establishment of a new 
department or institution within the IMF designed to take 
the responsibility of transferring excess holdings of
18?
currencies from countries having capital inflows to those 
suffering from capital outflows. According to Maudling a 
mutual currency account must be established within the IMF, 
thus enabling the surplus countries to continue to acquire 
the currencies of other countries. Claims in the IMF 
would then be submitted in the form of a mutual-currency 
account. The plan does not precisely describe the manner 
in which mutual currency accounts would be drawn upon 
and the purposes behind their drawings; it is reasonably 
clear, however, that should a surplus country run a deficit 
in its balance of payments, it would have the right to 
draw upon the account.
Maudling readily admits that he is not putting 
forward "any cut and dried plan."^ But speaking of dif­
ferent proposals for the reform of the international 
monetary system, he has the following to say:
I am myself, moreover, attracted by the thought that 
we might develop a system of cooperation between the 
leading trading countries in the form of a mutual 
currency account in the Fund. By this, I have in 
mind an arrangement of a multi-lateral character under 
which countries could continue to acquire the currency 
of another country which was temporarily surplus in 
the markets and use it to establish claims on a mutual 
currency account which they could themselves use when 
their situations were reversed. Such claims on the 
account would attract the guarantee that such a system 
would enable world liquidity to be expanded without 
additional strains on the reserve currencies or 
avoidable setbacks to their economic growth, and at 
the same time without requiring countries whose
^International Monetary Fund, Summary Proceedings, 
Annual Meeting (Washington, D. C., 1962 )̂  p. 6b.
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currencies were temporarily strong to accumulate larger 
holdings of weaker currencies than they would find 
tolerable.̂
Thus Zolotas* and Handling's plans have one feature 
in common: surplus countries should lend to the IMF, pro­
viding in turn reserves to the deficit countries through 
the reserves so created. One can also see that Hansen's 
plan is essentially an elaboration of the Zolotas Plan.
According to the Joint Economic Committee of the 
U.S. Congress steps are being taken toward the establish­
ment of a multiple currency reserve system. In May of 1962 
Robert Roosa, then Under Secretary of the United States 
Treasury, announced that such steps have been implemented 
by the U.S. through acceptance of the currencies of various 
countries as part of its international r e s e r v e s . ^
Ovei the past l4 months the United States has, for the 
first time since the later 1930's, entered into foreign 
exchange transactions for monetary purposes, as dis­
tinct from the more or less routine handling of foreign 
exchange to meet the Government's operating needs 
abroad. The Treasury began limited operations in 
March 1961, acting through the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York as its fiscal agent. In February of this 
year the Federal Reserve System announced its decision 
to enter the exchange markets for its own account.3
According to Roosa the advantage of a system of keeping
^Ibid., pp. 67-68.
2Remarks of Robert Roosa at the monetary conference 
of the American Bankers Association, Rome, Italy, May 1?» 
reprinted in "The Beginning of a New Policy Banking and 
the Balance of Payments Assuring the Free World's Liquidity," 
Factors Affecting the United States Balance of Payments, 
op. cit., pp. 327-351*
^Ibid., p. 327.
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currencies of other countries is not only that it limits 
temporary disturbances in the exchange market but that it 
also has the extreme advantage of using existing institu­
tions and practices. "Within such a system the patterns 
of reference are known to all; no one will be asked to do 
things that fall outside the realm of his experience."^
It must be borne in mind that Roosa, despite the
similarity of his proposal to those of Zolotas and Maudling,
does not want to suggest a gold guarantee for dollars:
he maintained that confidence in the dollar must be beyond
doubt or suspicion (a position not so surprising from a
U.S. official authority). Indeed, he tends to think that
a gold guarantee for the dollar is not only unnecessary
but harmful, worthless, and cumbersome. During 1962, the
United States took further steps toward bilateral "swap"
credit agreements with a number of countries such as
France, West Germany, England, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium,
3and the Netherlands.
In The Beginning of a New Policy Roosa makes a 
statement which applies not only to his views but also to 
those of Zolotas and Maudling--namely, the net effect of 
the U.S. holdings of foreign currencies would be "to
^Ibid., p. 332.
^Ibid., pp. 3&3-4.
3 Charles A. Coombs, "Treasury and Federal Reserve 
Foreign Exchange Operations," Ibid., pp. 335-369.
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multilateralize a part of the role performed now by the 
two key currencies, within a framework that would place 
great stress on still further cooperation among monetary 
authorities."^ Despite Roosa's contention, swap currency 
agreements would be more bilateral than multilateral 
arrangements. Thus Roosa's "multiple currency reserves," 
Bernstein's "reserve unit," Lutz's "multiple currency 
standard," Maudling's "mutual currency account," and 
Zolotas' "multi-currency international standard" (and 
even Hansen's plan) all have one feature in common--to 
rely on more currencies than dollars and pounds.
Other Proposals
Posthuma's Plan
S. Posthuma, a director of the Netherlands Central
Bank, proposes that surplus countries should reach an
understanding to hold only a certain percentage (60%) of
their international reserves in gold and the rest in key 
2currencies. His proposal is implicitly concerned with 
the leading gold holding countries and since the objec­
tive is to provide a means of creating more international 
liquidity, it would be of significance for the six large 
gold holding countries: Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium,
^Remarks of Robert Roosa . . ., op. cit. , p. 331.
2s. Posthuma, "The International Monetary System," 
in Banco Nationale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 66, 
September, 1963» Unless otherwise mentioned, this article 
will be the main source upon which this section is based.
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West Germany, France, and Italy. The effect of his pro­
posal upon the U.S. and the U.K. will be referred to in a 
later part of this section. The following two tables can 
be helpful in providing a better understanding of the 
nature of Posthuma's plan. As can be seen from these 
tables gold holding as a percentage of the total reserve 
of leading gold holding countries in most cases, with the 
exception of W. Germany, has been over 60 per cent in I966, 
while foreign exchange holding as a percentage of total 
reserves for the leading gold holding countries has been 
less than 40 per cent. What Posthuma suggests is, in 
effect, an agreement among these countries to take a lower 
percentage ratio of gold and a higher percentage ratio of 
foreign exchange to total reserves. In his opinion, this 
can, if successfully achieved, reduce the conversion 
demands for gold and can also increase the demand for 
foreign exchange. This "if" will further be discussed 
after the substance of his program has been presented.
Why does Posthuma limit himself only to the six 
Continental European Countries mentioned above? Because, 
first, these are the only countries, other than the key 
currency countries, which hold anything approaching the 
60 per cent ratio of gold to total international reserves. 
Second, he regards limiting of the proposal to the six 
countries mentioned above to be the most feasible and the 
simplest application of his proposal.
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What is required to put his proposal into effect?
The six gold-holding countries will have to either stop 
accumulating gold, sell some of their gold for foreign 
exchange, or both. On the other hand, the proposal requires 
that the key currency countries start to increase their 
foreign exchange from their present low percentages to 
something approaching 40 per cent. Further comments on 
the effects of the proposal upon key currency countries 
will be presented later. At this point, it must be noted 
that this proposal may be gradually put into action rather 
than being immediately effective.
If Posthuma's proposal were to be applied to the 
leading gold holding countries, it would require the foreign 
exchange purchases for the year I966 noted in the table on 
the following page.
Once required purchases under Posthuma's proposal 
are obtained, they may be compared with the actual gold 
and foreign exchange holdings of these countries. This 
comparison has been made in Table 7• This table clearly 
shows that if Posthuma's proposal of holding 60 per cent 
of total international reserves in gold and 40 per cent of 
total international reserves in foreign exchange were 
applied to the year 1966 and then compared with the actual 
holdings of the leading gold-holding countries, W. Germany 
and Italy would still deserve to get more gold, and the 
U.S., France, and Switzerland would be required to relin­
quish extra gold (extra being defined under Posthuma's
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plan as the positive difference between their actual 
holdings and their required holdings). The U.S., France, 
and Switzerland would thus have acquired more foreign 
exchange in order to meet Posthuma's requirement, an 
interesting situation which will be discussed later.
TABLE 6
FOREIGN EXCHANGE PURCHASES REQUIRED UNDER 
POSTHUMA'S PLAN FOR THE YEAR I966 








kO% of Total 
Reserves to be 
held in foreign 
exchange
(4)
60% of total 
Reserves to 
be held in 
gold
United States l488l 5952 8929United Kingdom 3100 1240 i860
Belgium 2320 928 1392
France 6733 2693 4o4oWest Germany 8028 3211 4817Italy 4911 1964 2947Netherlands 2448 979 1469Switzerland 3324 1329 1995
Total 45745 18296 27449
Source: Data in column 2 are taken from the last column
of Table I5 , Chapter VII below; data in columns 3 
and 4 are personally computed.
The net effect of the application of the Posthuma 
Plan upon the positions of the U.S. and the U.K. is not, 
however, as simple as the above paragraph might suggest. 
As shown in Table 7, the actual gold holding of all 
selected countries amounted to $33215 million (U.S.)
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF THE REQUIRED PURCHASES OF GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
UNDER POSraUMA'S PLAN AND THE ACTUAL GOLD AND FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1966 































United States 13235 8929 4306 1321 5952 -4631
United Kingdom 1940 i860 80 1159 1240 - 81
Belgium 1525 1392 133 428 928 - 500
France 5238 4040 1198 507 2693 -2186
W . Germany 4292 4817 - 525 2479 3211 - 732Italy 24l4 2947 - 533 1612 1964 - 352
Netherlands 1730 1469 261 305 979 - 674
Switzerland 2841 1995 846 483 1329 - 846
Total 33215 27449 5766 8294 18296 10002
VO*(!*
Source: Data in columns (l) and (4) are taken from IMF, International Financial
Statistics, Vol. 20, No. 8 (Washington, D. C., August 1967)» pp. 15-17; data in columns (2) and (3 ) are taken from Table 6 above; data in columns 
(3) and (6) are personal computations.
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dollars in I966 (total of column (l) in Table 7); under 
Posthuma's prescription, if the selected countries agreed 
to keep only 60 per cent of their international reserves 
in gold, they would have needed only #27449 million worth 
of gold (total of column (2) in Table 7)» The difference 
between the total actual gold holdings and the total 
required gold holdings thus amounts to #5766 million 
(= 33215 - 27449). On the other hand, the difference 
between total actual foreign exchange holdings and the total 
required foreign exchange holdings amounts to #10002 million 
(= 18296 - 8294). Essentially this is the crux of what 
Posthuma has suggested: If the leading gold holding coun­
tries were to agree that each would hold 60 per cent of 
its international reserves in gold and the rest in foreign 
exchange, international liquidity would then be increased 
by two means: a) the release of gold, and b) more demand
for foreign exchange and reduction of the pressure on 
U.S. dollars and the pound. However, to derive the net 
demand for foreign exchange from the standpoint of the 
U.S. and the U.K., their actual holdings of foreign exchange 
should be deducted from the totals. Thus for the year 
1966, one should deduct 1321 + 1159 = 2480 from 8294 (the 
total of actual foreign exchange holding in Table 7)«
This would indicate that countries other than the U.S. and 
the U.K. would have a demand for 8294 - 2480 = #58l4 
million more of foreign exchange. Thus the over-all
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effect of application of the Posthuma Plan is favorable to 
the U.S. and the U.K. as it increases the demand for their 
key currencies, despite the fact that each of these two 
key currency countries would have to buy foreign exchange 
from other selected countries to meet the requirements of 
the plan.^ The plan, therefore, could potentially involve 
a significant increase in gold release to the benefit of 
international liquidity and a considerable increase in the 
demand for dollars and sterling; by so doing the plan 
could actually transform what is now regarded to be a 
dollar glut (excess dollars) into required foreign exchange 
holdings. Thus a rigid control of the gold and foreign 
exchange ratios would permit an expansion of the inter­
national means of settlement as viewed in terms of gold 
and foreign exchange. Hence, Posthuma's plan calls for and 
results in the expansion of international liquidity without 
demanding a return to full gold-standard, a rise in the 
price of gold, establishment of a new international credit 
creating institution, or an international bank. Undoubtedly
^There is no way of knowing the net and exact 
effect of the application of Posthuma's plan upon the U.S. 
and the U.K. individually, since part of U.S. demand for 
foreign exchange may be met by British pounds in addition 
to the currency of other members, and by the same token 
part of the demand of the U.K. for foreign exchange may be 
met by U.S. dollars, in addition to the currency of other 
members. Posthuma has not specifically stated what the 
consequences would be in this event. The calculations com­
puted for the year 1966 clearly show that the net effect of 
the application of Posthuma's plan upon the U.S. dollar and 
the British pound cannot be measured accurately, despite 
the ostensible simplicity of the proposal itself.
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if Posthuma's plan were agreeable to the participating 
countries and these participants would only be composed of 
leading gold-holding countries and would not include the 
underdeveloped countries, it could make contributions 
toward a mutual sharing of the possible risks in terms of 
pressures on the key currency countries' monetary units.
Furthermore, if implemented, the proposal might 
give a tremendous impetus to the development of financial 
integration not only between the Common Market members but 
also between them, the U.S., and the United Kingdom. More­
over, if the program were successful, the U.S. and the 
U.K. would be left with a supply of foreign exchange equal 
to 40 per cent of their international reserves which would 
potentially make them more immune to speculative movements 
of any foreseeable magnitudes, hence more stability could 
be provided for the international monetary system.
Besides, international credit across the leading 
countries would be provided. Because, as Machlup has men­
tioned:
After all, the willingness of a central bank to allow 
its monetary reserves to grow by an accumulation of 
claims against a particular country implies its will­
ingness to grant increasing amounts of "credit" to the 
central bank of that country.^
In addition, when international reserves are held 
in the form of gold, the holding country would have to
^Machlup, "Plans for Reform . . .," op. cit.,
P • 30.
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forego any interest rate, since there is no interest paid 
on gold holdings of one country by others. There is the 
possibility of taking advantage of reserve holdings which 
are in the form of foreign exchange and foreign government 
securities, such as the Roosa bonds. Thus, if Posthuma's 
plan were accomplished, some countries could add their 
earnings from the interest rates on part of their interna­
tional reserves which would otherwise have been impossible 
if they held only gold or substantial gold.
Posthuma's proposal does not require an indefinite 
waiting period before the individual country may act; 
rather, it calls for immediate specific joint action.
This, it is possible to assume, may add to the difficul­
ties of implementation of his program.
Focusing attention on the undesirable aspects and 
disadvantages of Posthuma's plan, one may consider the 
following points.
First, this plan does not make any specific indica­
tion as to how countries can be induced to hold less gold 
and more foreign exchange balances in their international 
reserves.
Second, despite the significant short run increase 
in international liquidity that the proposal could poten­
tially create, it is doubtful if the need for increased 
international liquidity implicit in a growing world economy 
and a growing volume of international trade can be met on a
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long run basis through implementation of this plan.
Third, the 60 per cent gold ratio would bring about 
an increase in international liquidity under the condition 
that the U.K. and the U.S. could successfully place their 
government securities in European capital markets or with 
foreign governments and central banks in order to acquire 
the needed foreign exchange in the event that they are 
unwilling to give up more gold. Whether the Continental 
European countries are prepared to receive vast amounts of 
U.S. and U.K. securities in their capital markets remains 
questionable.
Fourth, Posthuma's prescribed uniform ratio of gold 
to total international reserves evidently requires sur­
veillance over the reserve composition of each participating 
country. But are these;countries really willing to agree 
to any such regimentation?
Fifth, the reader of the Posthuma Plan gets the 
impression that underlying his view is the concept that 
fluctuations in international reserves affect domestic 
price stability. This may be true with respect to W. Germany 
and possibly some other countries, but no longer need it 
necessarily be true. Today in some countries central bank 
authorities can more effectively control domestic price 
stability through credit controls and other devices (such 
as fiscal policy); it might be within their powers to 
isolate the volume of domestic credit and the domestic
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price level from the impact of fluctuations in foreign 
reserves.
Sixth and more important than the above criticism
is that there is no necessity to predetermine the desired
amount of international reserves: individual countries
decide this on the basis of what they believe they need.
A report of the IMF states that "many countries may state
that their reserves are too low or wish that they might be
larger, without being prepared to take the steps necessary
to strengthen them.
The adequacy of reserves, both for the world as a 
whole and for individual countries, can be judged only 
in a broad international context. For example, a given 
level of reserves will have one degree of adequacy 
when economic conditions between countries are in 
reasonable balance and when exchange rates are appro­
priate. If these conditions are not satisfied, the 
same reserves will have a different degree of ade­
quacy. Similarly, from the point of view of any one 
country, reserves that may be adequate if the country 
is following a program of development with stability 
may appear totally inadequate when it has an unbalanced 
budget or active credit inflation. No amount of 
reserves is adequate to finance a continuous deficit 
in the balance of payments resulting from excessive 
spending or insufficient revenue. In these cases, 
the immediate task is clearly to adopt fiscal and 
monetary policies that will restore external and 
internal equilibrium.^
Seventh, not only may the agreement between the 
leading gold holding countries not be easily achieved, the 
proposal requires new monetary machinery to be devised to
^International Monetary Fund, International 




facilitate internationalization of the free world's capital 
markets. Unless this machinery is revised, the proposal 
is likely to remain unworkable. Furthermore, the proposal 
may face other practical problems from the standpoint of 
feasibility. For example, it may prove difficult to per­
suade the European parliaments or even the U.S. Congress 
to give unilateral guarantees to their currencies. In 
practice it would probably be easier to achieve the same 
result through the IMF. Also the proposal, as already 
mentioned, calls for a formal commitment to maintain an 
established gold and currency mix. This, in the opinion 
of Williamson, is probably essential if a multiple-key 
currency proposal is to increase liquidity.^
Finally the program completely dismisses the under­
developed countries, and remains silent on how these coun­
tries would be affected by the new proposal. Presumably 
Posthuma thinks that the addition to total international 
liquidity can favorably affect the underdeveloped countries. 
Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen's Plan.
In contrast to many authors who have focused their 
attention on either the problem of inadequacy of inter­
national reserves or balance of payments adjustment, Hart, 
Kaldor, and Tinbergen have broadened their outlook with 
consideration of the problem of commodity price
1John H, Williamson, "Liquidity and the Multiple 
Key Currency Proposal," The American Economic Review, 
vol. LIII (June, 1963)» pp. (130-431-
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stabilization. Thus they present a plan^ which aims at 
solving (with one stroke) both the problem of international 
liquidity and the problem of commodity price stabilization. 
This proposal is therefore of a more comprehensive nature 
than many other proposals of the igbO's.
Long ago Benjamin Graham in Storage and Stability 
(1937) and World Commodities and World Currency (1944) 
paid attention to the problem of commodity price fluctua­
tions and its effects upon various countries. Thus con­
sideration of the role of storage of commodities, its 
effect upon international economic stability, and reliance 
on open market operations is not unique to the Hart,
Kaldor, and Tinbergen Plan; this plan can well be con­
sidered a modified or modern version of Graham’s earlier
pdiscussions.
The plan does not propose a change in the price of 
gold or in familiar institutions. With full respect for 
the present positions of gold, the dollar, the pound, and
^Albert G. Hart, Nicholas Kaldor, and Jan Tin­
bergen, The Case for an International Commodity Reserve 
Currency. A Memorandum submitted to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, March 28 to 
June 15, 1964.
2Even in the 1960's, Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen 
are not the only economists paying attention to the role 
of "open market operations" in the economy. See, for 
example, Fritz Machlup, "The Cloakroom Rule of Interna­
tional Reserves: Reserve Creation and Resources Transfer,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX, No. 3 
(August 1965), pp. 337-355; see especially p. 351 for 
Machlup's attention to the role of open market operations.
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the like, the plan requires that the IMF establish an 
international currency of its own (bancor) distinct from 
its present drawing rights which are denominated in the 
currency of individual nations. A further requirement of 
the plan is that member countries accept the bancors 
issued by the IMF on equal terms with gold. Under the 
scheme central bankers are permitted to hold bancor 
balances.
What quantity of bancors should be created ini­
tially? The plan requires an initial issue of $30 billion 
bancors to be exchanged with $5 billion of the obligations 
of member countries, $5 billion worth of gold, and a 
$20 billion bundle of thirty or so primary commodities 
suitable for storage. Such commodities, according to the 
plan, should be bought at a "declared value" to be computed 
for each year on the basis of their average world price 
in the two preceding years. If the market price of a 
commodity within the bundle rises by fifty per cent or 
more over its declared value for any reason (as in the 
case of sugar in 1962), the plan provides that such a 
commodity would be excluded from the bundle.
How are the commodities to be purchased? The 
plan provides that commodities must be purchased through 
open market operations and from the stocks held by member 
countries. The IMF should, according to the plan, set up 
a marketing organization of its own to be engaged in the
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sale and purchase operations of various commodities 
accepted in the bundle. The objective of these open 
market operations is not to prevent or eliminate relative 
price movements of these commodities with respect to each 
other, but rather to stabilize the general price index of 
commodities and to moderate their fluctuations.
The process of operation that Hart, Kaldor, and 
Tinbergen have assigned to the IMF is that of an intelli­
gent trader. The IMF should, so they argue, issue new 
bancors--or use already issued ones--to finance the pur­
chase of commodities and add them to its bundle whenever 
their market price is below their declared value. Further 
purchases of commodities and further addition to their 
storage should cease once the market prices of commodities 
reached their declared value. On the other hand, when the 
market prices of commodities rise above their declared 
value, the IMF would release part of its commodity stocks.
Thus under this plan, the Fund would provoke two 
distinct effects in its open market operations. First, the 
Fund would have a control or self-balancing mechanism in 
that there would be a release of stocks when the market 
price of commodities rises above their declared value and 
a storage of stocks when their prices fall. Second, by 
so doing, the IMF automatically injects bancor income into 
countries selling commodities when their price is below 
the declared value and withdraws bancors when prices of
205
selected commodities are above the declared value. As a 
result of these operations, a decrease in international 
liquidity would occur when world supply of primary products 
rises through the release of stocks, and the rise in bancor 
income of primary producer countries would be limited. By 
the same token, the volume of international liquidity 
would increase when world primary products fall through 
the injection of additional bancor incomes to the coun­
tries as a payment for whatever primary products they sell. 
The plan attempts to solve the problems of international 
liquidity and changes in the price of primary commodities 
through a reliance on a market mechanism affected by free 
forces of supply and demand. There are, however, reserva­
tions to this method which will be made below after the 
substance of the plan is analyzed.
Another related question is : "How is the bancor
to be used?" A partial answer to this question is implicit 
in the above paragraph; the IMF is to use bancors for 
making payments on the purchase of primary commodities.
This would add not only to the store of international 
liquidity, but would also curb the destabilizing effects 
of the price changes of the primary commodities for the 
developing countries. There is still the question of how 
the member countries should use bancor incomes. Hart, 
Kaldor, and Tinbergen assert that newly acquired bancors 
are part of the international reserves of a country and
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can be used to pay off debts incurred in international 
transactions. To make the bancor work, supporters of the 
plan have held that the creditor countries should help 
other countries by converting their holdings of key cur­
rency into gold. They can achieve this objective by 
reducing the rate of interest paid to foreign holders.
Citing a figure of $22 billion as official holdings of 
sterling and dollars in 1964 (the date the plan was written), 
the authors of the plan assert that should such a conver­
sion take place, $22 billion dollars of the newly created 
$30 billion dollars will be absorbed if the IMF uses all 
of these for the purchase of primary storable commodities, 
thus leaving the international economy with a net increase 
of $8 billion.
What if the creditor countries do not choose to 
take bancors? The answer provided by Hart, Kaldor, and 
Tinbergen--which incidentally places most of the burden 
on the key currency countries--is that they should freeze 
their bancors. This freeze, so their argument runs, would 
have the same effect on international liquidity as if the 
sterling and the dollar holdings have been converted into 
bancors.
What if the countries do not choose to make trans­
actions with the Fuiid in terms of buying and selling com­
modities? There is no answer provided to this, but it is 
reasonably clear that the authors of the plan have thought
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countries would prefer to engage in transactions with the 
Fund, as in a period of falling prices they can get some 
bancor income and prevent a loss due to inappropriate 
price reductions, and in a period of rising prices above 
the declared value they can buy cheaper from the Fund.
Not too much attention is paid to where (specifically in 
what country or countries) the commodities should be 
stored, and what the effect of transportation costs on the 
international movements of these commodities would be.
How urgently should the target of adding $30 billion 
bancors be sought? Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen assert that 
this would depend on how fast the $20 billion bundle of 
commodities can be bought and what the direction of move­
ment in their price is. Ostensibly, if commodity prices 
were falling--as was the case from 1955 to I962 according 
to Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen--the IMF can more easily 
engage in a rapid accumulation of the $20 billion bundle 
target. Depending on how fast the commodities can be 
bought a period of five years could be established.
Who is going to engage in IMF transactions with 
the member countries in terms of buying or selling various 
commodities? The authors have suggested that reliance 
could be placed upon private traders who would engage in 
open market operations and would work according to a 
general rule of action: to buy primary commodities in the
open market whenever the market price was less than the
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declared value and to sell when prices were more than the 
declared value within a margin to be specified officially 
for selling and buying parity rates. The activities of 
these IMF agents in different primary producing countries 
would be further supplemented by IMF marketing organization 
in the industrial commodity markets.
Basic to the analysis of this plan are two implicit 
assumptions. First, the continued growth of the industrial 
countries depends on an increasing supply of primary commodi­
ties. Second, the significant factor in the progress of 
developing countries is a smooth and adequate supply of 
foreign exchange. Both of these assumptions can be subject 
to challenge. On the one hand, at least some industrial 
countries can secure their needed primary products from 
within their own economies, and to the extent that they do 
(neglecting the substitutes that they may have or may 
develop for primary products) they do not have to engage 
effectively in primary product transactions with the IMF 
or with any other country. On the other hand, the acqui­
sition of foreign exchange is not the all-important factor 
in the progress of developing countries. At best, the same 
results can be achieved through a domestic stabilization 
fund to be set to engage in the same type of transactions 
and/or through compensatory fiscal and monetary policies.
What can be said about this scheme? To begin with 
it is quite clear that the authors have had a broader
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outlook than most economists dealing with the interna­
tional liquidity problem in that they have included the 
undesirable effects of fluctuation of commodity price 
changes which do undoubtedly affect developing countries; 
they deserve credit for this. But precisely how much more 
complex their plan becomes because of this very much 
broader outlook cannot be measured. It must also be 
recalled that Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen's attention to 
the price fluctuations of primary products is not a 
problem that other economists have been unaware of. It is 
only that the scale of preference and individual value 
judgments of economists vary; some economists have thus 
preferred not to mix up the two problems of adequate 
international liquidity and commodity price stabilization.
The primary characteristic of this plan, apart 
from the courage of its authors in attempting to deal with 
the two problems simultaneously, is that it appears to be 
"self-balancing." That is, whenever an excess supply of 
primary commodities occurs tô the extent that they would 
seem to bring the price below the value declared by the 
IMF, the excess supply could be bought and paid for by 
the IMF. Since the bancors thus acquired are a part of 
the international reserves of each country, they can be 
used either to pay off past debt or to buy manufactured 
goods. In any case the bancor-receiving country would 
experience either an export surplus or added income which.
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if not frozen by the central banks, could be used to 
accelerate expansion and growth. Their further expansion 
would require more primary products, which if not obtained 
domestically as the authors seem to have assumed, could 
be drawn from the IMF stocks. This process of adjustment 
has an advantage over the current one in that it does not 
necessitate prolonged periods of depressed prices, a reduc­
tion in employment and output of the primary producing 
countries, and decline in industrial export.
The problem of commodity price fluctuations and 
its acute effects on the earnings of countries, especially
developing ones, is undoubtedly one of the economic prob-
1lems of our time. A group of developing countries in
their Memorandum submitted to the Ü.N. Conference on
Trade and Development have specified their concern with
the problem of international liquidity and in this context
have said: "During the period of relative export price
stability from 196O to 1965» more than half of the developing
countries for which data are available were actually
2building up their reserves."
Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen readily admit that the
^Argentina, Brazil, Cameron, Ceylon, Congo (Demo­
cratic Republic of), Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, India, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Republic of 
Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Egypt, United Republic 
of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.
2Memorandum on International Liquidity, op. cit.,
p. 8.
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process of industrialization requires, among other things, 
technical know-how and entrepreneurial ability in addition 
to human, capital, and natural resources. Yet, they 
believe the experience of some countries such as Mexico, 
Brazil, and Japan can be obtained fairly rapidly when the 
other underlying conditions (not spelled out in the plan) 
for industrial development are favorable. They hold 
industrialization depends primarily on effective demand; 
yet, fluctuations in the income of primary producing coun­
tries not only create conditions unfavorable for their 
growth but also waste technological improvements in primary 
products. Furthermore, the authors seem to have fears 
concerning the capability of advanced countries in terms 
of following full employment programs, yet their compe­
tence in the area of fiscal and monetary policy would 
negate this conclusion. In essence they have aimed at an 
adequate amount of international liquidity but in conjunc­
tion with price stability of primary products, full employ­
ment and growth in advanced countries, and industrializa­
tion of advanced countries.
Despite the fact that Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen 
have paid more attention to primary product prices, they 
appear to hold that the one limiting factor and the impor­
tant constraint in the way of industrialization is lack of 
effective demand, which in this context, would mean bancor 
incomes or foreign exchange.
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If this were what they believed, have they not 
underestimated the great and perhaps innumerable obstacles 
to progress— many of which are non-economic in nature?
From their emphasis one gets the impression that in their 
estimation labor, know-how, and materials can easily be 
acquired or are amply available, but the only important 
element badly lacking for industrialization is foreign 
exchange.
Adroit salesmanship and great intelligence is 
required from the IMF under the plan. Moreover, new inter­
national arrangements are needed in order to operate the 
program; these cannot be easily reached. This, of course, 
is not a great disadvantage, yet even if the plan did 
result in what it was meant to achieve, one can see that 
the same goals could be accomplished through more practical 
and less complicated schemes such as preferential trade 
treatment for developing countries or support prices. 
Furthermore, the American farm program has provided us 
with the experience that the idea of stock piling may 
prove expensive, wasteful, and perhaps frustrating. These 
are, however, minor points relative to the scheme.
A significant economic shortcoming of the plan is 
that it professes to achieve the right amount of interna­
tional liquidity. Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen assumed 
that the amount of liquidity added to the international 
liquidity in pursuit of a policy of thirty primary
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products' price stability would be the "right" amount.
This assumption is subject to argument and challenge. If a 
price index of thirty primary products remains relatively 
stable over five years (or less or more), would one be 
justified in deriving the conclusion that international 
liquidity is also adequate? Should adequacy of interna­
tional reserves be judged in terms of fluctuations in the 
price of primary products? Or would other factors such as 
the growth of world production, the increasing volume of 
international trade, and growing world needs have some 
bearing on the subject? The need for international 
liquidity is by no means dependent on any "one" factor 
such as price fluctuations of some thirty primary products. 
One can hardly doubt that the two are interrelated, but 
this should not be taken to mean that international 
liquidity is a function of primary products price fluctua­
tions .
This plan also claims that historically a period 
of slowdown in the rate of industrial growth has often 
been associated with a preceding period of declining raw 
material prices. They have argued in their plan that rapid 
industrial growth is possible when the supplies of pri­
mary products are rising. Such statements are subject to 
doubt; at best, reliable econometric studies are needed 
for their proof.
CHAPTER V
OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL POSITIONS
In any review of the plans for reform of the inter­
national monetary system one needs to examine the official 
assertions of the IMF for at least two reasons: (l) the
content of such assertions may involve alternative sugges­
tions and may well be interesting from a theoretical stand­
point regardless of the official authorities who adhere to 
them; (2) since they come from the people actually in con­
tact with the international monetary system on a regular 
basis, they may be more practical. Discussion of the IMF's 
position on the international monetary system therefore 
deserves a thorough examination.
It must also be pointed out that the IMF realizes 
that the examination of the problem of international 
liquidity is not an easy task; yet despite the difficul­
ties of reaching an agreement on this subject, the IMF 
asserts that its analysis permits the conclusion that "it 
will be necessary to continue and possibly to broaden
international action directed toward the creation of 
international liquidity.
^1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 29*
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In order to avoid misinterpretation, intensive use 
will be made of quotations from the various publications 
of the IMF. The objective of this method is to provide 
the reader access to the exact terminology used by the 
IMF. The Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress 
has also made comments on the international monetary problem 
which have a semi-official nature; accordingly, this posi­
tion will also be presented.
An Analysis of the Fund's Position 
One may go back a few years and see, for instance, 
that in response to a request by the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations, the Fund published in its 
Staff Papers of 1953 an article entitled "The Adequacy of 
Monetary Reserves." The article concluded that the then 
existing monetary reserves were adequate.
Again, in 1958, at the request of several member 
governments, the Fund published a staff study. Interna- . 
tional Reserves and Liquidity. This study presented the 
conclusion that the Fund's sources were unlikely to be 
adequate in terms of meeting the contingency calls which 
might be made on them and greatly affected the general 
quota increase of the IMF in 1959«
At the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 
in Washington, D. C. in September of 1963t concern over 
the problem of international liquidity was once indicated 
in a statement made by the Managing Director that "the
216
Fund would intensify its studies of international liquidity 
and related questions and many Governors expressed keen 
interest in the subject and in the proposed studies."^ Fur­
thermore, the Annual Report of the IMF in 1963 included a 
chapter on the topic of international reserves and 
liquidity. It was concluded that the problem and the
structure of the international liquidity required continued
2close attention.
The Annual Report of the IMF in 1964 made the 
comment that :
Prospective adequacy depends to a very great extent on 
such unpredictable factors as the presence, at some 
future time, of inflationary or contractionary tenden­
cies in the world economy, and the distribution by 
countries of reserves and of payments deficits and 
surpluses at that time.3
The general assertion, however, was that continued inter-
4national action was necessary. Thus despite the continuing 
concern which originated in 1953» it is really the 1964 
Annual Report which began to undertake a more serious look 
into the problem.^ This was the beginning of a revision
^Ibid., p. 25.
52.
^IMF, 1963 Annual Report (Washington, D. C.),
o1964 Annual Report, op. cit. , p. 29.
4See footnote on p. above.
^This report and the 1965 report which complements 
it, unless otherwise mentioned, will be the basic sources 
for the materials presented in the following sections of 
this chapter.
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in the Fund's former long-standing position that interna­
tional reserves were adequate.^ In view of this background 
analysis of the Fund's position will now be undertaken.
Objectives of International Money Management
A starting point for discussion of the official 
views of the IMF is the aims of the Fund as stated in the 
following:
Practically speaking, the aim of international mone­
tary management must be the achievement of balance 
with the least possible sacrifice of the generally 
accepted objectives of economic policy, including full 
employment, an adequate and sustained rate of growth, 
maintenance of reasonable price stability, and the 
maximum degree of freedom in current international 
transactions. It is also important that distortions 
in the international flow of capital and financing be 
avoided.2
The Fund is pragmatic in realizing that at the present 
time many countries regard their domestic employment and 
growth important enough not to tolerate any major decline 
due to balance of payment difficulties and/or lack of 
adequate international means of payment. It is, however, 
necessary to point out that there are sometimes certain 
difficulties in terms of the possibility of conflict among 
certain policy objectives. To what extent one can combine
^The Fund's idea that the then general level of 
international liquidity was broadly satisfactory and ade­
quate does not necessarily mean that the supply of each 
type of liquidity as well as its distribution among coun­
tries were equally satisfactory. See ibid., p. 29.
21965 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 10.
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all the objectives mentioned in the above quotation remains 
an open issue. In the event of conflict, a certain trade­
off of the goals of the adopted economic policies must be 
achieved, and countries necessarily have different priori­
ties in this respect. Therefore, the question of how well 
the system has served to attain these objectives from the 
standpoint of the IMF must first be examined.
The Fund's Appraisal of the Systenl
The IMF asserts that the development of the world
economy as a whole and of national economies individually
cannot be attributed to any single factor such as the
international monetary system.^ By and large, in the
opinion of the Fund, the industrial countries have had a
"very high degree of success" in combating structural
unemployment ; the large pockets of unemployment which
existed in most European countries were largely absorbed
between 1950 and 1964. With respect to price stability,
however, the inflationary pressures "continued to be
felt," and "the cost of living over the same period rose
2by an average of 2.5 per_cent per annum."
The developing countries, however, have been 
hampered by structural problems and in view of the 




realized that simultaneous achievement of the goals of 
rapid growth and internal and external stability is diffi­
cult. As a result they have resorted not only to exchange 
rate depreciations but also to restrictions on imports and 
on their payments. Furthermore, their internal imbalances 
have interfered with the expansion of their economies.^
Some members of the Fund have made "great progress" 
in the removal of barriers to international trade by 
shifting from bilateral to multilateral payments and "all 
the major industrial countries have now accepted the con­
vertibility obligations of Article VIII.
One can infer from the manner in which the Fund 
speaks about monetary policy that it places greater hope 
on the efficiency of monetary policy for the future. As 
a result of convertibility since the late 1950's, espe­
cially after European currencies became convertible, there 
has been a massive revival of short term capital move­
ments among industrialized countries. This has obviously 
played a part in the U.S. deficit, and, according to the 
Fund, "capital movements have frequently played a dis- 
equilibrating, rather than an equilibrating role."^ As a 





the outflow of funds, and surplus coxmtries have limited 
the inflow of foreign funds by fiscal and monetary poli­
cies .
The Fund finds that reserve currencies form, next 
to gold, the largest portion of international reserves of 
the member countries, and in this context asserts that so 
long as the reserve centers in key currency countries are 
strong and enjoy unquestioned confidence, they can meet 
some proportion of the deficit in their balance of pay­
ments through an accumulation of liabilities to foreign 
central banks.^ To these points the Fund adds that no 
other country whose currency might be useful as an alter­
native reserve currency has shown any inclination to
2encourage or to welcome any such development.
The Nature and Components of International Liquidity
International liquidity consists of "all the 
resources that are available to the monetary authorities 
of countries for the purpose of meeting balance of pay­
ments deficits."^ The formal definition of the IMF for 
international liquidity is quoted here to demonstrate that 
the utilization of international liquidity for the purpose 
of making payments for international transactions is ex­
cluded. The IMF makes this exception because it believes
^Ibid., p. 14.
O1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 25.
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that importers and exporters "use the facilities of inter­
national banking and finance for this purpose."^ Elements 
of doubt may, however, come to the mind of the IMF Report 
readers when they look at the components of international 
liquidity. According to the Fund:
Such liquidity ranges from assets readily available 
to resources that become available only after exten­
sive negotiation. It may take many forms: reserves
of gold and foreign exchange; other assets that can 
be mobilized in case of need; facilities to draw on 
the International Monetary Fund or to borrow from 
other international institutions; various arrangements 
with foreign central banks or governments to borrow.2
It would seem that the indefinite nature of the
IMF definition of international liquidity is due to its
attempts to properly classify liquidity. For example,
the IMF specifies that "the drawing facilities in the
«International Monetary Fund can not properly be classified
3as either owned liquidity or borrowing facilities." In
any case, the IMF readily admits that any classification
of international liquidity into broad categories is some-
4what arbitrary.
Types of International Liquidity
The Fund has found it useful to distinguish 






former covers resources available to a country "subject to 
the adoption of satisfactory policies looking toward 
balance of payments adjustment"^; the latter involves the 
reserves which are more or less freely available to a 
country depending on how often countries resorted to them 
and the aggregate resources available to the Fund at the 
time. The Fund fully realizes that, in practice, coun­
tries do not appear to treat these two types of liquidity 
as interchangeable. The IMF admits that various countries
have a preference for international reserves at their free
2disposal comparable to borrowed funds or credit tranche.
The IMF further believes that it is the largest provider 
of conditional liquidity in the form of drawing rights 
under the quotas and that the supply of conditional 
liquidity should be broad and inclusive enough to meet 
all legitimate needs.
The IMF asserts, and rightly so, that neither too 
little nor too much of international liquidity is desir­
able. Too little liquidity is not desirable on the grounds 
that it gives too little time to deficit countries to 
adjust to their possible disequilibrium; it may further 
force them to adopt restrictive controls on trade and 
investment as well as restrictive financial policies. Too 
much international liquidity, on the other hand, is not
^1965 Annual Report, op. cit., p. l4.
^Ibid.
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desirable either because financial authorities of some 
countries may not adhere to any discipline and thus engage 
in overexpansive policies. This assertion is plausible 
from an economic standpoint because, on the one hand, if 
financing of balance of payments were regarded easy and 
cheap, countries might undertake expansionary policies 
that they would otherwise have regarded as inappropriate.
On the other hand, when circumstances are indicative of a 
general inadequacy of reserves, an increasing propensity 
to seek reserves, a reluctance to extend intergovernmental 
credit, and a marked tendency to increase or restore 
reserves would set in and become higher-priority objectives 
of economic policy.
Reserve Creation: Direction of Progress
The basic elements of the supply of and the demand 
for international liquidity were discussed in Chapter II.
It was pointed out that the need for change is sensed by 
the IMF. The next logical question is: "What is the posi­
tion of the IMF with respect to the variety of the pro­
posals which have been suggested for the reform of the 
system?" Does the Fund approve a rise in the price of 
gold? Or does it favor a flexible exchange rate system?
Or neither?
Despite an assertion that there is no need for 
immediate action to create additional reserves, the Fund 
admits that the topic of international liquidity must be
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examined before such pressing need develops in order that 
the many problems of principle and technique would not be 
too hastily considered.^ The Fund also thinks that 
improvements have been introduced to the international 
monetary system which have helped the system avoid the 
perils of monetary chaos. On these grounds the IMF sup­
ports the idea of improving the present system rather than 
replacing it with a totally different one--a point that
many economists such as Lutz, Posthuma, Zolotas, Hansen,
2Roosa, Bernstein have supported.
The tendency of the Fund for self-support can be
read from the following lines.
From a purely technical standpoint, it would in general 
be possible to attain through the Fund results (in 
terms of influencing the total level of world reserves) 
similar to those that might be sought in other ways, 
although this might involve certain amendments of the 
articles of Agreement.3
One can further note that the Fund is against 
raising the price of gold. Again, letting the Fund speak 
for itself:
A basic assumption of these studies has been that no 
change will be made in the price of gold in terms of 
currencies in general. This assumption corresponds 
to the endorsement of the established price of gold 
as one of the bases of the present monetary system, 
expressed by the responsible authorities of the prin­
cipal industrial countries as indicated in the
^Ibid., p. 19.
2See above, Chapter IV.
^Ibid.
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Ministerial Statement of the Group of Ten, an endorse­
ment in which the Fund concurs. The arguments against 
a change in the price of gold, including the inequi­
ties it involves and the speculative movements to 
which it is likely to give rise are well known and
need not be repeated here.^
It is also important to note that the Fund has 
remained relatively silent on the issue of accepting a 
flexible exchange system. In addition to this silence one 
can clearly see, as indicated below, that the whole atten­
tion of the Fund's research is centered around reserve 
creation and relevant questions. This could be interpreted
to mean that reserve creation and evaluation of its techni­
calities has occupied more place in the minds of the IMF 
researchers; otherwise they should have mentioned some­
where that devotion of their whole attention to the topic 
of reserve creation does not negate the acceptance or the 
desirability of a flexible exchange rate.
Furthermore, the Fund states "changes in price 
levels can not be counted upon as a quick or adequate 
equilibrating force between deficit and surplus countries." 
If the phrase "changes in price level" is taken to mean 
the rate of exchange (which is a connecting link between 
countries' currencies) then one gets the impression that 
the Fund is unwilling to rely on a flexible exchange rate.
Apart from rejecting the idea of a rise in the 
price of gold and indirectly rejecting the dependability
^Ibid., p. 15.
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of a flexible exchange rate system, in focusing its atten­
tion on reserve creation the Fund devotes the rest of its 
research to some of the technicalities of reserve creation. 
Questions that are raised in this connection are as fol­
lows : What type of reserves should be created? How may
general reserve needs be established and measured? In 
what form should such additional reserves be made available? 
How should they be distributed initially and what role 
should they play? What institutional arrangements are 
needed for the management of the reserves? These questions 
will be discussed next, and the Fund's preliminary answers 
will be presented. One should remember that the Fund is 
of the opinion that such questions require a great deal of 
further study from the viewpoint of techniques and objec­
tives; therefore, the Fund does not mean "to provide 
definitive answers or present concrete proposals."^ It 
does not go beyond mere disucssion of a range of possibili­
ties .
Criteria of General Reserve Needs
What the Fund is aiming at is deliberate creation 
of reserves by collective international action in the light 
of an appraisal of the general need for reserves rather 
than on their creation in response to immediate needs of 
particular countries for balance of payments assistance.
^Ibid., p. 16.
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This requires elaboration if one distinguishes the need of 
an individual country in balance of payments difficulties 
from the needs of the system as a whole. Then it is only 
the latter need which has attracted the attention of the 
IMF, as the IMF holds that the former should be attacked 
through appropriate corrective measures of fiscal and 
monetary policy.
The Fund realizes that there is no precise criteria
to measure the general reserve needs and that qualitative
judgement is inescapable.^ There are many factors which
should therefore be taken into consideration. The Fund
is specific on some of them:
Whether, in circumstances in which countries' finan­
cial policies are likely to be influenced by the level 
of world reserves, it appears desirable on balance 
to enlarge the scope for an expansion of monetary 
demand or to influence countries in the direction of 
counter-inflationary action; whether, on balance, 
exchange rates are under undue pressure, or needed 
adjustments in exchange rates are being unduly delayed; 
and whether there are widespread tendencies to specu­
lative capital movements that an expansion in world 
reserves could to some extent relieve.2
Also it would seem that the adequacy of international 
reserves and liquidity should not be judged in a vacuum 
as it is closely related, among other factors, to the effi­
ciency of the international credit system, appropriateness 
of domestic fiscal and monetary policies, the prevalence 




output and international trade. What is needed is an aggre­
gate long term expansion of international liquidity in 
order that the expanding needs of world economy will not be 
hampered.
Types of Reserve Creation
Countries may acquire reserves unilaterally as 
when a country obtains a reserve currency in exchange for 
its gold or bilaterally as when two countries make recipro­
cal credit or swap arrangements. Several countries can 
also agree on reserve creation either through an interna­
tional institution or otherwise. Reserves may also be 
extended to different countries on an unconditional basis 
or by creating reserve claims in exchange for claims on 
countries. Receiving countries may be looked upon either 
as the customers of a domestic central bank, thus creating 
liabilities on a set of customers vis-a-vis another set, 
or they may simply exchange claims among each other (or 
between an international institution and each member coun­
try) . None of these can be selected and proclaimed as the 
best alternative; the acceptance of either of these forms, 
or any other, depends on the attitude of financial authori­
ties of different countries and the negotiations involved. 
One can, however, rely more on an alternative if it is 
flexible enough to change reserves in either direction 
depending on the circumstances of the time.
229
Transferability of Reserves
Countries should be able to use their reserves for 
the purpose of balance of payments deficits; reserves must, 
therefore, be transferable from one country to another or 
to the IMF--if it happens to be the intermediary institution 
--or from one currency to another. Countries must also 
accept, if transferability is to be assured, certain arrange­
ments and obligations. If, for example, countries under­
take to accept the created reserves in a certain ratio to 
gold (or to gold and foreign exchange) the holder of reserves 
can use them freely and must in turn be prepared to accept 
them freely. Transferability can, then, be either free, 
or very limited, or somewhere in between.
Certain other questions related to the transfera­
bility of reserves are significant such as whether the 
reserves bear any interest, whether the holding country 
enjoys a "value-maintenance guarantee," and eventual 
arrangements for liquidation should the scheme fail to 
operate. The Fund believes that such issues not only 
affect acceptability of new reserves, but also countries' 
preferences between holding gold and holding reserve cur­
rency.^
Initial Distribution of Reserves
This is an issue closely related to the type of 
created reserves. If reserves were created in the form of
^Ibid., p. 17.
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an automatic access to credit, the countries which resort 
to it would, in practice, he the first round beneficiaries. 
If, on the other hand, reserves were created in the form 
of purchases of assets by an international institution, 
only the countries whose assets have been purchased in 
exchange for reserves would be the beneficiaries. The two 
groups may overlap in actuality. Even assuming that they 
do not overlap, there may be a tendency that sooner or 
later the bulk of them would gravitate to countries with 
a high propensity to accumulate reserves. This might 
necessitate arrangements for re-transfer of such reserves, 
if this be desirable. The Fund holds, without explaining 
the reason, that if countries with a strong tendency to 
hold reserves obtain these reserves at the time of creation, 
the effect of reserve creation on the movement of real 
resources between countries and the balance of payments 
disequilibria would be minimized; while if they were ini­
tially distributed among less developed countries, "the 
creation of reserves would also involve a long-term move­
ment of real resources from the more developed to the less 
developed countries.
Institutional Aspects
The Fund, as mentioned before, is naturally willing 
to preserve its present standing or even to enlarge the
^Ibid., p. 18.
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scope of its operations; it believes that even at the 
expense of some amendments of the Articles of Agreement, 
the Fund can theoretically attain results similar to those 
expected in other ways. The Fund's reason for this asser­
tion is that "a matter which is of concern to all countries 
should be handled in an institution that has been organized 
as an instrument of financial cooperation on a world-wide 
basis.
Reserve Creation through the Fund
If reserves are to be created through the Fund, 
they can take, according to this institution, either the 
form of an extension of "quasi-automatic drawing facili­
ties beyond the gold tranche" or an operation "whereby the
Fund simultaneously would obtain special assets and assume
2additional liabilities." One way of increasing reserves 
is for the Executive Board to decide that "the ratio of 
the Fund's currency holding to quota up to which members 
can draw on a virtually automatic basis would be raised to
3some higher percentage of quota." Another way, not so 
automatic, would be to substitute unconditional for condi­
tional drawing rights. This, however, has the disadvantage 





direction of the adoption of appropriate balance of pay­
ments policies" might be reduced. Still a different way 
to increase the ability of the Fund in terms of reserve 
creation is to allow it to acquire guaranteed assets other 
than the ordinary currency holdings which determine mem­
bers' drawing rights. Needless to add, liabilities to be 
created would have to be "suitable for incorporation in 
countries' reserves." Details of such technicalities can 
be made more acceptable through negotiations. Under any 
approach, however, attempts should be made to enable the 
Fund, without impairing its present influence, to meet the 
reasonable additional needs.
The Group of Ten 
During the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 
of the IMF in I963» the Ministers and Governors of the ten 
participating countries in the General Arrangements to 
Borrow established a study group to make "a thorough 
examination of the outlook for the functioning of the 
international monetary system and of its probable future 
needs for liquidity."^
On the tenth of August, 1964, a "Ministerial State­
ment of the Group of Ten" or the "Report of the Deputies" 
was published. The Report, which is concerned with
^Ministerial Statement, op. cit. , p. 4.
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longer-run prospects,^ reaffirmed the conviction of the 
Governors and Ministers that the present system based on 
a fixed price of gold and fixed exchange rates had proved 
its value as a foundation upon which to build for the 
future. For reasons discussed in Chapter III many econo­
mists tend to agree with this assertion. The Report made 
it clear at the outset that the growing world economy and 
the expanding volume of international trade are likely to 
create a need for more international liquidity. The 
Governors held, however, that the then existing amount of
international reserves was "fully adequate" and was likely
2to remain so for the immediate future.
The Governors also emphasized at the outset that 
the smooth functioning of the international monetary system 
depends largely on the avoidance of persistent balance of 
payments disequilibria and effective reliance on appropriate 
fiscal and monetary policies. Under the prevailing circum­
stances relevant to the U.S. balance of payments deficit 
the participating delegates showed their reluctance to 
make future commitments which might have helped to per­
petuate the U.S. balance of payments deficit. The report 
affirmed that the review undertaken by the Governors clari­
fied various national points of view. The Report was to
^Reviewing the General Arrangements to Borrow 
reiterated their conviction that the resources of the GAB 




be expressed in an unbiased manner; however, the different 
attitudes of various countries in regard to the functioning 
of the system were soon apparent.^
The main objective of the Group of Ten was to 
investigate bases of agreement for improvement of the 
system. It is hard to read the report without receiving 
the impression that the Group feels that some improvement 
is needed for the smooth functioning of the system, but 
precisely what the nature of such improvements should be 
remains a matter of dispute. On two important subjects--*- 
ways and means of adjusting balance of payment disequi­
librium and new reserve assets--the Group of Ten was 
unable to reach agreement during the discussions. As a 
result both of these subjects were passed on to study 
groups.
The first group, under the chairmanship of
R. Ossola from the Bank of Italy, published a report in
2
May of 1963. Despite the review of various proposals 
that the group undertook, it showed little progress in 
terms of resolving the questions related to the type of 
most important assets. Further reference to this report 
will be made later in this section. The second group,
^Since these different attitudes form the sub­
stance of the next chapter, only a reference to them 
seemed adequate at this point.
2Group of Ten Study Group on the Creation of 
Reserve Assets, Report of the Study Group on the Creation 
of Reserve Assets (Washington, D. C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 31st May, 19o5)*
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concerned with the means and ways of adjustment in the 
balances of payment, showed less progress partially 
because countries hesitate to make commitments in this 
regard. The following sections will attempt a descriptive 
review of the suggestions and recommendations made by the 
Group of Ten in their important issues.
Ministerial Statement--1964
The Group reviewed proposals for the reform of the 
international monetary system ranging from a return to 
former gold standard to the establishment of an interna­
tional central bank with supra-national authority. The 
group argued that no single plan appeared to meet the 
requirements to be fully consistent with the operation of 
international payments and arrangements in a general 
political, economic, and social environment^ but did not 
explain what these circumstances were. The objective of 
the Group in making this review was, as stated in the 
Statement, to examine the major aspects of the interna­
tional monetary system in the postwar world, to make an 
appraisal of the system, to explore the path of future 
development, and to set forth a conclusion.
In regard to the functioning of the present 
system the Ministers held that the system is, and doubtless 
will long be, in a state of evolution with old elements
^Ministerial Statement, op. cit. , p. 4.
2 3 6
such as gold and foreign exchange and new elements such 
as international monetary cooperation in the form of 
General Arrangements to Borrow. Furthermore, while the 
report focuses on official liquidity, it realizes that 
private liquidity does influence the international monetary 
system. The Group does not specify, however, to what 
extent private liquidity is important, and how it affects 
the system (equilibrating or disequilibrating?).
In appraising the system the Group emphasized 
that the system has shown "great capacity for adapting 
itself to change and growth, and has contributed to the 
economic development achieved after WWII, in addition to 
withstanding with success periods of stress." After 
referring to the continued role of gold and foreign 
exchange, the Group noted that there is no prospect of 
any other currency assuming the role of a key currency, 
and went so far as to say that such a development "could 
raise problems without substantially strengthening the 
system.
The Ministers of the Group of Ten also were con­
vinced that there is no single, unique manner in which 
the expanding needs for international liquidity have to 
be met, as the various forms of reserves available and 
the degree of substitutability between them are determinant
^Ibid., p. 9*
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factors.^ According to the Ministerial Statement some 
deputies stressed the disadvantage of individual coun­
tries ' deficits in regard to the source of liquidity and 
felt that improvements and changes were desirable in the 
provision of owned reserves. Others noted that key cur­
rency countries were unlikely to make as much contribution 
as in the past to the growth of international liquidity. 
Accordingly, three lines of advance were agreed upon:
1) strengthening the international monetary system by multi­
lateral surveillance of the means of financing balance of 
payments disequilibria, 2) support of the IMF quota 
increases (which was affected in 1964), and 3) investiga­
tion of new types of reserve assets which could be intro­
duced and could prove useful in the long run.
The conclusions and recommendations of the Ministers 
concern support of the continuation of the monetary use 
of gold, establishment of a multilateral surveillance 
over the means of financing balance of payments deficits 
and provision of statistical data bearing on the means, of 
financing (which would provide a basis for multilateral 
surveillance). The discussion of further needs for 
reserve assets, another concern of the Ministers, was 
centered around acceptance of a gold tranche or similar 
claims on the Fund, or the creation of new reserve assets. 
The Group did not mention what type of assets should be
^Ibid., p. 9.
2 3 8
created and how; mention was made only that complex prob­
lems would be involved.^ The Ministers also held that 
short-term supplies of gold and reserve currencies were 
adequate but that official bilateral credit facilities 
such as swaps and a network of standby arrangements would 
still be beneficial. In regard to the provision of long­
term liquidity the Group did not want to lay down general 
arrangements as it was thought that this type of provision
might unjustifiably reduce the attempts for adjustment of
2the existing imbalances. Finally, the Group agreed that 
"appropriate credit facilities of the IMF provide an
3element of strength in the system."
Report on the Creation of Reserve Assets--1965
4The problem which was referred to the Study Group 
concerned an examination of the factors determining the 
creation of reserve assets and of various methods of 
meeting the need for reserve assets other than through new 
accruals of gold and reserve currency balances. The Group 
attempted to identify some possible indications of the 
overall general circumstances of inadequacy of reserves. 
They commented that total need for reserves is conditioned
^Ibid., p. 11.
^Ibid., p. 13.
^Communiqu^ of Ministers, op. cit., p. 2.
4Report . . .  on the Creation of Reserve Assets,
op. cit.
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primarily by the needs of individual countries; aggregate 
need for reserve assets depends greatly upon a compromise 
among different attitudes of different countries, each 
faced with different problems of internal economic 
stability and desiring different degrees of economic 
independence in international economic relations. Indi­
cations of a general inadequacy of reserves were discussed. 
(These will be referred to in Chapter VIII below since 
they are more pertinent to a general discussion of reserve 
adequacy.)
Reserve assets were defined as those assets of a 
country's monetary authority which can be used to support 
its rate of exchange when external payments are in deficit; 
these were categorized into gold, currency assets, and 
claims on the International Monetary System (gold tranche, 
GAB creditor position). Each type of asset was then 
defined as to function, characteristics and how it contrib­
utes to increasing aggregate reserves. The Group empha­
sized that any reserve asset creation must inspire confi­
dence in the international monetary system, conform to 
established patterns of international cooperation and be 
flexible so that it could promote the smooth functioning 
of the system.^
Before undertaking the analysis of proposals for 
new reserve creation, the Study Group discussed the
^Ibid., p. 20.
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procedural matters in regard to methods of reserve forma­
tion, distribution and use of resulting assets, scope of 
membership and the institutional framework, the management 
and the decision-making apparatus. Each of these funda­
mental aspects of reserve creation was analysed in rela­
tion to the existing system and reserve assets already in 
existence as well as with regard for the impact of the new 
asset on policies of present monetary authorities.
The proposals studied by the Group all shared 
certain common characteristics. The assets created under 
these schemes would be uniformly available without condi­
tions affecting economic policy; they could be held only 
by monetary authorities and could not be used to settle 
private or governmental transactions; they could not be 
used for direct intervention in exchange markets; and they 
derive their validity from international convention.^
Proposals were broken down into three basic types. 
Plans for the creation of reserve assets by a group of 
countries constituted one type: some of these favored the
formation of a completely new monetary authority to deal 
with reserve creation while others also wished to deal 
with the problem on a limited membership basis but within 
the institutional structures of the IMF.
Other proposals designed to work through the IMF 
desired either universal membership or membership with a
^Ibid., p. 26.
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self-qualifying element. Those who planned IMF participa­
tion envisaged the extension of normal drawing rights in 
credit tranches, enlargement of automatic drawing rights, 
extension of the gold tranche rights without gold payments, 
or special monetary operations to be carried out through 
the IMF.
A third group of proposals concerned the provision 
of currency holders with alternative assets through either 
conversion of currency balances into reserve positions in 
the Fund or through the creation of Mutual Currency 
Accounts.
Underlying their failure to agree upon any one of 
the proposals discussed, the Group found certain basic 
differences among their members in regard to several funda­
mental aspects of the problem of reserve creation. These 
were concerned with the role of gold, the role of the IMF, 
width of membership and the rules for decision-making.
Inasmuch as the roles of gold and of the IMF will 
be given extensive coverage later in this study and con­
sideration will be given there to the views expressed in 
this Study Group's report, discussion will be limited 
here. It is sufficient to note at this point that although 
there was no disagreement on the position of these elements 
in the basic reserve situation in relation to the introduc­
tion of new reserve assets, differences of opinion emerged 
on the role they would play.
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The width of the management group and the distribu­
tion of the assets were also open to disagreement. Those 
favoring a small homogeneous management body felt that the 
large industrialized countries are the ones principally 
concerned with the use of reserve for international mone­
tary purposes. They cited the General Agreements to Borrow 
as a successful venture of such a limited group designed 
to operate in the best interests of the system. Opponents 
argued that, while a small group may effectively operate 
to the benefit of the system as a whole, the consideration 
of the liquidity system as a whole should not be limited. 
Because ultimately decision rests in the hands of the 
limited number primarily engaged in the successful working 
of the system, the dangers of a too-wide representation 
would be eliminated.
Dispute over distribution of any new reserve asset 
also centered over width of the group to be involved. Some 
felt that since an international asset is based on credit 
and such credit must be unque s t i one d , those countries most 
able to assume obligations for the working of the conven­
tion would be the larger industrialized ones. Proponents 
of a wider distribution argued that smaller nations also 
need room in international payments in which to maneuver 
and that if these countries were excluded, they would 
have to surrender real resources or attract capital inflow 
to increase their reserves.
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Because the economic impact of any scheme would be 
greatly influenced by rules of decision-making, the body 
considered several general rules of decision-making. They 
arrived at no agreement other than that a means of resolving 
differences of attitude and policy among members which 
would affect application of any scheme is of primary impor­
tance. The rule of unanimity was considered by some to be 
an essential safeguard of monetary autonomy, and when used 
in a small homogeneous body would be a feasible means of 
arriving at agreement. However, the result of a lack of 
unanimity would be failure to take action, therefore 
restricting approaches for supplying reserve needs.
The weighted vote with an ordinary majority received 
strong support from some who pointed to its generally suc­
cessful use in the IMF. However others noted that criti­
cism has been made of some individual decisions arrived at 
under this procedure (but did not discuss these specifi­
cally) and that reserve creation would entail discussion 
of even more fundamental issues and divergences which 
would become sharper. The weighted vote with special 
majority was only noted in regard to its use in present 
Fund operations. The exposition of the divergences of 
view within the Group was an improvement.
Communiqué of Ministers and Governors--1966
The Communiqué of Ministers recognized three 
actual or potential problems in the international monetary
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system. These are: 1) "insufficient effectiveness of the
adjustment process," 2) risk of instability resulting from 
shifts between reserve assets, 3) the probable inadequacy 
of gold and reserve currencies as a source of new reserves 
in the future. All these problems had been recognized 
earlier. From the review of the previous "Statement" it 
is evident that it was realized that prolonged and large 
imbalances often have undesirable effects on the economies 
of the participant countries. Also, the potential risks 
of instability were realized, risks which prevail in a 
system in which gold and key currencies exist side by side, 
capable of being converted into each other or into gold. 
With respect to the third problem the "Statement" con­
cluded that there was at that time no general shortage of 
international liquidity, but that in time such a shortage 
might develop.
After restating the familiar problems the Report 
discussed possible improvements in the present system. In 
regard to the adjustment process, the group recognized 
that the supply of international liquidity has a bearing 
on the functioning of the adjustment process in that 
insufficient adjustment efforts may contribute to infla­
tionary tendencies and/or place an undesirable burden on 
the real resources of the countries. On the other hand, 
a harsh adjustment process could endanger the aims of
growth and stability of the international economy or its 
individual components.
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Multilateral surveillance was again emphasized 
and the Report added that it has proved its usefulness.
In order to make this surveillance possible, participants 
should provide the Bank for International Settlements with 
monthly confidential reports on their external monetary 
positions which were to be reviewed by the BIS and help' 
the Bank in making a collective judgement on the monetary 
position of the world as a whole and of individual coun­
tries. One approach toward strengthening of multilateral 
surveillance and toward harmonization of reserve policies 
which was put forward is very similar to Posthuma's Plan, 
as can be seen from the following lines.
According to this proposal, high gold ratio countries 
would settle deficits mainly in gold and accumulate 
surpluses mainly in other reserve assets, whereas low 
gold ratio countries would do the opposite. In this 
way, members would make an effort to narrow down the 
existing discrepancies between their gold ratios by 
bringing each individual ratio, progressively and by 
stages, towards a band established around the average 
ratio of the Group.^
The Report added that in the long run some understanding
with regard to the composition of reserves would become
necessary if reserve policies were to be adjusted to the
declining share of gold in reserves. The Report stated
that in order to provide for short-term credit facilities
a network of reciprocal credit such as swap agreements
2would be needed. It concluded that in the long run,
^Communiqué of Ministers, op. cit., p. 5»
^Ibid., p. 6 .
246
however, since the supply of reserves from traditional 
sources such as gold and foreign exchange was "unlikely to 
keep pace with legitimate demands," supplementary means 
would probably be needed in order to "provide for an ade­
quate secular growth in reserves."^ This marked a remark­
able difference in the attitude of the Group of Ten 
Ministers; as it had clearly declared in 1964 that the 
supply of liquidity was adequate and would remain so for 
the foreseeable future.
It was recognized that the process of reserve 
creation should be neither geared nor directed to the 
financing of the balance of payments deficits of the indi­
vidual countries; rather it should take place on the basis 
of world needs for reserves. However, this was not dis­
cussed at any point. Contingency plans were also empha­
sized and according to the report were not to be based on 
reserve creation for distribution to all IMF members
either on the basis of their quotas, or of their quotas
2plus GAB commitment or a similar formula* The new supple­
mentary reserves would take the form of new issues of 
reserve units which would be, according to the Group, 
transferable between the Fund and the monetary authorities
^Ibid., p. 7» one of the members, however, was 
prepared to accept the notion of a shortage of reserves 
sometime in the future only as a legitimate working 
hypothesis.
^Ibid., p. l8 .
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1and could not be used for direct market intervention.
The Report realized that all countries have a legitimate
interest in the adequacy of international reserves. Yet,
in regard to their creation, the Report specified that
most of the ministers favored the creation of new reserves
by a limited group of the major countries who held key
positions in the functioning of the international monetary 
2system. The Report attached the greatest importance to 
the adoption of internal economic policies conducive to 
balance of payments adjustment.
Despite improvements and agreement on the process 
of deliberate reserve creation, the Report did not solve 
the problems concerning provisions which would govern the 
use and acceptability of reserves, the role of multilateral 
surveillance in reviewing reserve policies and the tech­
niques of minimizing strains on the system. For these, 
and other similar problems, the Report specified that
3further studies would be required.
A Semi-Official U.S. View on Reform 
Because of the international role that the dollar 
has played as a key currency in the international monetary 
system, the United States has been especially concerned
^Ibid.. p. 19.
^Ibid.
3The outline of the settlement reached at Rio de 
Janeiro will be discussed briefly in Chapter VIII below.
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with the problems of the international economic system.
The subject of reform in the system has attracted the 
attention of the U.S. Congress' Joint Economic Committee.^ 
Accordingly, the Committee has proposed guidelines for 
reform. These guidelines can be discussed from the 
standpoint of the Committee's position with regard to the 
present and future role of the dollar, gold, and the IMF, 
considerations for the creation of new reserve units and 
other means of strengthening the system.
The Committee asserts that the demand for the dollar 
as an official reserve is likely to remain high; even if 
monetary authorities of other countries choose to reduce 
their holdings of dollars, the role of the dollar in private 
transactions will be unimpaired. The United States should 
seek neither to reduce nor to expand the international 
role of the dollar. At the same time arrangements must 
be made that would not encourage countries to convert 
their existing or future balances of key currencies into 
gold. If such arrangements are introduced, the dollar 
can continue to play a voluntary international role as it 
can be used abroad by businessmen, traders, and bankers 
without resulting in pressures on U.S. gold holding.
^U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Sub­
committee on international Exchange and Payments, Guide­
lines for Improving the International Monetary System 
(Washington, D. C.T Government Printing Office, 1964) , 
pp. v-vi, reprinted in Hawkins (ed.), op. cit., pp. 129- 
131.
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Interestingly enough, the Joint Economic Committee 
has felt, just as has the IMP, that gold should continue 
its present role as a medium of international exchange.
The Committee has gone even one step further by setting a 
guideline for the U.S.: namely, the U.S. should not seek
to undermine the role that gold presently plays in interna­
tional affairs. Furthermore, no arrangements should be 
accepted which would, or could, result in providing incen­
tives to convert key currencies into gold.
Present international reserves such as gold, 
dollars and pounds sterling, cannot adequately meet world 
liquidity needs even if new reserve currencies were to be 
added.^ In the Joint Economic Committee's view new ways 
of creating international reserves must be sought which 
should combine agreed minimum annual increases to be supple­
mented and/or modified by annual decision. The J.E.C. 
has full respect for the International Monetary Fund, and 
it specifically indicates that such new arrangements 
should be carried out under the IMF. The IMF can, by 
developing a new reserve unit or claim or by making 
drawing rights more automatic and larger in amount or even 
by special operations in gold, currencies, and deposits, 
create new international reserves. The distinction between 
borrowed and owned reserves should not be critical in
One cannot make quite sure that if new reserve 
currencies are added, the world would still lack liquidity. 
Here, however, the opinions of the Committee are expanded.
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choosing among these possible methods.
The new reserves, according to the J.E.C. cannot 
be used as a primary foreign aid device, yet economic 
development can be respected by selecting suitable stanr-. 
dards to allocate the newly created reserves. The Com­
mittee holds this opinion because it asserts that securing 
the newly created reserves by the credit of less developed 
countries might impair their acceptability. The Committee 
is specific on the distribution of newly created reserves 
from the standpoint of their recipients as it indicates 
that such reserves should be distributed among all Fund 
members who would qualify according to criteria which 
could be applied impartially to all countries.
The Committee held that creation of additional 
reserves is not enough, specifying that the conditional 
credit facilities of the IMF should be expanded at the 
same time that new reserves are created. To go still one 
step further, it adds that international financial respon­
sibilities should be shared in a better manner through an 
improved structure of Fund quotas.
It also goes beyond mere international financial 
reforms and states thàt such reforms, however desirable, 
are:not sufficient insofar as they do not take the adjust­
ment process into account. Accordingly, substantial 
improvements in the adjustment process are regarded to 
be needed. Although the Committee does not state
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specifically what types of improvements are needed, it 
feels that a harmonization of national fiscal and monetary 
policies and agreement between countries upon codes of 
national behavior with respect to restrictions on capital 
movements for balance of payments reasons can better the 
international monetary system.
The Committee's outlook is not limited to a short- 
run evaluation of the reform as it maintains that the 
present second line of defense against short-term insta- 
bility--bilateral arrangements--should be expanded, empha­
sizing, however, that they are not a once-and-for-all 
solution for long-term needs. Finally, from the stand­
point of negotiating strategy the Committee asserts that 
all members of the Fund should be eligible to participate 
in a conference for reform of the system, yet a unanimous 
vote should not be required.
CHAPTER VI 
NEGOTIATING ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM
Whether or not a country regards reform of the 
present international monetary system desirable depends, 
among other things, on the following factors: whether
the country in question is economically developed or under­
developed, and if developed whether it is a key currency 
country or not, whether the country is suffering from 
excessive or inadequate demand pressures, whether more 
stability or more adjustment of exchange rate is desired, 
whether the country will have to resort to compensatory 
financial policies if a change is adopted, whether the 
accepted reform would bring about trade and capital move­
ment restrictions, whether adequate hope can be placed 
upon the relative effects of alternative changes, whether 
the country in question is politically ready for the 
acceptance of effective international negotiations, 
whether it has inflation in its domestic economy or not, 
and whether it has deficit or surplus in its balance of 
payments.
The desirability of reform, then, depends on 
innumerable economic and noneconomic factors. In the
2 5 2
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words of J. M. Fleming, since "consensus between govern­
ments is unattainable," one can hope that "the dictatorial 
judgements of economists may help to provide the basis of 
a reasonable compromise."^
It would be unreasonable to expect that anyone 
could devise an international monetary system serving 
all purposes optimally. Since people's aims are 
different, and to some extent incompatible with one 
another, no system can be objectively called the 
best. Only if we could first agree on a single objec­
tive to be given absolute top priority or if we could 
agree on preference scales for mutual trade-offs among 
different objectives would it be possible for us to 
judge one of the plans superior to all the rest.
There is, of course,no chance for such agreement 
ever to be obtained.
Due to their differences of opinion and biases, 
economists have had, by and large, a hard time reaching 
agreements on the topic of the international monetary 
problem. In his latest work Triffin reported that Machlup 
had organized meetings of thirty-two academic economists 
in answer to Secretary Dillon's press announcement (at 
the 1963 meeting of the IMF) that "no academic economist 
would be invited to testify before the Group of Ten, pre­
sumably because it was felt that they never would agree
^J. Marcus Fleming, "Toward Assessing the Need for 
International Reserves," Princeton University--International 
Finance Section, Essays in International Finance, No. 58 
(Princeton, N. J.1 Princeton University Press, February
1967), p. 1.
0 Fritz Machlup, "International Monetary System and 
the Free Market Economy," Princeton University--Interna- 
tional Finance Section, Reprints in International Finance, 
No. 3 (Princeton, Nâ J,: Prinôeton University Pireës,
February 1966), p. 1.
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anyway on any practical solution of the problems under 
debate.̂
Part of the economists' disagreement can be justi­
fied in view of the fact that they are from different coun­
tries with somewhat different political points of view.
It is necessary, therefore, that such different political 
as well as economic viewpoints be analyzed in an attempt 
to better understand the feasibility of various proposals. 
This is especially inescapable if one is to look into 
prospects for the future.
One can, for analytical reasons, neatly break down 
the dangers of the present international monetary system 
and its major defects into three problems: l) liquidity,
2) confidence, 3) adjustment. The first problem is con­
cerned with what should be done to provide the system with 
adequate liquidity if and when it is needed; the second 
is related to what to do,to prevent a lack of confidence 
or what to do should a crisis of confidence happen, e.g. 
attempts to convert currency reserves into gold; finally, 
the third problem is concerned with what facilities should 
be provided for the countries which would possibly face 
persistent disequilibrium of international payments and 
with what can be done to make adjustment more effective as 
a counter to difficulties. Machlup reports that at the
^Triffin, The World Money Maze, op. cit., p. 317-
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1965 annual meeting of the Governors of the IMF, "liquidity" 
was given top priority by the U.K. and the U.S., while 
voted last place by Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands; "confidence" was awarded highest rating by the 
Governors from the Netherlands and Italy; finally, France 
and Germany gave top billing to "adjustment."^ This can 
be taken as a sample of the distribution of weights given 
to the three problems by some of the economically advanced 
countries. It is more likely that underdeveloped countries, 
in view of their problems of internal and external finance, 
would give top priority to liquidity. Attention will there­
fore be focused in the following section on some of the 
attitudes of different countries. Although the primary 
focus of attention is economic, political as well as insti­
tutional implications of the various attitudes cannot be 
ignored.
The Position of France
According to American sources, as can be seen 
below, the French position is influenced by noneconomic 
factors such as jealousy, prestige, etc. For such reasons, 
and partly due to the conversion of dollars into gold with 
the resulting increase in gold reserves, the French monetary
^For more details see: Fritz Machlup, "World
Monetary Debate--Bases for Agreement" in: Princeton
University— International Finance Section, Reprints in 
International Finance, No. 4 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, September 1966). Reliance is placed on 
this study for the preparation of this section.
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authorities claim that there is no such thing as a world
liquidity shortage. The idea that the balance of payments
deficit of individual countries should not be confused
with a world wide problem of international liquidity has
its root in the French position. A September issue of
The Economist reports that
not only the French, but most of their partners, have 
not budged an inch from the view that while the 
United States runs persistent and sizeable balance 
of payment deficits there is no shortage of liquidity.^
Charles Kindelberger is more specific when he says:
At the bottom of much of the European case against the 
dollar standard is prestige . . . and much of the
French case rubs off on other Europeans.
Prestige is expensive. It is expensive in earnings 
foregone on foreign exchange reserves (corrected for 
a proper evaluation of the risk of loss through 
[^olla^ devaluation) and it is expensive in trans­
action costs.2
It is interesting to note that, according to 
Kindelberger, the dollar is a world unit of account, a 
world standard of value, a world medium of exchange, and
3finally a world standard of deferred payments. Thus the 
dollar is performing its monetary functions in the world 
scene, whether France likes it or not. A gold exchange
^The Economist, no volume yet, September 2, 196?» 
p. 800, column one.
^Charles Kindelberger, "The Politics of Interna­
tional Money and World Language," Princeton University—  
International Finance Section, Essays in International 
Finance, No. 6l (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press, August 196?), p. 2.
^Ibid., pp. 2-3 •
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standard based on the use of dollars is unacceptable to 
France which wishes to become the world's central banker; 
on this Kindelberger has the following analogy between 
money and language in the international sphere: "Languages
are ordered hierarchically. Like sterling, French used 
to dominate. Like the dollar, English does now. Frenchmen 
must learn English."^ Kindelberger is saying, in effect, 
because the U.S. buys and sells gold at a fixed price in 
dollars, and because the dollar has more price stability, 
larger capital markets, and more capacity to supply incre­
mental exports at relatively constant prices behind itself, 
the dollar deserves the role that it now performs in the
world. By the same token, French francs, Dutch marks,
2lire, etc. do not enjoy all these advantages. Without 
agreeing with the arguments of Kindelberger one can see 
some elements of truth in them.
One can gather how France looks at the problem 
from the following points :
(l) The gold-exchange standard permits the United States
3to consume beyond its capacity to produce. Kindelberger 
suggests that De Gaulle's monetary advisor Jacques Rueff 
suggested this at a time, when the American balance of




payments on current account reached close to record sur­
pluses.^
(2) For a good many years the U.S. has spent, lent, and 
invested abroad more than it has received. Some of the 
U.S. foreign spendings are for purposes that France does 
not approve--such as expenditures for the prosecution of 
the war in Viet Nam and for the take-over of foreign firms, 
including industrial concerns in France.
(3) According to Machlup another feature in the French 
position has been the downgrading of plans for borrowing 
facilities and the creation of new reserves.
The affluence of the Bank of France that followed 
the devaluation of 1958, and has now reached enormous 
proportions, makes it hard for the French to appreci­
ate any talk about a present or imminent shortage of 
reserves in the world. The growth of reserves in 
France and a few other countries has contributed to 
embarrassing inflationary pressures. The French 
experience, therefore, is one of abundance of reserves 
and, if some nations have been unable to get a share 
in this abundance or even to avoid payments deficits, 
they evidently have not been "living right.
(4) Also France has, or may have, a fear of possible devalu­
ation of the dollar.
(5) Going beyond the above points and listening to the 
French spokesmen, one can see, for example, that the French 
leading monetary authority who is advising De Gaulle,
Jacques Rueff, is an ardent supporter of a return to the
^Ibid.
2Machlup, "World Monetary Debate," op. cit., p. 2.
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gold standard. The automaticity of such a system in theo­
retical terms and its supposed efficiency as an adjustment 
mechanism greatly reduces the need for liquidity and 
reserves. According to the advocates of a pure gold 
standard system, a loss of gold due to disequilibrium in 
balance of payments would reduce the money supply of the 
country in question which is facing deficit, while the 
surplus country would expand its money supply because of 
its gaining gold. The decreasing money supply in the 
deficit country would create tight credit conditions, 
higher interest rates, and lower incomes; the opposite 
reactions would occur in the surplus country. As a conse­
quence, exports of the deficit country should rise and its 
imports fall, and the reserves reactions should occur in 
the surplus country. These processes of adjustment to 
gold transfers within the deficit and surplus countries 
are assumed to go on until eventually an equilibrium would 
exist, by the rule of market forces, among countries.
The gold standard system gained appeal during its 
"golden age" in the last century and, without doubt, could 
set a standard and procedure by which international malad­
justments could be ironed out without tinkering and meddling 
by monetary authorities. There are, however, some basic 
assumptions behind this system, and it is likely that it 
would not work so automatically if, among other things, the 
following assumptions do not hold true.
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a) The proposal assumes that the domestic money supply will 
necessarily change as there is a change in gold reserves 
of the country.
h) It further assumes that the change in money supply is 
in the same direction as the changes in the country's gold 
reserves.
c) The proposal requires that the change in the money 
supply be no smaller than the change in gold reserves.
d) It assumes that there is no sterilization of the effects 
of gold inflow on the money supply by government actions.
e) And finally, the gold standard system would work best 
if there were 100 per cent gold backing for the money 
supply. Once a fractional reserve system exists the central 
bank may manipulate to change the ratio of gold to money.
The advocates of the gold standard see the reserve currency 
component of international reserves as the source of the 
fundamental difficulty of the present system.
One can close discussion of the French position
with one quotation from Triffin.
The surplus countries of today--or yesterday— might 
well have cause to regret tomorrow their failure to 
negotiate from strength, and to seize in time the 
opportunities open to them when their American partner 
negotiated, more amenably, from a position of rela­
tive, but temporary weakness.^
It is also interesting to note that Triffin asserts that
those who argued that negotiation for the reform of the
^Robert Triffin, "From Waterloo to Tokyo" in The 
Economist, vol. 208, August 15» 1964, p. 659*
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system should be postponed until the U.S. balance of pay­
ments had been put in order "lest new international credit 
facilities be abused to finance balance of payments deficits 
and monetary irresponsibility in the United States" now 
argue that "reforms have become unnecessary in view of the 
spectacular improvement in the American balance of payments 
and of the consequent abatement of the dollar crisis."^
The Position of the United States 
From what has been already presented, one can see 
that much of the disturbance in the political atmosphere 
governing the negotiations related to the reform of inter­
national monetary system has been created by France. Not 
all of France's objections are theoretically well-founded. 
The United States appears to have a feeling that it has 
been committed to maintaining the gold value of the dollar. 
Before assuming office as President, the late John F.
Kennedy made statements to the effect that "the dollar
2price of gold would in no event be changed."
There are two significant, optimistic suppositions 
that underlie the American position. First, the U.S. 
thinks--and there are elements of truth in this-^that the 
dollar is functioning in the role of an international 
money as it is performing the functions of: a medium of
^Ibid., p. 659.
2Reprinted in The South African Journal of Eco­
nomics , op. cit. , p. 94.
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exchange, a world standard of value, a world standard of
deferred transactions and a unit of account. Moreover,
according to Machlup the U.S. thinks that "the dollar is
as good as gold and will remain so even if the deficit
lasts for another few y e a r s . S e c o n d ,  the United States
believes that its deficit can and will be eliminated 
2shortly.
The attitude of American monetary authorities is 
thus understandable. They feel that if any change is to 
be made, "it should be after cool consideration, and not
3under the force majeure of market forces." Machlup takes
a similar position and says: "One can hardly expect a
debtor, in a situation regarded as precarious by some of
his creditors, to propose and urge that measures be taken
to safeguard against a loss of confidence in his ability 
4to pay."
Official American authorities, therefore, feel-- 
perhaps in view of the statements made by President Kennedy 
and also on prestige grounds— that agreement to a rise in 
the price of gold would involve loss of dollar face value.
^Machlup, "World Monetary Debate," op. cit., p. 2. 
^Ibid.
3The South African Journal of Economics, op. cit., 
p. 94. ----
4"World Monetary Debate," op. ■ cit. , p. 3.
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This according to Sir Roy Harrod, the old ardent and real
advocate of a rise in the price of gold, is a false point.
The real loss of face was when the dollar lost more 
than half its value in terms of goods during the war 
and the following years. A change in the dollar price 
of gold would merely mean the recognition of facts 
that already exist.^
Undoubtedly there has been some degree of inflation in the 
U.S. economy in the past years, but what Harrod does not 
take into account is the possible, and probably disastrous, 
consequences of an official change in the value of the 
dollar in terms of gold. This may bring about monetary 
chaos and thus affect the distribution of income and of 
wealth within the American society, the distribution of 
foreign exchange reserves among countries in the interna­
tional scene and the functioning of price mechanism in 
both American and international economies.
The United States also thinks, and rightly so, 
that if it were not willing to accept a deficit in its 
balance of payments, the growth of world trade and world 
prosperity would have been much less. The U.S. also 
realizes that if its balance of payments deficit is elimi­
nated and nothing takes its place, the annual growth of 
the non-communist world reserves will be confined to 
country's drawing rights on the IMF, the acquisition of 
gold by monetary authorities, and potential borrowing
^The South African Journal of Economics, op. cit.,
p. 94.
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capacities of different countries.
The concern of the United States with the realiza­
tion of the strategic importance of external finance in 
the process of development of developing countries should 
not be neglected. Also it is very likely that the U.S. 
may have noticed that mere reliance on domestic policies 
for an increase in domestic savings and the financing of 
development is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
development. Finally, whether France, Russia, and others 
like it or not, the U.S. has become involved in foreign 
commitments, and for prestige and political reasons it can 
not easily withdraw. In the meantime, so long as all 
foreign expenditures, no matter for what purposes, remain 
and exceed total receipts, the deficit remains. Elimina­
tion of U.S. deficit may be easier economically than politi­
cally. Thus one can hope for an honorable way out of the 
dilemma for the U.S., a way which would seem to be centered 
more around the creation and utilization of more reserves 
than the acceptance of either a rise in the price of gold 
or a flexible exchange rate.
Referring to the American position Harrod believes;
The Americans on their side also appear to take the 
view that no bold initiative can be made by them 
until their deficits are terminated. This arises 
from a sense of diffidence; they fear that, if they 
press forward with proposals, the Continental Euro­
peans would argue that the proposed scheme was merely 
another device by the Americans for getting the rest
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of the world to bale them out of their difficulties. 
And this is precisely how they would argue.^
The Position of Great Britain
Because of the use of the pound as a key currency
and especially in the sterling area, the financial position
of the United Kingdom has been one of the major concerns
of the world's central bankers.
At the end of December, 1966, United Kingdom
external sterling liabilities were $12499 million, which
is 17-47 per cent of world international reserves in 1966
as quoted below. External claims of the U.K. (on central
monetary institutions, banks and others) in the same month
2stood at $3436 million. If this were deducted from U.K. 
external liabilities, a figure of $9063 million could be 
obtained, which might be referred to as the U.K.'s net 
external sterling liability. This constitutes 12.67 per
Ocent of $71510 million, the world's international reserves 
in 1966.
In addition to the fact that a large part of inter­
national trade is still financed in sterling, and apart 
from the fact that sterling assets of countries other than 
the U.K. constitute a substantial proportion of the total
^Ibid., p. 102.
2International Financial Statistics, Vol. 20,
No. 8, op. cit. , p. 301.
Taken from Taljle 23 below.
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international reserves (17*^7 per cent on a gross basis, 
and 12.67 per cent on a net basis), the convertibility of 
sterling is a prerequisite for the convertibility of several 
other currencies.
Furthermore, the foreign trade orientation of the 
U.K.'s economy affects its international position in that 
its foreign trade is large in relation to its gross national 
product and its reserves, as can be seen from the following 
table. Shifts in payment leads and lags may cause impor­
tant movements of reserves. Such movements may sometimes 
be accentuated by changes in the amounts of sterling 
credits used by other countries to finance transactions not 
directly connected with the United Kingdom's international 
trade. Finally, the U.K. has had, and still has, grants 
of foreign credits, foreign investment (direct or port­
folio) and other foreign capital transactions (including 
repayment of debt), and emerged from the Second World War 
with greatly increased foreign liabilities, largely reduced 
foreign assets, and a great deal of wartime damage which 
have affected the course of its reserve problem. Its foreign 
liabilities, mainly in the form of sterling balances, can 
be easily drawn upon; if this were done, the financial 
ability of the U.K. would be affected. Under the above 
conditions, any adverse circumstances are likely to affect 
confidence in sterling and to lead to substantial changes 
in sterling reserves. In view of the existence of the
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TABLE 8
U.K. IMPORTS, EXPORTS, INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, AND GNP 






























Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, Vol. 20, No. 8 (Washington, D. C., 
August 1967)» p. 35 for imports; p. 34 for exports, p. 303 
for GNP.
*U.K. GNP is given in pounds sterling and is 9*78 
billion pounds sterling, or 9780 million pounds sterling. 
Using a rate of exchange of #2.80, if this figure were
converted to U.S. dollars = ^9780 X #2.80 = #27384.
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sterling area, the heavy foreign trade orientation of 
Britain, and all of the above factors, it is not surprising 
that the U.K. has been concerned with confidence in its 
sterling and with maintenance of monetary order in the 
international economic relations.
Compared to the U.S. position, then, England sees 
more urgent needs for reform of the international monetary 
system. Their incentives, however, vary: the U.S. places
more value on world prosperity due to its economic leader­
ship of the Western world, while the United Kingdom seeks 
a way out of difficulties. Part of this can be explained 
by the recent deficit years and loss of international 
reserves that the U.K. has faced; in each case, of course, 
the U.K. has been able, through the cooperation of the IMF 
and other countries, to stand ready to defend pound sterling 
and prevent a iponetary chaos. Yet one can safely assert 
that all these disorders have placed more and more burdens 
of keeping the world confidence, and negotiations neces­
sary for this purpose, on the U.K.'s shoulders.
To some extent the United Kingdom has made obliga­
tions to help the developing countries, especially Common 
wealth nations. In this the U.K. resembles the United 
States. For this reason, and also in view of the fact 
that the U.K. has had to suffer years of deficit with 
resistance against speculative movements of the pound 
sterling and expectations of pound devaluation on the part
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of other countries, it is desperately in favor of reform 
of the international monetary system.
The United Kingdom had a deficit in 196O that was 
financed temporarily by a high interest rate which attracted 
private short term capital. In 196I partly because of the 
upward valuation of the German mark in February of that 
year, and perhaps partly due to the deficit of the previous 
year a lack of confidence in sterling developed. The U.K. 
obtained the support of continental Europe by means of the 
Basel Agreement. The United Kingdom, it was understood, 
would repay credits it had received in this way by drawing 
on the IMF. This, coupled with the U.S. balance of payments 
deficit created the prospect of two countries with large 
quotas to draw on the IMF.
The U.K. deficit, along with more international 
concern over the maintenance of order in the international 
monetary system, had bearings on the development of new 
arrangements : General Arrangement to Borrow. Article VII
of the IMF Agreement provides that the Fund may borrow 
currencies if and when they are in danger of becoming 
scarce. The Managing Director of the Fund in I96I, Per 
Jacobson, could have persuaded the countries whose curren­
cies were in danger of becoming scarce to lend them by 
resorting to this clause if he had so desired. He was, 
however, cautious and perhpas thought it would be wiser 
to make a multilateral arrangement, including more
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industrialized countries whose monies are not becoming 
scarce, at least in the immediate future. Under these 
circumstances, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
eight other countries agreed to put up respectively #1000, 
#2000, and #3000 million among themselves in the form of 
a stand-by arrangement. This became known as the General 
Arrangement to Borrow.
A final note on the British position concerns her
interest in terms of joining the European Economic Com-
munity--more commonly known as the Common Market.
The British are not in a good position to take a bold 
initiative owing to the recurrent sterling crises in 
recent years arising from lack of confidence in the 
maintenance of the sterling parity and their dependence 
on foreign credits for dealing with these crises. . . . 
The British position is also temporarily complicated 
by their application to join the Common Market, which 
would make them hesitant about backing up a strong 
initiative by the Americans, if this was opposed by 
the Common Market countries.^
The Position of the Developing Countries
So far three relatively different attitudes have 
been discussed. Analysis of the position of other coun­
tries can throw further light on the topic. It is not 
practical, however, to examine the attitude of each country, 
The three countries chosen so far can be regarded as a 
representative sample of the various views of industri­
alized countries. But since the developing countries have
^The South African Journal of Economics, op. cit.,
p. 102.
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been thus far left out of the discussion, it is now neces­
sary to look at the problem from their standpoint also.
The way some--and perhaps most--developing coun­
tries look at the problem of international liquidity can 
be summarized as follows. They think that some of the 
capital exporting countries are beset with balance of 
payments problems. Even if they are not beset with balance 
of payments difficulties, the export of capital from them 
depends much on their willingness and/or regulations; they 
have not always shown such a willingness. Furthermore, 
official loans are occasionally tied with respect to their 
source of procurement. Finance is also earmarked to 
specific projects approved by the capital exporting country 
--needless to say the scale of preferences of the two 
groups do not always correspond. Moreover, even food 
which is distributed in kind will be distributed when the 
donor country is burdened with agricultural surpluses.
From a domestic standpoint, on the other hand, 
underdeveloped countries face difficulties in increasing 
their domestic savings through various means such as 
taxation, forced savings, voluntary savings, inflation, 
etc. Under these circumstances they are facing problems 
from two fronts: external and internal finance. The
experts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development have evidence to suggest that "an increase of 
several billion dollars in external finance is well within
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the absorptive capacity of such countries."^
Economic relations between industrialized and the 
developing countries are not limited to trade and invest­
ment matters. It is by now a familiar argument that some
of the developing countries have a "high foreign trade 
2orientation" and occasional fluctuations in their foreign 
exchange earnings (especially those whose exports are 
largely raw materials and primary products). This may 
create a rather special need for reserves to enable these 
countries to fall back on in bad years; otherwise their 
development programs may have to be postponed or not imple­
mented at all.
In spite of their need for financial reserves they 
have had to suffer from the inadequate supply of inter­
national liquidity. Moreover, the economic strength of 
their countries in terms of fiscal and monetary policies 
cannot make one very optimistic about how they can over­
come their problems of finance.
^N. T. Wang, "New Proposals for the International 
Finance of Development" in Princeton University--Interna- 
tional Finance Section, Essays in International Finance,
No. 59 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
April 1967), p. 1.
^A. J. Kondonassis, "Concepts of Economic Develop­
ment with Special Reference to Underdeveloped Countries" 
in University of Oklahoma--Graduate International Studies 
Program, The Emergent Nations, Monograph No. 1 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 8l. See also 
Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic 
Growth (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 4o-41.
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Underdeveloped countries have further been excluded 
from many plans for the reform of the international monetary 
system. Three reasons for this may be found:
(1) There is the argument that these countries are "too 
poor to afford to lock up 'real resources' in the form of 
reserves."^ This argument is counterargued by reference 
to fluctuations in their foreign exchange earnings, high 
foreign trade orientation, and their special need for real 
reserves to fall back on.
(2) It is also held that the currencies of these countries
are not of sufficient importance to justify their inclusion
in a scheme for reform of the international monetary system.
Sir Roy Harrod, in response to this assertion, points out
that if, e.g., such countries wish to withdraw from the
scheme and they have reserve units to be converted, then
their currencies would necessarily have to be considered
2worthy of consideration.
(3) There is also a belief that underdeveloped countries 
should be kept out of the management of the new schemes 
for reform of the system on the grounds that they might 
advocate inflationary reserve creation and, while lacking 
monetary discipline, might bloc their votes in such a 
manner as to push through the policy they desire. This




fear is not justifiable, because, as Harrod points out, 
these countries "have only a small voting power in the 
Fund and any inflationary proposals by them could always 
be outvoted by the members of the Group of Ten."^
Harrod finds none of these three arguments "really 
2tenable." The real fear, in Harrod's estimation, is that 
if underdeveloped countries "had any say in the manage­
ment" of a reform proposal, "they might join with the 
Anglo-Saxon countries in the International Monetary Fund 
and out-vote the more conservative members of the Group 
of Ten."3
In recent years, however, more attention has been 
paid in scientific circles to the desirability of the par­
ticipation of underdeveloped countries in schemes for the 
reform of the international monetary system.
A more decentralized IMF, recognizing and encouraging 
openly the role of emerging regional monetary organiza­
tions and integrating in Europe, Latin America, and 
elsewhere, would be far preferable economically--and 
politically— to a rump IMF overshadowed by a separate 
rich nation's club of the ten or eleven most powerful 
industrialized countries.*
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that 




4"From Waterloo to Tokyo" in The Economist, op. 
cit., p. 659»
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any share in the management aspects of the plans for reform 
of the system. Their eventual interest in smooth func­
tioning of the system, however, should not be neglected. 
Despite the clear recognition of the absorptive capacity 
of underdeveloped countries and the strategic role of 
external finance to their development programs, the flow 
of international liquidity to developing countries has not 
always been regarded to be sufficient. Therefore, their 
needs should not be neglected, and adequate international 
liquidity could prove helpful to them. Machlup reports: 
"The spokesmen for developing nations stressed chiefly the 
problem of liquidity and the importance of having their 
countries share in any distribution of greater reserves 
and easier borrowing facilities."^ The concern of under­
developed countries discussed in Chapter II above throws 
further light on this section.
What Then?
It is now appropriate to integrate different sig­
nificant points from the positions already discussed. As 
mentioned above, France denies a problem of shortage of 
international liquidity as such, yet believes the present 
international monetary system is not satisfactory in that 
it does not provide for adjustment in the case of persis­
tent balance of payments imbalances. The United States
^"World Monetary Debate," op. cit., p. 3*
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regards reform of the system to be useful, yet has been 
unwilling to show any weakness in negotiations (and to 
pursue negotiations out of fear) by agreeing to demands 
concerning elimination of its balance of payments deficit 
as a prerequisite for reform negotiations. The United 
Kingdom has been under severe balance of payments and 
speculative pressures in recent years and has been hard- 
pressed to defend the pound. How successful it will be 
in this direction remains to be seen. The U.K., in con­
sideration of its application to join the Common Market, 
has been unwilling to make statements which might hurt its 
prospective Common Market partners. The underdeveloped 
countries are not strong enough politically to participate 
in the negotiations, yet the problem also interests them.
To the above considerations one must add theoreti­
cal disagreements between theoreticians and policy makers 
and even within academic circles. It is for these reasons 
that some of the leading authorities in recent years have 
tried to look into the bases for agreement not only through 
their writings, but also by establishing seminars in 
different places.^ The objectives in such attempts have
^Fritz Machlup, professor of Economics at Princeton 
University, is a striking example in this regard as he 
organized meetings of thirty-two academic economists at 
Princeton University and Bellagio, in answer to Secretary 
Dillon's press announcement at the 1963 meeting of the 
IMF that ". . .no academic economist would be invited to 
testify before the Group of Ten, presumably because it was 
felt that they never would agree anyway on any practical 
solution of the problems under debate. . . . "  See The 
World Money Maze, op. cit., p. 31?.
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been to provide the policy makers with guides to the 
points of agreement among theoreticians. One can read 
from these why the problem of the international monetary 
system has not yet been solved. These are meant to be 
guidelines and samples to show the point of disagreement 
as well as the different attitudes of the governments.
(It is felt that enough has been said in this direction.) 
More thorough analysis of the political disagreements 
and their justification is felt to be beyond the scope of 
this analysis.
There is, however, an important point to be clari­
fied, namely that
Even those most reluctant to see any reform may feel 
that they cannot resist indefinitely the growing 
world demand for it. It is not as though the problem 
itself would disappear; the shortfall in the growth 
of world reserves compared with the growth of world 
trade will continue to operate and will accelerate.
Robert Triffin, referring to the meetings of
thirty-two academic economists (mentioned in a previous
footnote), observed the following:
We all recognize the existence of three separate, 
but interrelated problems in this area: (a) the need
for relatively prompt intercountry balance-of-payments 
adjustments so as to avoid the growth of cumulative 
disequilibrium; (b) the need for long-term adaptation 
of the over-all volume of world reserves to the full 
non-inflationary possibilities of economic growth;
(c) most urgently, the need for reduction of the vul­
nerability now imparted to the system by an excessive 
overhang of international short-term dollar and
^The South African Journal of Economics, op. cit.,
p. 103,
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sterling indebtedness resulting from past reserve 
accumulation by central banks (i.e. for the liquida­
tion of the so-called "reserve currency system.
Taking Triffin's word one can see that academic economists 
are trying to be helpful to the policy makers by providing 
them with points of agreement. Indeed, one gets the impres­
sion that as time passes they are able to understand each 
other's points more thoroughly. At the same time recongi- 
tion is given to the impracticality of some proposals for 
reform of the system--such as the proposals for raising 
the price of gold which brings out the opposition of the 
U.S., the U.K., and a few other countries. If an under­
standing exists among the academic economists, then what 
one can hope is to see the practicing economists test the
degree to which they can reach consensus on their first,
2or, as Triffin emphasized, even on their second-best 
answers to the problem rather than to look for panaceas.
The process of adjustment could be made to be as painless 
and orderly as possible, more liquidity could be provided 
for the growing needs of world trade and investment so that 
each country would have command of foreign currencies to 
tide it over a balance of payments deficit; before these 
can be done, however, there must be some common under­
standing of the problem which might be achieved through 
negotiations.
^The World Money Maze, op. cit., p. 320.
^Ibid.
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of the problems, the 
political maneuvers involved in practical negotiations and 
all of the other relevant problems should not be dis­
couraging. Perhaps enough proposals have been suggested 
in the 1950's and 1960's. What is needed is an agreement 
among economists as well as policy makers on what is the 
trouble and what would be the best or at least the most 
acceptable and practical method of attacking it.
CHAPTER VII
A LOOK INTO THE DATA
In this chapter an attempt is made to compare the 
behavior of different countries with respect to their 
holdings of reserves relative to their imports based on 
the comprehensive data published by the IMF. Unfortunately, 
the data are not always comparable, not only because of 
possible different reporting practices in various coun­
tries , but also because of the split personalities of 
monetary authorities in different countries. What follows 
is not claimed to be a perfectly valid comparison; yet 
such an attempt to derive patterns of behavior is worth­
while, partly because no such attempts have been made.
In addition a set of correlation analyses will be 
tried to see the degree of correlation between interna­
tional trade, world reserves, world gross product, and 
passage of time. The objective of this analysis is to 
see whether variations in the volume of international 
reserves account for changes in international trade, and 
if so, to what extent, or whether, there are other factors 
such as world production whose variations can also be 
correlated to the changes in the volume of international
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trade. The period under observation covers the years 
between 1948 and I966 inclusive.
Reserve Behavior of Selected Countries
In addition to the eleven industrialized countries 
(the Group of Ten and Switzerland) other countries from 
Europe as well as other continents were selected at random 
from the International Financial Statistics published 
monthly by the International Monetary Fund. The countries 
selected.(in addition to the Group of Eleven) are: 
Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Greece, 
Turkey, Argentina, and Venezuela. Thus the sample covers 
twenty countries. For each country data were taken per­
taining to their imports and international reserves for 
the years 1948 through 1966. The study thus covers a 
period of approximately two decades.
One of the significant reasons for holding of 
international reserves by these countries is assumed to 
be for use either in normal transactions and financing of 
their imports or for "rainy day" use as a means of inter­
national settlements. There are, of course, speculative 
factors also involved; yet they do not consistently lend 
themselves to measurement. Having assumed that interna­
tional reserves are held partly for the purpose of making 
international settlements, the percentage ratio of 
reserves of each country to its imports, all measured in 
U.S. millions of dollars, is computed for all twenty
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countries and for each year. The result of such computa­
tions are presented in Appendix III. It must be added 
here that not all countries reported their import data on 
a "cif" basis. The IMF, however, has adjusted such data 
to include freight and insurance, and IMF adjustments are 
taken as they stand without questioning their validity.^
Table 9 presents the maximum and the minimum 
reserve-imports percentage of these countries in order of 
magnitude. It shows that the maximum percentage of reserves 
to imports that any of these countries held between 1948 
to 1966 was held by the U.S., the minimum percentage by 
Germany. This Table, however, can only reveal the range 
of the magnitude of reserve-import percentage; and as such, 
these percentages do not tell anything about the most 
frequent values. As a result, the Table cannot be relied 
upon as fully indicative of customary behavior. However, 
their mode of behavior can be derived statistically.
Before this derivation is given a look into the data is 
necessary.
One can note clear patterns of behavior for most 
of the countries. All such patterns, however, may not be 
of immediate interest. Accordingly, in the following 
analysis, attention will only he focused on the aspects 
which seem to be most significant in relation to their
^For details see the I966/67 Supplement to IFS.
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TABLE 9
THE HIGHEST AND THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF INTERNA­
TIONAL RESERVES TO IMPORTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
1948-1966
Country









U.S. 345.0 Switzerland 80.2
Switzerland 191.8 U.S. 50.6
Australia 122.1 Venezuela 45.9
Turkey 90.5 Australia 39.1Argentina 84.0 Belgium 30.8
Venezuela 78.4 Italy 29.8
Germany 77.6 Canada 24.5Austria 73.4 Japan 19.3Italy 72.7 Netherlands 18.3Canada 59.0 Turkey 17.6
France 56.9 Sweden 16.9Japan 54.3 Greece 15.9Belgium 54.2 U.K. 15.0
Greece 52.6 France 13.8
New Zealand 52.4 Norway 13.3Netherlands 51.9 Austria 12.6U.K. 46.8 Denmark 11.3Sweden 35.2 Argentina 10.4
Denmark 24.6 New Zealand 8.8
Norway 21.2 Germany 7.0
Source: Data in Appendix III.
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relevance to the problem of international liquidity. In 
the period covered:
1. The percentage ratio of reserves to imports for 
the U.S. has been generally declining with a maximum in 
1949, and a minimum in I966, excepting 1952, 1954, and 
1957»^ Furthermore, until 1962, the U.S. had always had
a ratio greater than 100 per cent.
2. Next, Switzerland, until 196I and with the 
exception of 1957, has shown a tendency to keep the per­
centage ratio of its reserves to imports somewhere above 
100. Since 1962, however, it has had a percentage less 
than 100.
3. Surprisingly, the Netherlands, the country
which has a higher average propensity to import than both
the U.S. and Switzerland--and indeed is regarded to be
among the countries having the highest average propensity 
2to import --has kept low international reserves relative 
to its imports. In this, it resembles Denmark and Norway 
--both of which are among the countries with high average 
propensity to import.
y
4. In the case of France two waves of increase in
^The exceptions in 1952 and 1957 in which the ratio 
of reserves to imports for the U.S. has not declined might 
be attributed respectively to the War of Korea and the 
Suez Crisis which may have caused an outflow of capital 
from Europe and other continents to the U.S. The excep­
tion of 1954 cannot be easily attributed to any one 
factor.
2Snider, op. cit., p. 468.
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the reserve import percentage can clearly be observed.
(See Appendix III.)
a) 1949 to 1955
b) 1958 to 1964 (excepting a decrease in 1962) 
During the same period that the U.K. and France both show 
a decrease in their official holding of reserves (1955 to 
1956), the U.S. records an increase. This can be attrib­
uted to the uncertainty which prevailed before the Suez 
Crisis reached its peak that might have caused capital 
flights from the U.K. and France to the U.S. The pattern 
of French behavior shows a range of variations much smaller 
than that of the U.S. Furthermore, it shows an upward 
trend, with most of the increase in reserve-import per­
centage concentrated after 1958 (the year in which the 
large U.S. balance of payments deficits began).
5. The percentage of U.K. reserves^ to her imports 
has undergone more violent fluctuations than that of the 
U.S. without showing too much of a decrease when compared 
with 1948 percentage ratio. Moreover, the highest reserves 
to imports percentage that the U.K. has held has at best 
been less than half of that of the U.S.
6. More generally, if one recognized the following 
three classes of percentages:
These reserve holdings are not net; for the U.K. 
borrowings for reserve purposes have sometimes been in 
excess of reserves held.
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a) from 7 to 20 per cent
b) from 20 to 40 per cent
and c) from 40 to 60 per cent or above, 
he would find Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands under 
category a); Canada, Japan, Sweden, Greece, under cate­
gory b); and finally countries such as Switzerland, the 
U.S., France, in category c). This reveals that the 
selected countries have varying traditions in this context 
or differing degrees of responsiveness in regard to their 
needs for international economic relations. The outstanding 
feature of this type of analysis, which incidentally con­
tradicts the commonsense impression, is that:
a) Countries with high average propensity to import 
(some Scandinavian countries) are less prone to keep high 
reserve-import percentages and perhaps less cautious as to 
the amount of their reserve holding relative to their 
international trade.
b) Countries have different central tendencies 
around a percentage value; Denmark and Switzerland almost 
at the extremes of the range of variations, and other coun­
tries falling in between.
The difference in their habits of holding reserves 
can be one guide for those who are looking for a practical 
solution of the problem of international liquidity through 
reserve creation. It can be a guide in that no one type 
of behavior is recognizable, and that no one rule may
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appropriately be imposed on different countries. Neither 
may it suit the different degrees of need in different 
countries.
Now, in order to see the mode of past behavior (or 
performance) or the central tendency to which a country 
has most adhered to, a glance at Table 10 is necessary.
In order to distinguish the mode of behavior in the past, 
each selected country's performance is taken into account 
through examination of the percentage of reserves to imports 
Of course, what countries have actually come up with is 
not necessarily indicative of what they have desired. 
Therefore these percentages have been taken for what they 
signify objectively, and not as a sign of a country's 
willingness to maintain certain levels. An attempt has 
then been made to pick up the mode of performance: namely,
the percentage which has most frequently occurred in the 
case of each country. A clear mode could not always be 
discerned since in many cases the countries had a "bimodal" 
percentage,^ that is, holding two percentages fairly 
consistently. Table 10 as arranged is, in effect, a digest 
to the statistical Appendix III.
One final step in deriving the mode of behavior 
has been taken; that is to establish an entry form for the
^In a few cases, like GLreece, Austria and Switzer­
land, it was observed that a clear first mode could not be 
recognized as there were two modes.
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TABLE 10
BIMODAL FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE PERCENTAGE RATIO 
OF RESERVES TO IMPORTS FOR 20 SELECTED COUNTRIES
Fre-
Country % of First quency 
& 2nd Modes in 
Years
Fre-
Country % of First quency 
& 2nd Modes in 
Years
Japan 30 to 39.9 6 Vene­ 50 to 59.9 940 to 49.9 3 zuela 70 to 79.9 4
Australia 50 to 59.9 6 Germany 50 to 59.9 540 to 49.9 4 60 to 69.9 4
Canada 30 to 39.9 11 Austria 50 to 59.9 540 to 49.9 6 60 to 69.9 410 to 19.9 4
Italy 30 to 39.9 550 to 59.9 3 Sweden 20 to 29.9 14
60 to 69.9 3 10 to 19.9 3
Denmark 10 to 19.9 15 Norway 10 to 19.9 1620 to 29.9 3 20 to 29.9 3
Belgium 40 to 49.9 11 U.S. 100 to 199.9 830 to 39.9 7 200 to 299.9 4
New 20 to 29.9 6 Swit­ 100 to 199.9 13Zealand 30 to 39.9 5 zer­ 90 to 99.9 3land 80 to 89.9 3Greece 30 to 39.9 740 to 49.9 4 Nether­ 20 to 29.9 610 to 19.9 4 lands 30 to 39.9 6
Turkey 30 to 39.9 5 France 50 to 59.9 650 to 59.9 4 10 to 19.9 6
Argentina 20 to 29.9 5 U.K. 20 to 29.9 1430 to 39.9 4 10 to 19.9 3
Source: Personal derivation from Appendix III.
The modes shown for each country are those occurring most 
frequently.
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percentages given in Table 10. In order to accomplish 
this, each "year" for each country has been referred to 
as a "case." Thus there are altogether three hundred and 
eighty such cases, as twenty countries are involved and 
for each country a period of nineteen years is under 
observation (20 X 19 = 380). Then one can have the entry 
form as depicted in Table 11.
It is now easy to see to what percentage countries 
have most frequently adhered. One can summarize the 
results of the Entry Form in the form of a frequency dis­
tribution arranged in order of magnitude as shown in 
Table 12.
Looking at Table 12 it can now be established that 
most selected countries have adhered to a reserve-import 
percentage of 30 to 39*9; the next mode of behavior is 20 
to 29*9; the third is 10 to 19-9; finally the next two 
items in order of magnitude of their case frequencies are 
50 to 59-9 per cent and 40 to 49*9 per cent. The conclu­
sion which can be derived is interesting. It has been 
beyond the control or willingness of many of the twenty 
selected countries to keep reserve-import percentages as 
high as 100 to 199*9 or even at the level of 70 to 79*9 
per cent. Equally important is the behavior of the coun­
tries to have a central tendency around 20 to 39*9 per 
cent I but less around 10 to 19*9 per cent and 50 to 
59*9 per cent of reserve-import ratios.
TABLE 11
ENTRY FORM FOR PERCENTAGES OF RESERVE-IMPORTS FOR 20 SELECTED COUNTRIES 
IN TERMS OF THEIR BIMODAL BEHAVIOR— 1948-1966
lO to 19. 9 % 20 to 29.9 % 30 to 39'.9 % 40 to 49.9 % 50 to 59.9 %Countries & Countries & Countries & Countries & Countries &
Frequencies * Frequencies * Frequencies * Frequencies * Frequencies *
U.K. 3 U.K. 14 Netherlands 6 Greece 4 France 6France 6 Netherlands 6 Argentina 4 Belgium 11 Austria 5
Norway 16 Norway 3 Turkey 5 Canada 6 Germany 5Sweden 3 Sweden 14 Greece 7 Australia 4 Venezuela 9Austria 4 Argentina 5 New Zealand 5 Japan 3 Turkey 4Greece 4 New Zealand 6 Belgium 7 Italy 5Denmark 13 Denmark 5 Italy 5 Australia 6Canada 11 Total 28
Total 51 Total 53 Japan 6 Total 40
Total 56
TABLE 11 Contd.
60 to 69. 70 to 79-9 % 80 to 89.9 % 90 to 99.9 % 100 to 199.9 % 200 to 299.9Countries & Countries & Countries & Countries & Countries & Countries &
Frequencies * Frequencies * Frequencies * Frequencies* Frequencies * Frequencies*
Austria 4 Venezuela 4 Switzer- 3 Switzer­ 3 Switzerland 13 U.S. 3
land land U.S. 8
Total 4 Total 4 Total 3 Total 3 Total 21 Total 3
Source: Data presented in Table 10 above and Appendix III. 




A DIGEST TO TABLE 11 
(BimodaT Percentages of Reserve -Imports)
Percentage iof Reserves Number of Per cent of
to Imports Cases Total
30 to 39.9 56 21.0520 to 29.9 53 19.9210 to 19.9 51 19.1750 to 59.9 40 15.0340 to 49.9 28 10.52100 to 199.9 21 7.8970 to 79.9 4 1.5060 to 69.9 4 1.5080 to 89.9 3 1.1290 to 99.9 3 1.12200 to 299.9 3 1.12
Total 266 100.0*
Source: Data presented in Appendix III.
*The total actually amounts to 99*9^ per cent 
The difference is due to rounding.
In addition to the measure of central tendency 
which was used above, namely mode, another measure of 
central tendency was used. This is mean. For each country 
the mean--or the average--value of the percentage of 
reserves to imports have been computed. These data are 
presented in Table 13* All such means give a mean for 
the sample equal to 48.33 per cent. This result does not 
closely correspond to the first three modal values (30 to 
39*9 per cent, 20 to 29.9 per cent, and 10 to 19.9 per 
cent) of reserve-import percentage ratios presented in 
Table 12 above. It must, however, be remembered that
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TABLE 13
MEAN VALUE OF PERCENTAGE RATIO OF RESERVE-IMPORTS
(1948-1966; 1948-57; 1958-66)
1948-66 1948-57 1958-66
Japan 34.5 38.71 31.8Australia 61.3 69.35 52.46Canada 38.2 41.73 34.44Germany 50.1 41.63 57.88Austria 46.8 34.29 61.75
Sweden 24.1 25.97 22.20Norway 18.0 16.74 19.56
Italy 51.0 36081 63.74
Denmark 15.2 12.39 18,. 34Belgium 42.4 43.99 40.73
New Zealand 26.5 33.55 18.78Greece 32.7 33.45 32.00Turkey 44.3 51.56 36.31Argentina 37.3 43.87 30.00Venezuela 58.2 56.73 60.01
U.K. 24.8 25.8 23.71France 34.0 21.61 46.81









Source : Data presented in Appendix III.
*All totals divided by 20 give the means.
293
means are, after all, simply arithmetic averages and not 
only are affected by individual extreme values, but also 
may not exist at all in reality. Table 13 not only shows 
the average percentage of reserves to imports that each 
country has held between 1948-66, 1948-57j and 1958-66, 
but also the overall percentages of reserve-imports for 
all selected countries for each of these periods. Thus 
one can assert that the selected countries have held 
their reserves, on the average, equal to 48.33 per cent 
of their imports. Assuming that this figure is 50 per 
cent, it suggests that countries have had access to no 
more than, on the average, half of the reserves necessary 
for fulfilling their needs. It is, therefore, not sur­
prising that for financing of the other half they have 
had to resort to ^d hoc credit facilities.
The pattern of past performance need not neces­
sarily continue into the future. Yet, it is interesting 
from the standpoint of showing performance in retrospect, 
whether or not the situation has been desirable to these 
countries and whether it has been within or beyond their 
control. Now that some of the general facts about the 
behavior of selected countries with respect to their 
holdings of international reserves have been examined, 
one can look further into the data to see if any other 
features can be determined from past records. Before this 
a broad note is pertinent.
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It can be observed from the above data that in the 
case of the U.S. and Switzerland, the percentage of their 
international reserves to their imports has been more than 
100 for quite a number of years. This may well be attributed 
to a low average propensity to import in the case of the 
U.S. and the key position of its currency in the interna­
tional reserves; and to capital inflows in the case of 
Switzerland which is usually thought by many countries to 
be a "safe" place for deposits.
Nevertheless, the U.S. and Switzerland are rather 
exceptional cases, and other selected countries showed, 
in general, a reserve-import percentage of less than 100 
at all times, and less than 70 per cent in the majority of 
cases, with an over-all average close to 50 per cent. Thus 
the international liquidity for the free world as a whole 
has been less than adequate if it were to be measured in 
terms of import needs. What the data suggest are also 
supported in view of developments such as General Arrange­
ments to Borrow, increases in the IMF quotas, stand-by 
credits, currency swap transactions, sale of Roosa bonds 
to foreign countries by the U.S., and other mutual credit 
agreements which have taken place among governments. It 
must be borne in mind that these developments have been 
at least partially in response to a feeling of inadequacy 
of international reserves; furthermore, it would seem that 
the international liquidity has been less than enough
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despite all such developments.
Comparison of the Increase in International Trade 
and International Reserves
Between 1950 and I966, the world official holdings 
of gold and foreign exchange reserves have increased by 
little over ten billion dollars. Of this increase,
5.6 billion was in gold, and 4.4 in foreign exchange, all 
expressed in U.S. dollars (Table l4); over the same period 
of time, all international reserves have increased by 
little over $16.3 billion, while the growth of the non­
communist world trade, measured in terms of imports, was 
132.3 billion dollars. (Table 25 below, column 2) A 
simple mathematical manipulation reveals that for the 
period of 1950-1966 the increase in international reserves 
has only been 12.4? per cent of the growth of international 
trade. This can be another measure of the inadequacy of 
the growth of international reserves. If the U.S. balance 
of payments deficit be restored in the future, further 
increase in international reserves will have to come 
either from Russia's gold sales--if it is not diverted 
into private hoards--, or from foreign exchange in some 
form other than U.S. dollars, or from newly mined gold or, 
finally.from some new institutional arrangements.
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TABLE l4
WORLDf OFFICIAL HOLDINGS OF GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
1950-1966










1950 35300 19810 55110
51 35475 19165 5464052 35745 19700 55445
53 36120 21400 5752054 36700 22440 59140
1955 37370 22520 5989056 37890 23480 61370
57 38705 23800 6250558 38030 16965 54995
59 37880 16185 54065
i960 38030 18615 5664561 38870 19175 5804562 39275 19770 59045
63 40220 22040 6226064 40845 23410 64255
1965 41850 22895 6474566 40905 24275 65180
Source: for 1950 through 1957 the data in
column (2) and (3) are taken from: IMF, International
Financial Statistics, vol. 11, no. 12 (Washington, D. C., 
Dec. 1956), pp. 15-16 and for 1958 through 1966 from IMF, 
IPS, vol. 20, no. 8 (Washington, D. C., Aug. 196?),
pp. 15-17.
^Excluding Communist bloc, and not including gold 
holdings of the Bank for International Settlements, the 
IMF, or the European Fund.
*(4) = (2) + (3).
Notes: The fall in gold holdings in 1959 can be
attributed to the gold payments of the IMF members when 
their quotas were increased. The decline in foreign 
exchange holdings in the same year was the consequence 
of the liquidation of the European Payments Union, and 
the resulting settlements of claims.
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Components of Country Reserves
Group of Eleven
Difference of behavior can also be recognized 
among the selected countries from the standpoint of the 
distribution of their international reserves among gold, 
foreign exchange, and reserve positions in the Fund. 
Although some economists (such as Roosa and Bernstein) 
hold that the present level of international reserves-- 
gold, reserve positions in the Fund, and foreign exchange 
--is adequate, the growth of future reserves may not be 
sufficient for an expanding international economy.
Table 15 further reveals that the eleven large 
industrial countries have held more than 72 per cent of 
total international reserves from 1958 to 196b.
Moreover, the eleven countries held, in June 196?1 a 
little over 90 per cent of $40,420 million of world gold 
outside the communist bloc (Table I6). Clear patterns 
can be seen in the holding of gold relative to foreign 
exchange among these eleven countries. Japan, Canada, 
and Sweden had I5 to 40 per cent of their reserves in gold. 
Italy, Germany, and the U.K. had from 48 to 59 per cent 
of their reserves in gold. On the other hand, the U.S., 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France held 70 to 90 per 
cent of their reserves in gold.
There are also great differences among these coun­
tries in their holdings of foreign exchange relative to
TABLE 15
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES* OF ELEVEN SELECTED COUNTRIES, I958-I966
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
U.S. 22540 21504 19359 18753 17220 16843 16672 15450 14881U.K. 3105 2801 3719 3318 3308 3147 2316 3004 3100Belgium 1553 1306 1506 1813 1753 1940 2192 2304 2320France 1050 1736 2272 3365 4o49 4908 5724 6343 6733Germany 5879 4790 7032 7163 6956 7650 7882 7429 8028Italy 2184 3056 3251 3799 4068 3619 3824 4800 4911Netherlands 1539 1442 1863 1958 1946 2102 2349 24i6 2448Sweden 516 478 528 736 801 758 964 972 1027
Switzerland 2063 2063 2324 2758 2871 3074 3120 3244 3324Canada 2038 2029 1989 2276 2547 2603 2881 3027 2693Japan 1062 1447 1949 1666 2022 2058 2019 2152 2119
11 countries 43529 42652 46792 48605 48541 48702 51943 53141 51584
all others 14026 14663 13423 16300 14304 17498 16467 16979 19926
world total 57555 57315 60215 62205 62845 66200 68410 70120 71510
%, 11 countries 75.6 74.4 77.7 78.1 77.2 73.5 75.9 75.7 72.1
\0
CO
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Vol. 20, No. 8
(Washington, D. C., August 196?), pi 16.
End of period; international reserves are defined by the IMF as: 




INTERNATIONAL RESERVES OF ELEVEN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, JUNE I967 











as % of 
Total 
Reserves
U.S. 14274 13169 739. 92.2 5.17U.K. 2834 1677 1582 59.1 55.82Belgium 2457 1522 598 61.9 24.33France 6688 5235 537 78.2 8.02Germany 7794 4292 2411 55.0 30.93Italy 4965 2412 1654 48.5 33.31Netherlands 2471 1731 363 70.0 14.69Sweden 1007 203 656 20.1 65.14Switzerland 3239 2831 407 87.4 12.56Canada 2630 1066 1112 40.5 42.28Japan 2099 330* 1510* 15.7 71.93
11 countries 50458 36468 11568 72.2 22.92
all others n.a. 3952 12042 n.a. n.a.
world total n. a. 40420* 23610* n.a. n.a.
%, 11 coun­
tries n.a. 90.2 48.9 n.a. n.a.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics,
vol. 20, no. 8 (Washington, D. C., Aug. 190?)» PP» 15-17• 
All percentages are computed personally.
*As of the end of the first quarter of the year; 
June data are not available yet, as a result, the world 
total of gold and foreign exchange is an approximation of 
the June, 196? data.
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total reserves. Japan, Sweden and the U.K. held 55 to 71 
per cent of their reserves in foreign exchange; Canada, 
Italy, and Germany had an intermediate range of 30 to 42 
per cent; and finally, other countries such as the U.S., 
France, and Switzerland kept much lower percentages of 
foreign exchange relative to their total reserves. It can 
be observed from the data that the range of variations in 
foreign exchange holdings of the eleven countries (5 to 
71 per cent) is less than the range of variations of their 
gold holdings (15 to 92 per cent). On the average, all 
these countries held 22.92 per cent of their international 
reserves in foreign exchange in June, 196?•
Developing Countries
What about the countries outside the Group of 
Eleven? To look at the behavior of these countries from 
the standpoint of their holdings of foreign exchange and 
gold, twenty-two countries presented in Table 17 were 
chosen for which the data pertinent to these holdings were 
available in the IPS. Their holdings of foreign exchange 
and gold for every other year starting from 1951 to I965 
were then recorded; the 1966 data were also added to the 
Table to provide the most recent picture. Upon computing 
the percentage ratio of foreign exchange to their gold 
holdings, three categories of countries were recognizable: 
First, countries whose percentage ratio of foreign exchange 
to gold holdings was generally more than 100 per cent
TABLE 17
PERCENTAGE RATIO OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO GOLD HOLDING OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 















Greece 128 4 3200 180 11 1630 199 11 1809Iceland , 8 1 800 15 1 1500 13 1 1300Ireland ' 188 18 1044 216 18 1200 225 18 1250Portugal 291 265 109 255 361 70 244 428 57Turkey 66 151 43 69 143 48 67 144 46Argentina 253 267 94 160 372 43 85 372 22Brazil 198 319 62 284 321 88 168 323 52Chile 10 45 22 26 42 61 38 44 86Colombia 77 48 160 104 86 120 50 86 58Mexico 46 208 22 61 158 38 276 142 194
Uruguay 2 221 9 64 227 28 *? 216 *Venezuela * 373 * io4 373 27 122 403 30Iran 58 138 42 48 137 35 67 138 48Iraq 114 *• * 181 * * 286 * *Israel 33 * ♦ 33 * * 81 * *Kuwait * * ♦ * * * * * *
Saudi Arabia * * * * * * * * *
Egypt 783 174 450 554 174 3100 467 174 268India 1698 247 687 615 247 2489 1619 247 655Pakistan 611 27 258 38 6789 322 48 670Philippines 240 7 2260 231 9 2566 l4o 16 875Thailand 245 114 210 188 ll4 16 186 112 166
Source : International. Monetary Fund, Int erna 11onal Financial Statistics,
wO
exchange for 1951-1957; for 1959-1965 from IMF, IFS, Vol. 20, No. 8 , August
1967, p. 16 for gold holding and p. 17 for foreign exchange.
















Greece 183 13 1407 185 26 711 i64 87 188Iceland 15 1 1500 10 1 1000 23 1 2300Ireland 234 18 1300 299 18 1661 317 18 1761Portugal 226 46l 49 260 548 47 249 443 562Turkey 172 144 119 11 133 8 62 133 46Argentina 185 126 146 220 56 392 196 190 103Brazil 150 324 46 4o 327 12 185 285 64 ,Chile 6 4o 15 86 42 204 26 48 54Colombia 83 62 133 l4l 71 198 61 88 69Mexico 272 180 151 271 142 190 259 112 231Uruguay * 180 * 12 180 6 25 180 13Venezuela 726 719 100 65 655 9 l4l 401 35Iran 107 138 77 73 l40 52 79 130 60Iraq 242 * * 212 84 252 130 84 154














Greece 200 77 259 158 78 202Iceland 31 1 3100 50 1 5000Ireland 378 18 2105 378 21 1733Portugal 330 497 66 4l8 576 72Turkey 63 115 54 25 116 15Argentina 192 78 246 170 66 257Brazil 66 150 44 442 63 701Chile 34 43 79 94 44 213Colombia 44 62 70 95 35 271Mexico 354 139 261 325 158 205Uruguay 23 174 13 35 155 22Venezuela 306 401 76 4o4 40l 10
Iran 87 142 61 87 146 59Iraq 194 98 197 109 109 100Israel 449 60 748 575 56 1028Kuwait 50 48 104 60 52 115Saudi Arabia 422 78 541 635 73 869Egypt 42 174 24 54 139 38India 360 247 145 319 281 113Pakistan 239 53 450 168 53 316Philippines 82 28 292 147 38 386













% RATIO OF 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
TO GOLD (2 ) X 100 (3)
Greece 128 45 106Iceland 53 120 5300Ireland 471 1 2147Portugal 460 23 71Turkey 29 643 28Argentina 132 102 157Brazil 352 84 782
Chile 126 45 280Colombia 97 45 373Mexico 369 26 338Uruguay 50 104 34
Venezuela 313 146 78Iran 108 401 83Iraq 195 130 185Israel 553 105 1202Kuwait 85 46 126Saudi Arabia 656 67 950Egypt 63 69 67India 364 93 149Pakistan 146 243 275Philippines 122 53 277Thailand 808 44 870
Source : International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, Vol. XX, No. 7» August 1967, p. 17 
for column (2); and p. I5 for column (3); column (4) is 
based on personal calculations.
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(sometimes as high as I8OO per cent) such as Greece, Ice­
land, and Ireland.
Second, countries in which this percentage was generally 
less than 100 per cent, such as Turkey, Iran, and Vene­
zuela.
Third, countries in which the percentage ratio of foreign 
exchange to gold holdings was less than 100 per cent at 
times, and more than that at other times, such as Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Egypt.
Although these data do not suggest too much in the 
way of a derivation of a pattern of behavior, they are 
indicative that there are significant differences among 
these countries in this respect.
Correlation Analyses
The volume of international trade in any given 
year depends on many factors among which are time, the 
availability of international reserves, the production of 
the countries participating in trade, their willingness 
to participate or not to participate in trade depending 
on the principle of comparative advantage and/or other 
considerations such as the costs of transportation, the 
average and marginal propensity to import and export with 
respect to their national income, the degree of restric­
tion inherent in the circumstances of the time in terms 
of quotas, controls, limitations, tariffs, the stage of 
economic growth of the country, the degree and acuteness
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of need. The number of factors affecting international 
trade are perhaps countless ; they extend also beyond mere 
economic factors.
Among the factors affecting international trade, 
some lend themselves to quantitative measurement, and some 
do not. For those that do lend themselves to quantitative 
analysis, sometimes past records are available and some­
times not.^ One of the objectives, taking all of these 
factors into account, of the rest of this Chapter is to 
look into the available or projectable data with the. hope 
of achieving some quantitative measurements of the rela­
tion between two or more variables.
Few studies have ever been undertaken in this 
direction, thus their assertions have, for the most part, 
been based upon theoretical or common sense grounds.
In order to introduce the quantitative measurements 
that the rest of this Chapter attempts to undertake, it 
would seem advisable to set some functional relationships 
to form a framework of analysis.
The sign "f" would be used to denote "a function 
of" which is simply a mathematical way of saying "it 
depends on." Thus one can recognize the following func­
tions .
Sometimes, when data are not available it is 
possible to estimate and project the needed data, but at 
other times it is not.
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1. World production of gold = f (time)
2. International reserves in the form of foreign exchange = 
f (time)
.3» International reserves^ = f (time)
4. International trade = f (time)
5. International trade = f (reserves)
6. International trade = f(reserves with one year time 
lag)
7. International trade = f(world gross product)
8. International trade = f(world gross product with one
year lag)
9. International trade = f(reserves, world gross product)
10. International trade = f(lagged reserves, lagged world 
gross product)
11. International trade = f(reserves, world gross product, 
and time)
12. International trade = f(lagged reserves, lagged world 
gross product, and time)
Each of these will form a separate subsection.
World Production of Gold and Time
Based on the data presented in Table 1 of Chapter II 
above a scatter diagram was plotted, and, as discussed 
there, a linear relation did not exist between world gold 
production and time (measured in years) for the years 1945
^International reserves refer to gold, foreign 
exchange reserves, and drawing rights on the IMF. For 
short, the word "reserves" will be used to denote the international reserves.
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through 1966. A "second degree curve" seemed to best fit 
the data, and the following regression equation was obtained:
Y = 757.126 - 2.083 t + 1.738 t^.
In this formula Y represented gold production, and 
t represented^ year(s). The figures in the formula were 
simply coefficients of the trend line that the formula 
presented. Attention will now be focused on the computa­
tion of the coefficient of correlation between world gold 
production and the time element as measured in years. This 
has been shown to be .98, meaning that a strong positive 
correlation does exist between production of world gold and 
time. The square of the correlation coefficient, sometimes 
referred to as the "coefficient of determination" enables 
one to state the relative amount of variation in the depen­
dent variable (gold in the case of this subsection) which
2can be explained by the estimating equation. Stated 
differently, the coefficient of determination is equal to 
the proportion of the Y (gold) variance explained by the 
influence of t (passage of time, measured in terms of 
years). If the coefficient of correlation be designated 
by r, the usual notation in many statistics texts, an 
r value of 0.98, therefore, indicates that the least-squares
^World is used here and in later subsections in 
the same sense that the IMF has used it, namely, excluding 
the Soviet bloc.
2Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden,
Applied General Statistics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Second edition, 196O), p. 455*
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regression of Y on t accounts for 96 per cent of the 
variance in Y.^
The exact direction of causation is hard to estab-
2lish, as correlation does not mean causation. Keeping 
this in mind, the above regression equation gives the 
strong coefficient of determination, .96, meaning that 
96 per cent of variations in gold production can be 
explained by the passage of time. As mentioned above, 
correlation does not mean causation; yet, if on theoretical 
bases, one assumes that as time passes there are increases 
in world gold production, then such increases can be esti­
mated by looking at the other variable (time) to which it 
is closely correlated.
When the coefficient of correlation is so high, 
there is no need of showing how closely the estimates of 
the gold production for the last few years approach the
^Lee J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 31.
2"The coefficient of correlation must be thought 
of, not as something that proves causation, but only as a 
measure of co-variation." Croxton and Cowden, op. cit., 
p. 469. Any one of the following situations may exist 
with respect to correlation. 1. "A variation in either 
variable may be caused (directly or indirectly) by a 
variation in the other. . . .  2. Co-variation of the two
variables may be due to a common cause or causes affecting 
each variable in the same way, or in opposite ways. . . .
3. The causal relationship between the two variables may 
be a result of interdependent relationships. . . .  4. The 
correlation may be due to chance. . . ." Ibid., pp. 469- 
470. The portions of paragraphs quoted here are all pre­
sented in italics by their authors.
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actual values given in the IFS. Yet, the following table 
can provide an approximation of the correspondence for a 
few years, in addition to serving as a projection for the 
next decade.
TABLE 18
ESTIMATES OF THE WORLD PRODUCTION OF GOLD: 1960-1974




Estimate of World 
Gold Production




61 1223.997 121562 1282.744 1300
63 1344.967 135464 1410.666 1400
1965 1479.840 144066 1552.492 15:42
67 1628.619 *68 1708.222 *
69 1791.301 *
1970 1877.856 *
71 1967.887 *72 2061.394 *
73 2158.377 *74 2259.836 *
1975 2362.771 *76 2470.182 *
Source: Data in column 2 are estimates on the basis of
the use of the regression equation obtained previously: 
Y = 755*126 - 20S3t + 1.738t^; data in column (3) are 
taken from Table 1 in Chapter II above.
= not available yet,
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Foreign Exchange Reserves and Time
Table 19 shows total foreign exchange reserves for 
the years 1948 through 1966. On the basis of the data in 
this Table, a scatter diagram was plotted, and a straight 
line appeared to best fit the data. The regression equa­
tion obtained for this straight line is :
Y = 11068.33 + 655.245 (t)
In this equation Y designates world foreign exchange, t
designates time, and the figures are coefficients of the 
• 1regression equation.
Again, the volume of foreign exchange is taken to 
2be a function of time, and the above equation represents 
its functional relationship. The coefficient of correlation 
is .88, and coefficient of determination is .79» indicating
^The term "regression," as Croxton and Cowden men­
tion, "entered statistical literature as a result of the 
use of correlation by Galton to study biological regression 
(that is, the tendency to revert to a common type or 
average). Since correlation analysis is applied to many 
types of problems, the term 'estimating' seems more appro­
priate." Croxton, op. cit., footnote to p. 454. Despite 
this assertion, in this study the term regression will be 
used since more people are accustomed to it.
2Volume of foreign exchange is not only a function 
of time, but also a function of the willingness of other 
countries to accept deficits in each other's balance of 
payments. This latter part, however, can not always be 
measured as it varies depending on international confi­
dence, the size of deficit, the willingness of other coun­
tries to accept the deficit of the deficit countries, etc.
In this section, attention is focused only on the relation 
of foreign exchange and time to see how much of variations 




INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY: FOREIGN EXCHANGE, 1948-1966






1948 13365 1958 17140
49 10390 59 16470
50 13290 60 19030
51 13720 61 1964552 14245 62 20020
1953 15565 1963 22350
54 16675 64 23860
55 17015 65 2386056 17820 66 24275
57 17025
Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, Supplement to 1965,86 Issues, 
p. vii for the years 1948-1964 inclusive; for 1965 and 
1966 from IPS, Vol. 20, No. 8, August I967, p . 17»
that passage of time could account for no more than 79 
per cent of the variance in foreign exchange. Table 20 
provides projections for foreign exchange in the next 
decade.
International Reserves and Time
Based on the data presented in column (3) of 
Table 25 below, a scatter diagram was plotted but a linear 
relationship did not seem to fit the data of international 
reserves. Application of a second degree curve gave better 
results and the following regression equation was derived:
Y = 55805 - 70.60t + 56.54t2
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TABLE 20
ESTIMATES OF WORLD FOREIGN EXCHANGE 1967-1976 






1967 24173.230 1972 27449.45568 24828.475 73 28104.700
69 25487.768 74 28759.946
70 26138.965 75 29415.190
71 26794.210 76 30070.435
Source;: ; Personal Computations on the basis of the 
regression equation of thé previous'subsection.
In this formula Y represents total international 
reserves, and t represents year(s). The figures in the 
formula were simply coefficients of the trend that the 
formula presented. The coefficient of correlation for the 
relation between total international reserves and time was 
.88. The square of this, coefficient of determination, was 
.77 indicating that passage of time could count for no more 
than 77 per cent of the variance in international reserves.
If one looks at the components of international reserves-- 
gold, foreign exchange, and drawing rights on the IMF-- 
one cannot safely expect that the U.S. and the U.K.'s 
balance of payments deficits, which count for part of the 
key currency element of international reserves, will be 
added indefinitely from year to year. Hence, a not -very 
high coefficient of correlation. Based on the above 
regression equation, the following Table provides projections
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for foreign exchange in the next decade. This, however, 
should be taken as an approximation since in the final 
analysis, the expansion of some elements of international 
reserves (such as key currencies) will depend on the will­
ingness of the key currency countries to expand this 
element and on the international confidence placed in them.
TABLE 21
ESTIMATES OP INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 1967-1976 
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Year International Year International
Reserves Reserves
1967 72885 1972 84094
1968 74877 1973 86963
1969 77011 1974 89381
1 9 7 0 79 2 5 9 197 5 92194
1971 81620 1976 95121
Source : Personal computations on the basis of
the relevant regression equation in this subsection.
International Trade and Time
Based on the data presented in Table 2 of the 
second chapter a scatter diagram was plotted, and again 
a linear relation did not exist between world trade^ and 
time. Thus using a non-linear equation, the following 
results were obtained:
Y = 93468.17 + 709lt + 630.65t^
^In this and the following sections, any time 
world trade is used, unless otherwise mentioned, it is 
meant to refer to the imports (cif) of the non-communist 
bloc as presented in the IFS.
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In this equation Y designates world trade and t 
represents time. More specifically, international trade 
is taken to be a function of time, and the above equation 
represents the functional relationship. On the basis of 
this regression equation, international trade (as measured 
by imports) can be projected for the year 1976, a decade 
from now. This turned out to be 4251?6 million of U.S. 
dollars. The following table presents the estimate of 
world trade for the years 196? through 1976 inclusive.
TABLE 22
PROJECTION OF WORLD TRADE, 1967-1976 
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Year Trade Year Trade
1967 208,267 1972 316,1721968 227,328 1973 341,533
1969 247,649 1974 368,1541970 269,230 1975 396,035
1971 292,071 1976 425,176
Source: Personal computations on the basis of the regres­
sion equation in this subsection.
It must be pointed out that the coefficient of 
correlation between international trade and time, unlike 
world gold production, did not show a strong positive 
correlation as it was only .77. The square of this coeffi­
cient of correlation, that is, coefficient of determination, 
is .59) meaning that passage of time accounts for no more 
than 59 per cent of the variation in international trade.
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This result should not be surprising, as one can show, on 
theoretical grounds, that the volume of international trade 
is related not only to the time element, but also to the 
availability of international reserves, world gross product, 
tariffs, quotas and other restrictions and/or freedom of 
trade. Due to problems of measurement and lack of sta­
tistics some of these variables cannot be satisfactorily 
measured for the world as a whole. However, the variables 
which lend themselves to quantitative measurements could 
be analyzed statistically.
On the basis of the data presented in the following 
Table, one can compute the percentage ratio of interna­
tional reserves to international trade (which are stated 
in millions of U.S. dollars). This ratio has a general 
downward trend, meaning that every year the volume of 
international reserves forms a smaller proportion of world 
trade. This is another way of saying that the growth of 
world reserves has been less than the growth of interna­
tional trade, and as the data in the following Table sug­
gest, while reserves were 92.7 per cent of world imports in 
1950, in 1966 they were only 37-3 per cent of the world 
imports, and may go down still further (Table 24). 
International Trade and International Reserves
Since both of these variables are projected approxi­
mately for the next decade, no more regression equations 
and projections will be made for these two variables from
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TABLE 23
WORLD TOTAL RESERVES, WORLD IMPORTS, AND THE PERCENTAGE 
RATIO OF RESERVES TO IMPORTS I95O-66 







Value of Imports 
(cif )
(3)




1950 55000 59331 92.7
51 54400 81390 66.852 55050 80186 68.6
53 57100 76563 74.5
54 58750 79596 73.8
1955 59500 88968 66.856 60900 98122 62.0
57 66250 107010 58.158 57555 100800 57.0
59 57315 106700 53.7
i960 60215 119400 50.4
61 62205 124600 49.962 62845 132400 47.4
63 66200 143600 46.164 68410 160800 42.5
1965 70120 175000 40.066 71510 191700 37.3
Source: Data in column 2 are from: IMF, International
Financial Statistics, Vol. 11, No. 8 , Aug. 1958, p. 14 for 
the years 1950 through 1957; for 1958 through 1966 from 
IPS, Vol. 20, No. 8, August 1967, p. I6; data in column 3 
are taken from Table 2 above; data in column 3 are per­
sonal computations.
♦Total reserves = gold, reserve positions in the Fund, 
and Foreign Exchange, end of period.
here on. The coefficients of correlation will, however, 
be introduced. For the period under observation (1950- 
1966) the coefficient of correlation between the above 
mentioned two variables was .94. The square of this
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TABLE 24
PERCENTAGE RATIO OF THE ESTIMATES OF WORLD TOTAL 
RESERVES AND OF WORLD IMPORTS 









% Ratio of 
(2) and (3)
1967 72885 208267 34.968 74887 227328 32.9
69 77011 247649 31.070 79259 269230 29.4
71 81620 292071 27.9
1972 84094 316172 26.5
73 86963 341533 25.474 89381 368154 24.2
75 92194 396035 23.276 95121 425176 22.3
Source: Data in column (2) are from Table 21 above; data
in column (3) are from Table 22 above; data in column (4) 
are personal computations.
coefficient, namely, coefficient of determination, was .89, 
meaning that variations in international reserves account 
for no more than 89 per cent of the variance in interna­
tional trade. Interestingly enough, it was found that 
variations in international reserves, as compared with 
the passage of time, can account for more variations in 
international trade as the comparison of the coefficient 
of determination of this subsection (.89) and that of the 
previous subsection (.59) can show.
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International Trade and International Reserves with One 
Year Time Lag
A variable may not show a high degree of correla­
tion with another if they are both pertinent to the same 
year. For example, it may be that a consumer's income of 
the last year will affect his consumption this year and 
his present year's income would affect his next year's 
consumption. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that intro­
duction of a dynamic element in the form of a year time lag 
may increase the degree of correlation between variables.
To test the effect of the introduction of a dynamic 
element with respect to the international trade and inter­
national reserves, the data pertinent to international trade 
of each year were correlated with the international reserves 
of the preceding year. The objective in this test was to 
see whether international trade of each year was correlated 
more to the international reserves of its preceding year 
than to the international reserves of the same year or not.
Upon computing the coefficient of correlation 
between international trade of each year and international 
reserves of its preceding year for the period of analysis 
(195O-I966), the coefficient of correlation turned out to 
be .93. The square of this, the coefficient of determina­
tion, .88, indicates that variations in the international 
reserves of each year account for 88 Oer cent of the vari­
ance in international trade of the succeeding years for
1950-1966.
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If these results were compared with the results of 
the correlation in the previous subsection in which a time 
lag of one year was not introduced, it could be observed 
that the two coefficients of correlation are very close to 
each other leading to close coefficients of determination 
(.88 and .89). The result of this test is interesting. 
Introduction of a time lag of one year does not greatly 
change the coefficient of correlation between international 
trade and international reserves as these were respectively 
.94 (without time lag) and .93 (with time lag).
International Trade and World Gross Product
Based on the data presented in Table 25 a coeffi­
cient of correlation was computed for the above variables 
in the period under observation. This was .97, a high 
positive correlation. The square of this, coefficient of 
determination,^was compared with the coefficients of deter­
minations in the previous three subsections: .59, .89,
.88 respectively, it could be observed that variations in 
world gross product can explain a larger percentage of 
variations in international trade than passage of time, 
international reserves, and one year-lagged international 
reserves. The high degree of positive correlation between 
international trade and world product is a support of 
theoretical assertions that production of goods and services 
in different countries has a closer relation with the inter­
national trade than international reserves.
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TABLE 25
RAW DATA FOR SIMPLE AND MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS 
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)* (6)Year I.T.+ I.R.+ I.R.+ W.G.P.+ W.G.P.+
(imports) (one year lag) (one year lag)
1950 59331 55000 53450 697723 660009
51 81390 54400 55000 744867 69772353 80186 55050 54400 773153 744867
53 76563 57100 55050 810296 810868
1955 88968 59500 58750 876870 820296
56 98122 60900 59500 905157 876870
57 107010 61750 60900 933441 90515758 100800 57555 61750 942870 933441
59 106700 57315 57555 999442 942870
i960 119400 60215 57315 1046585 99944261 124600 62205 60215 1084300 104658562 132400 62845 62205 1140872 1084300
63 143600 66200 62845 1197447 114087264 160800 68410 66200 1235159 1197447
1965 175000 70120 68410 1272874 123515966 191700 71510 70120 1310589 1272874
Source: Figures in column (2) are taken from column (3)
of Table 23 above; data in column (3) are taken from 
column (2) of the same Table; data in column (4) are from 
column (3) of this Table, with the exception of the first 
figure which is from IMF, IFS, Vol. VII, No. 8 , August 
1953» p. 15» data in column (5) are computations based on: 
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1964, p. 543 and on: 
Mikoto Usui and Everett Hagen, World Income, 1957 (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology--
Center for International Studies, 1959)» p. 25; data in 
column (6) are from column (5) of this same table with one 
year lag.
*At constant prices
■‘I.T. = International Trade; I.R. = International Reserves; 
W.G.P. = World Gross Product
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International Trade and World Gross Product with One Year 
Time Lag
Again, to test the effect of the introduction of a 
year time lag in the world gross product upon international 
trade another correlation analysis was undertaken. In this 
correlation the data pertinent to international trade of 
each year were correlated with the world gross product 
figures of their preceding years. The objective was to 
test the effect of the introduction of a one year time lag 
upon the results of correlation presented in the preceding 
subsection. The coefficient of correlation for these two 
variables was .97, or more specifically, .97029, which 
when compared with the exact coefficient of correlation of 
the previous subsection, .97009, shows very minor improve­
ment. Coefficient of determination for this set of data 
was .94" Thus introduction of a one year time lag did not 
in a statistical sense change the results of the correla­
tion.
International Trade, International Reserves, and World 
Gross Product
To carry the statistical test one step further 
another correlation analysis was applied to see if the 
introduction of more than one variable such as world gross 
product would change the results of correlation already 
obtained in the above subsection. Upon the application 
of a multiple correlation to these variables, the coeffi­
cient of correlation was .97 for the period under
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observation. The square of this, the coefficient of deter­
mination, was .95, indicating that variations in both 
international reserves and world gross product account for 
95 per cent of the variance in international trade. It is 
pertinent to note that the above multiple correlation was 
applied to the data of the trade, reserves, and product of 
each year with no time lag.
International Trade, Lagged Reserves, and Lagged World 
Gross Product
To carry the statistical observations still one 
step further, another multiple correlation was applied to 
the above variables. This time, however, a time lag of one 
year was introduced, that is, international trade of each 
year for the period of analysis was correlated with inter­
national reserves of their previous year and world gross 
product of their previous years. The coefficient of mul­
tiple correlation was .97, and the coefficient of deter­
mination was .95. Comparing these results with the results 
of the previous subsection, one can notice that introduc­
tion of a one year time lag did not change the results of 
the correlation.
International Trade, International Reserves, World Gross 
Product, and Time
Again, to go one step further, another multiple 
correlation was applied in which in addition to the vari­
ables of the previous subsections, passage of time was 
added, not in the form of time lag but in the form of
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correlation between international trade, reserves, world 
product and time all for the same years. The coefficient 
of correlation for this set of data was .97» and its square 
or coefficient of determination .96, indicating that varia­
tions in the variables: international reserves, world gross 
product, and passage of time altogether account for 
96 per cent of the variations in international trade.
Thus introduction of more variables slightly increased the 
coefficient of multiple correlation.
International Trade, Lagged International Reserves, Lagged 
World Gross Product, and Time
Finally, to check once again the effect of one year 
lag time upon the coefficient of correlation between the 
above variables, another multiple correlation was applied. 
This time, however, international trade of each year was 
correlated with the international reserves of the preceding 
year, world gross product of the preceding year, and passage 
of time. The coefficient of correlation for this set of 
data was .98 which compared to the coefficient of correla­
tion of the preceding subsection shows still further 
improvement. The coefficient of determination for this 
set of variables was .96.
Obviously further variables can be introduced, and 
further multiple correlation analyses with expanded vari­
ables can be applied to them also. What has been undertaken 
so far, however, does show that the variations of interna­
tional reserves, world gross product, and passage of time
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together account for a large percentage (more than 96 per 
cent) of variance in international trade. The already 
obtained coefficient of multiple correlation in the last 
subsection was .98 which is only .02 off from one, the 
maximum value that the coefficient of correlation can ever 
take.
It must be noted in closing, and emphatically so, 
that there is no claim of perfect accuracy for these types 
of statistical analyses. They can, however, very well be 
accepted as approximations of the degree of relation 
between international trade and other variables such as 
international reserves, world gross product, and passage 
of time.
The above approximations show that variations in 
international trade can be explained not only by changes 
in international reserves, but also by changes in other 
variables such as world gross product and time. They also 
show that the highest coefficient of simple correlation 
exists between international trade and international 
reserves on the one hand and world gross product on the 
other. Thus the statistical study of the period under 
observation suggests that variations in world product and 
international reserves (and its adequacy or inadequacy) 
do affect changes of international trade, but less so than 
variations in world gross product.
If world gross product at constant prices as
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presented in Table 25 above were taken as an approximation 
of the rise in world income, upon computing the ratio of 
each year's imports to it, one can observe that the world 
average propensity to import (average propensity to import 
being defined as the ratio of imports to income) seems to 
have increased since 1950 (Table 26).
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TABLE 26




World Imports* (3)World Gross 
Product
(4)
% Ratio of 
(2) to (3)
1950 59331 697723 8.5
31 81390 744867 10.952 80186 773153 10.3
53 76563 810868 9.454 79596 820296 9.7
1955 88968 876870 10.156 98122 905157 10.8
57 107010 933491 11.458 100800 942870 10.6
59 106700 999442 10.6
1960 119400 1046585 11.461 124600 1084300 11.4
62 132400 1140872 11.6
63 143600 1197447 11.964 160800 1235159 13.0
1965 175000 1272874 13.766 191700 1310589 14.6
Source: Data in colutnna (2) and (3) are taken from
Table 25 above; data in column (4) are based on personal 
computations.
*There is no indication in the International Financial 
Statistics that the world import data in column (2) are at 
constant prices. Column (3) data are, however, at constant 




It is the purpose of this chapter to bring together 
some of the elements of what has already been discussed 
in an attempt to help solve the problem of international 
liquidity. However, new discussions will be presented as 
this is not designed to be mere reiteration of past chap­
ters . ̂
Success Criteria
An ideal proposal for the reform of the interna­
tional monetary system should be universal and evolutionary 
in the sense of being capable of evolving into more 
advanced forms of international monetary management. It 
must also provide for rational and non-inflationary needs 
of international liquidity and thus promote world produc­
tion and trade rather than discourage it. The ideal pro­
posal must also maintain and reinforce the stability of 
the system by counteracting massive shifts from one reserve




to another and safeguarding the value of reserves.^ 
Acceptability
An analyst of the current international monetary 
system may be concerned with restoring the world to full 
employment and growth, with international liberalism or 
with trade discrimination, with or without restrictive 
practices such as exchange control, quotas, prohibitive 
tariffs, with or without relative fixed ratios of currency 
to gold, with or without the objective of avoiding 
liquidity crisis, and with or without balance of payments 
adjustment. Thus depending on what his personal bias may 
be, an ahalyst is likely to accept certain plans and 
reject others.
On the other hand, attention may be limited only 
to short term measures resulting in provision for ad hoc 
arrangements which may be tentative in nature and leave 
the international monetary system constantly guessing about 
what will be the next piece of "ad hocery"; such proposals 
are, therefore, inherently unstable. Many proposals have 
not addressed themselves to the long-term needs for inter­
national reserves. Probably more significance has been 
attached to the international liquidity than to the balance 
of payments adjustment problem. Thus a number of plans
^Zolotas, Alternative Systems for International
Monetary Reform, op. cit. , pp. 17-1Ü.
330
have been advanced to provide for more liquidity which 
suggest that the problem of adjustment would either be 
automatically reduced or relatively eliminated through 
normal functioning of the revised system.
Controversy exists between proposals which would 
bring about radical change through eliminating totally the 
undesirable aspects of the present international monetary 
system and the time-tested advantages of the present 
situation, a study of which would lend weight to those 
arguing for amendment of the present system. This contro­
versy ranges from the complete elimination of already 
existing international institutions, such as the IMF, to 
simple amendments in the charters of existing institutions 
which would make them more amenable to achieving the 
desirable objectives.
Dissension exists also over the question of pro­
viding more international liquidity for underdeveloped 
countries. Proposals may vary with respect to their 
political implications and considerations; some favor cer­
tain countries within the present international environ­
ment, or at least attempt to respect their established 
rights (i.e. the Lutz Plan which respects the UiS. role in 
the international economy); others are against established 
rights.
Mere addition to international liquidity may not 
be as important as the ability of the countries to
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effectively (or efficiently) use the additions to liquidity. 
Thus the ability of underdeveloped countries to use their 
economic aid effectively is not to be confused with the 
need for addition to world liquidity. Moreover, differing 
degrees of value may be attached to the practicality of a 
proposal; some proposals are strictly limited to a theo­
retical framework of analysis; others go beyond that.
National interests is another factor that affects 
rejection or advocacy of a particular plan in certain 
circles. For a country with heavy involvement in inter­
national trade a flexible exchange rate may be intolerable 
to traders and even to central bankers. If the foreign 
sector of the economy accounts for a large part of total 
business, the introduction of a flexible exchange rate 
into the system may involve substantial additional risk, 
thus bringing uncertainty with respect to a large percentage 
of total transactions. Business likes predictable future 
conditions and relative stability; as a result, a flexible 
exchange rate may impose a real burden that the business 
sector may actively resist.
The degree to which a country relies on interna­
tional trade for its economic welfare also affects the way 
it thinks about different proposals. Some would advocate 
the present status quo, holding that it is better for the 
monetary authorities of a nation to run its monetary 
affairs than administering them through a remote "House of
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Lords" composed of central bankers over whom the electorate 
has no control.
Modern economics will hardly tolerate undesirable 
consequences of adjustment to a balance of payments deficit 
in regard to their employment and income. Too, facing the 
realities of life, one should not forget that it is not 
always the prices alone which adjust to restrictive poli­
cies, but also employment and income levels. Thus the 
social or political costs of a movement may seem so great 
to the authorities of a country that they could be blinded 
to the economic justifications. Central bankers also have 
differential propensities to inflate under different condi­
tions. Thus the same banker who may allow a six per cent 
rate of inflation in one year may not tolerate more than 
three per cent inflation under different circumstances. So 
one may disagree even with himself, let alone others.
Several other factors can also help one to decide 
on general acceptability of a proposal. For example, 
prestige and pride may dictate that the United States has 
a currency that would not depreciate vis-a-vis the curren­
cies of other countries. The nationality of the analyst, 
too, is a factor in that if he is from a "strong currency" 
nation, which normally is taken to mean a surplus country, 
he may use a "big voice"; his tone might be a reflection 
of the power of his country.
Finally, no one proposal should be looked upon as
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a panacea for solving all the problems of the present inter­
national monetary system. The objective that has occupied 
most of the attention of the individual (or group) analyst(s) 
varies, hence in their "scale of preference" various aspects 
of the international monetary system have occupied different 
significance. For example, Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen have 
tried to solve the problem of commodity price stability 
along with the international liquidity problem. Obviously, 
all objectives of an economic system (i.e. efficient allo­
cation of resources, maximum and consistent growth, and full 
employment) do not always correspond. To the extent that 
they do not and so long as there is disagreement among 
financial authorities of different countries as to "objec­
tive" priorities differences of opinion will exist.
In this study the underlying structure of the 
present international monetary system--based on the estab­
lished fixed price of gold, international cooperation, and 
relatively fixed exchange rates--can be accepted as a 
structure upon which to build future arrangements.
To create acceptable--continuously acceptable-- 
international money is a novel and, perhaps, very 
difficult task. The practical problem is not to 
arrive at a theoretically perfect solution--desirable 
as it may be to know what this would be--but rather 
to find workable schemes that governments might be 
willing to accept. The best bet is to bring about an 
evolutionary change in the state of mind of those who 
are responsible in each nation for managing its inter­
national affairs.1
^Kriz, op. cit., p. 25.
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Smooth Growth of Liquidity and Factors Affecting Adequacy 
of Reserves
If it is agreed that more liquidity is needed, 
its injection into the system should be smooth. It must 
further take account of possible necessary increases as 
well as decreases under various circumstances. A reformed 
system must aim at adequacy of international reserves.
Is it possible to lay down any criteria for determining 
adequacy? No simple positive or negative answer can be 
given to this question. The following paragraphs, how­
ever, will provide insights to this problem.
There are numerous elements which affect interna­
tional liquidity. The exact manner and the degree of 
influence is not easily measured. Some of these have been 
already referred to at different occasions in this study, 
for example, growth of world trade and capital movements, 
the degree of dependence on international trade, efficiency 
of corrective adjustment policies, and amplitude and dura­
tion of imbalances in international payments. There are 
other factors which are influential. Among these are: 
national reserves, psychological attitudes toward minimum 
or desired level of reserves, namely, the level of reserves 
a country thinks it "should" or "ought to" hold, the 
reserve level that a country may expect to hold under 
different policies, the actual significance attached to 
reserves, the use of available international credit facili­
ties, the ability to borrow, the conventional forms of
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savings habits, and international banking habits of each 
country, country reserve policies, envisaged domestic 
and international policy aims, the use of appropriate 
exchange rates, stage of development of the countries, 
seasonal fluctuations of export proceeds, the adoption of 
fiscal and monetary objectives and conditions in the 
world as a whole.
The absence or presence of these conditions cannot 
be determined a priori. For example, reserves that may 
seem adequate at one time, may be regarded inadequate at
another time. Below a minimum reserve balance, a country
may want to undertake corrective measures, while above a 
maximum reserves may not be as important a policy issue.
For instance, if the reserves of a country fall below ten
per cent of its imports, or short-term liabilities, the 
country facing this position may become greatly concerned 
about increasing its reserves; if the same ratio reaches 
forty or fifty per cent, the country may not be greatly 
concerned with increasing the level of reserves. Again, 
above a certain percentage an increase in reserve-import 
ratio may encourage an expansionary policy, and below a 
certain minimum a contractionary one. Reserves which are 
regarded sufficient under one type of fiscal and monetary 
policy combination may be inadequate under different cir­
cumstances. Some countries may question the validity of 
inadequacy of reserves, yet they may go along with uneven
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distribution of reserves. Thus, determination of the real 
adequacy or inadequacy of reserves, without considering 
many other factors which affect the question of adequacy, 
is difficult. In fact, in the light of so many qualifica­
tions it would seem unwise to lay down any simple rule in 
this subject. Nevertheless, the international monetary 
system must provide for rational and non-inflationary 
needs of international liquidity thus promoting world pro­
duction and trade.
Flexibility
A proposal should be sufficiently flexible to 
allow an increase or a decrease in liquidity without undue 
delay, if such change is regarded to be necessary and/or 
desirable.
Technicalities
From the standpoint of technicalities the proposal 
should be specific in its compatibility with the existing 
system, its ability to channel the liquidity to the point 
of greatest legitimate needs in different circumstances, 
its ability to respond to global shortages as opposed to 
individual country needs, its effect on the trade and 
investment relations between countries, its merits in 
terms of bringing about a greater stability in the system, 
the machinery required for control of the countries, 
desirability of a world-wide approach versus a group 
approach, etc. Also, a proposal may well be theoretically
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neat; yet, if it is not feasible within the existing
framework of norms and institutions it may not work.
To conclude this section one may be reminded of
Machlup's interesting assertion:
It would be unreasonable to expect that anyone could 
devise an international monetary system serving all 
purposes optimally. Since people's aims are different, 
and to some extent incompatible with one another, no 
system can be "objectively" called the best. Only if 
we could agree on preference scales for mutual trade­
offs among different objectives would it be possible 
for us to judge one of the plans superior to all the 
rest. There is, of course, no chance for such agree­
ment ever to be obtained.^
Guidelines Toward Constructive Action 
When it comes to proposing the creation of more 
international reserves or the provision of more interna­
tional liquidity, the premises on which the proposer bases 
his judgements must be analyzed. Accordingly, the following 
subsections are part of the personal judgement of the under­
taker of this study, and in some cases coincide with the 
assertions of the authorities in the field.
Importance of Liquidity
All economic knowledge of all countries shall be 
used in full awareness of the interrelated national and 
international responsibilities and must be used to the
2Machlup, "International Monetary Systems and the
Free Market Economy," op. cit., p. 1 .
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advantage of the world economy as a whole rather than to 
the benefit of specific countries. If no action is taken 
to reform the international monetary system, there is no 
doubt that currencies of individual countries would con­
tinue to have periods of strength or weakness, as has been 
experienced in the case of Deutsche mark, lira, guilder, 
pound, and dollar; many countries would occasionally face 
periods of difficulties. In fact, even with the reform 
of the international monetary system, it is likely that 
the currency of some countries would still face periods of 
strength and weakness.
Just as in a domestic economy whose production is 
affected by a large set of factors including physical and 
human conditions under which production of the country 
proceeds, in the international economy the success or 
failure of every country is influenced not only by the 
country's own policies (monetary, credit and fiscal, 
commercial, wage, investment, growth, employment and 
counter-cyclical policies) but by the repercussions of 
the policies of other countries as well. Accordingly, one 
cannot neatly select one factor and attribute the success 
or failure of the international economy to that particular 
factor. Yet, by and large, some of the factors play a 
more significant role than the others. The amount of 
money in circulation is one such factor, as it is believed 
that lack of adequate money would result at least in a
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cut in business and may retard growth and employment.
It was pointed out that in the international 
economy, too, an adequate supply of international money 
(anything which can be accepted as an international medium 
of payment, measure of value, medium of savings and 
deferred international transaction) is a crucial factor. 
Unfortunately, all indications, theoretical as well as 
statistical, suggest that the international economy, with 
the exception of a few countries, has not enjoyed adequate 
long term international liquidity if the growth of liquidity 
be compared with that of international trade and/or world 
production.
It was also mentioned that there seems to be a 
growing agreement that an expanding volume of interna­
tional trade calls for a growing value of international 
liquidity facilities in the long run, but this does not 
necessarily have to be in arithmetic proportion. Since 
at the present time gold is supplemented by the reserve 
currencies and the expansion of both gold and currencies 
are subject to limitations, the long run growth of world 
production and trade may be inhibited. The evolution of 
the international monetary system will go on, and if there 
is to be no inappropriate brake upon the possible expan­
sion of world production and trade, the world must be, and 
in fact is becoming, prepared to supplement the present 
international system.
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International Monetary System in Retrospect
The developing countries, hampered by their struc­
tural problems and occasionally subject to fluctuations 
in their export earnings, have found it difficult to 
achieve simultaneously their goals of economic develop­
ment, rapid growth, internal and external stability. 
Internal imbalances have prevented the expansion of their 
economies; exchange rates have been changed usually in the 
direction of depreciation; restrictions on imports have 
often been restored and are likely to remain there for the 
foreseeable future.
Advanced countries have enjoyed a greater degree 
of success as they have pursued policies of full employ­
ment. Not only has their production increased at an 
annual rate of four to five per cent on the average, but 
also their productivity has grown and large amounts of 
structural unemployment (which at one time did exist in 
many European countries) have been eliminated. With 
respect to price stability, it must be noted that infla­
tionary pressures continued to be felt, and the cost of 
living in these countries has increased over the last two 
decades.^ This is a general and broad picture of the 
functioning of the international economy over the last 
twenty years.
^1965 Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
341
At the same time, most of the countries of the 
world did not, and still do not, want to sacrifice domestic 
economic objectives such as a high rate of growth and full 
employment for the sake of periodic or consistent balance 
of payments problems. If this be the case, there is no 
doubt that if the system were left to itself without any 
shoring up, it would be liable to failure and collapse.
In short, the system has shown remarkable adjustability in 
the past, but the future is not so certain.
In this environment means of temporary financing 
and short run solutions for the prevention of monetary 
crisis have already been developed (i.e.. General Arrange­
ments to Borrow, increase in the IMF quotas, stand-by 
credits, currency swap transactions, sale of Roosa bonds 
to foreign countries by the U.S., London gold pool). Most 
of these, however, are short term solutions which are of 
a pallative nature and have done no more than mount a 
temporary attack on the problem.
A Continuing Place for U.S. Dollars
Stability of Dollar in Terms of Its 1934 Gold Content
As quoted previously from Robert Roosa, on a per­
centage scale in relation to the 1934 gold price, it is 
only the dollar that remains at a 100, while the monetary 
units of other countries have depreciated--and sometimes 
greatly--over the last three decades. The French franc 
works out at three per cent of its 1934 value; the German
342
mark at four per cent; the Belgian franc at nine per cent; 
the Dutch guilder and the Swiss franc, however, have held 
close to forty per cent and seventy per cent respectively.^ 
Thus one is left with no doubt in mind that even in view 
of the historical evidence, the dollar has remained 
remarkably stable relative to its 1934 gold content, while 
France has shown the least success in this direction.
If there is no indication that the Swiss or the 
German monetary authorities are anxious to see their money 
more widely used outside their borders and thus outside of 
their control (as they tend to think), then the dollar 
will not only have to remain as a key currency for the 
free world, but the need for international reserves, over 
and above newly mined gold, will have to come either from 
the U.S., or from the IMF, or from some such institution
to be created.
It must be assumed that payments deficit of the United 
States will not contribute to the formation of reserves 
in future on the same scale as in recent years. It 
therefore seems safe to forecast that in the future 
greater reliance than over the past decade will have 
to be placed on the provision of international liqui­
dity, as needed, by other means. The Fund could make 
an essential contribution in this connection.3
Since 1958 dollars have been accepted reluctantly, 
at least in some instances. If restoring confidence in
^Roosa, op. cit., p. 84.
21965 Annual Report, op. cit., p. l4.
O 1964 Annual Report, op. cit. , p. 31 «
3^3
the key currencies through reversing the deficit of the 
key currency countries is considered an advisable move, 
the undesirable effects of this solution in bringing 
about severe international deflation, more urgent needs 
for international liquidity, and possibly even more ele­
ments of vulnerability in the system should not be for­
gotten. Thus expansion and contraction of the U.S. deficit 
may both have undesirable effects in the sense of confi­
dence in and acceptability of dollars.
Dollar Purchasing Power Compared with the Purchasing Power 
of Other Currencies
The following Table shows that the cost of living 
has gone up less in the U.S. than in any other major 
industrialized country in 1966 as compared with I96O, on 
a 1958 basis (the year in which U.S. deficit began).
Overall Financial Soundness of the U.S. Position
A continued place for U.S. dollars in reform of 
the international monetary system can also be supported in 
view of the overall financial soundness of U.S. position. 
Salant, Kindleberger, and Despres have argued in the 
Economist! that the U.S. is borrowing short and lending 
long, and has become the world's financial intermediary. 
Gunther Ruff adds to the above argument that a glance at 
the U.S. balance of international indebtedness shows that 
"this country's over-all financial position vis-/-vis the
^February 5 , I966, pp. 525-529.
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TABLE 27
COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN THE COST OF LIVING BETWEEN 
THE U.S. AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP OF ELEVEN 
(Index Numbers : 1958 = 100)
Country i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
United States 103 104 105 107 108 110 114
United Kingdom 102 106 109 111 116 112 127
Germany 103 106 109 113 115 120 123
France 110 ll4 120 127 129 133 137
Italy 103 106 113 120 128 132 135
Japan 104 113 118 126 132 l4o 148
Canada 103 103 105 106 108 112 116
Netherlands 103 106 106 111 117 124 128
Belgium 101 103 104 108 112 117 121
Sweden 105 103 113 117 121 128 136
Switzerland 101 105 108 113 115 121 126
Source; International Monetary Fund, International Finan­
cial Statistics, Vol. 20, No, 8 (Washington, D. C.,
August 1967), p. 33•
rest of the world, far from weakening, has been growing 
stronger year by year." Ruff further adds that "through 
all the years since the so-called dollar crisis was pro­
claimed, the dollar's purchasing power has remained rela­
tively more stable than that of any other currency."^ The
^Gunter Ruff, "A Dollar-Reserve System as a Transi­
tional Solution" in Princeton University--International 
Finance Section, Essays in International Finance No. 57
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previous Table showed the validity of Ruff's assertion.
He goes on to cite the holdings of a number of countries 
such as Canada, Japan, and Sweden to a large dollar 
reserves as a sign of their being "more impressed by facts 
and figures than by the hue and cry raised in some Con­
tinental places."^ In view of such assertions one may 
safely hold that the dollar is in no immediate danger, 
and can still be used as a component of international 
reserves, even after the reform of the system.
Possible Effects of a Dollar Devaluation
Should the U.S. dollar be devalued while other 
alternatives are open which do not necessarily imply a 
decline in the role and/or prestige of dollar interna­
tionally? The purpose of the following paragraphs in this 
subsection is to show the inappropriateness of such a 
measure.
Suppose that the U.S. wants to devalue its dollar. 
How much would this country benefit or lose? To what 
extent would the foreign official and private dollar 
holders be affected? What would be the terms of devalua­
tion? The following calculations are meant to show how 
uncertain the results of such a measure would be.
Assume that the U.S. decides to devalue the dollar




by twenty per cent. At the present price of $35 = 1 ounce 
of gold, this would mean a $7 increase. A twenty per cent 
devaluation would thus mean that the price of dollars in 
terms of gold would rise to $42 per ounce. The same twenty 
per cent dollar devaluation in terms of gold would, of 
course, mean a twenty per cent rise in the price of gold 
in terms of dollar.
Based on these simple calculations and using 1966 
as the base year, further computations can be made to 
check the possible effects of a twenty per cent dollar 
devaluation on the U.S. U.S. gold holdings in December 
1966 were reported to be 13»235 million dollars.^ If this 
is regarded as one hundred per cent, twenty per cent rise 
in its price would mean a gold profit of $264? for the 
U.S. which is the addition to the dollar value of U.S. 
gold holdings under a twenty per cent devaluation.
But would the U.S. benefit from this? Obviously 
other countries are involved which the U.S. may or may 
not want to consider; apart from a weakening of confi­
dence in the U.S. dollar, foreigners holding official and 
private dollar balances would be disturbed because their 
dollars would have lost part of their value. U.S. short 
term liabilities to foreigners in December 1966 were equal 
to $27596.1 million.^ From this amount $588.1 million
^International Financial Statistics, August, 1967» 
op. cit., p. 15.
^United States Treasury Department, Treasury 
Bulletin (Washington, D. C., September I967), P» 91.
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were payable in foreign currencies. If this amount were 
to be deducted from the total U.S. short term liabilities, 
there will remain $27008 million. This is the total of 
U.S. short term liabilities to foreigners (official, 
private, international, and regional) payable in dollars, 
including official dollar balances held by foreigners. 
Table 28 shows the components of U.S. short term liabili­
ties .
TABLE 28
U.S. SHORT TERM LIABILITIES TO FOREIGNERS 
PAYABLE IN DOLLARS 
(in millions of dollars as of December 1966)
To official institutions $12023*7 million
To foreign banks 9860.5 million
To other foreigners 3743*3 million
To international and regional agencies 1380*6 million
Total $27008*1 million
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Bulletin,
(Washington, D. C., September 1967), p* 91 *
Now the losses which would be suffered by official 
holders of dollars and other short term U.S. liabilities 
in case of a dollar devaluation of twenty per cent, is 
$24o4.74 million. This is twenty per cent of $12023*7 
million (official short term liabilities of the U.S.).
If the U.S. decides to compensate the losses suffered by 
foreign official holders of U.S. liabilities, its gold
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profit as a result of a possible twenty per cent devalua­
tion is large enough to cover this compensation; inasmuch 
as the $2674 million U.S. gold profit as computed above 
is larger than #2404.74 million. In fact, if only U.S. 
official liabilities were to be guaranteed against devalu­
ation, the U.S. would be left with #269*26 million (#2674 - 
2404.74 = #269.26 million), or approximately one-fourth 
of one billion dollars profit. But would this country 
really have this much profit? This depends on what the 
reaction of the private dollar holders is. Obviously, if 
the danger of devaluation were imminent, private holders 
of dollars and U.S. short term liabilities may sell their 
holdings to their central banks. If so, private or non­
official holdings could quickly and easily become official 
holdings. Thus the U.S.' possible profit depends on 
whether private holders of dollars are offered a compensa­
tion or guarantee for the loss of their value due to 
devaluation.
If all U.S. short term liabilities were to be 
guaranteed and compensated for the full loss of their 
value, then the U.S. would have to pay #5401.6 million.
This is twenty per cent of #27008 million (total U.S. 
short term liabilities payable in dollars). Now comparing 
this total of possible compensation to the U.S. gold 
profit, that is, comparing #5401.6 and #2647 million 
respectively, the U.S. will be left with #2754.6 million
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net loss ($5401.6 - $264? = $2754.6). The question now 
is: Is this a small price for the U.S. to pay for some
gain in international liquidity--a decline for the U.S.?
The answer depends on the personal judgements of the 
individuals. Some may wish to see such losses spread 
over many years, and may therefore conclude that it is a 
small price.^ Others may not tolerate the loss for the 
American economy for a little ease in international 
liquidity due to a rise in the price of gold. All of 
these possibilities, of course, are based on a shaky 
assumption that U.S. devaluation will not seriously disturb 
the international confidence and will not bring about 
international monetary chaos. But a devaluation of 
twenty per cent on the part of U.S. dollar could create 
retaliatory actions on the part of other countries, and 
make the system more vulnerable by shaking international 
confidence. Even if other countries were assured that 
they would be reimbursed for losses due to U.S. devalua­
tion, the very fact of such guarantee may entail losses 
for the U.S., which cannot be so easily tolerated. Due 
to all such disadvantages and for other reasons discussed 
in Chapter III above, it is hard to accept an increase 
in the price of gold, or a dollar devaluation, as a solu­
tion to the problem of international liquidity. In the 
above paragraphs, attention has been limited to the U.S.;
^Hansen, op. cit., p. ?4.
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this was done for the sake of brevity, but the real effect 
of a dollar devaluation upon the international monetary 
system and countries other than the U.S. remains subject 
to uncertainty and approximations.
A Continuing Place for Gold
Pros and Cons in Regard to a Close Link Between Gold and 
New Reserves
There is less disagreement on the place of gold 
in the system than there is on its role in relation to 
the introduction of new reserves.^ To illustrate this 
disagreement it will be worthwhile to look into the argu­
ments against a close link to gold in the creation, dis­
tribution, and use of new reserves. Then in the light of 
validity of such arguments, which must necessarily remain 
value judgements, arguments in favor of a close link to 
gold will be presented.
The opponents of a close link to gold in the cre­
ation, distribution, and use of new reserve assets assert 
that
l) This link would represent a step backward in that it 
reverses the historical tendency to relax the use of gold 
in monetary management and to rely more on the use of 
monetary instruments other than gold. Some advocates of 
this argument refer to the evolution of the monetary system
^For the following section, reliance is made on 
the 1965 Report of the Study Group, op. cit., pp. $4-64.
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in the U.S. and argue that since it has proved possible 
to rely less and less on domestic monetary management, 
gold could assume a lesser role in the international 
economy as well. Resort to historical evaluation as above 
has, undoubtedly, some validity. On the other hand, how­
ever, confidence in monetary system is also important.
2) Distribution of newly created reserve assets in propor­
tion to gold holdings of countries is inequitable. While 
this point too has some validity, it must be noted that 
the distribution of new reserve assets does not neces­
sarily have to be made on the basis of the countries' gold 
holdings; other factors such as country quotas and share 
in international trade may be used. This objection is not 
really against a close link to gold, but against the 
manner of distribution of new reserves on the basis of 
gold holdings.
3) It is also argued that monetary authorities would feel 
an incentive to maximize their gold holdings by converting 
their assets into gold. A close link to gold would 
encourage countries to hold a higher ratio of gold to 
total reserves resulting in sizable gold movements in 
international settlements which could be damaging to con­
fidence. There is no convincing argument that countries 
would necessarily maximize their gold holdings or that 
they would initiate sizable gold movements. These assump­
tions are based on theoretical formulations of economic 
behavior and remain in the realm of subjective judgements.
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Against the above arguments, and in support of a 
link with gold it is asserted that:
1) Gold is still a basic reserve asset acceptable by many 
countries, even preferable by some. Thus if there were 
any new reserve assets with a close link to gold, not
only would there be a higher likelihood of their acceptance 
by various countries, but also safeguarding creditor coun­
tries against excessive accumulation of new reserve assets 
would be simplified.
2) Furthermore, a close link to gold would make it clear 
that a rise in the price of gold is excluded as a possi­
bility of the reform which may put an end to, or reduce, 
the existing uncertainties about gold; these uncertainties 
are factors in gold hoarding.
3) Moreover, to supplement gold which is limited both in 
terms of stocks and production would contribute to the 
solution of an inadequate gold supply without disturbing 
an already existing basic element of the system.
4) Finally, it is said that the shift from other forms 
of reserve assets into gold, which might theoretically
be induced by a close link of new reserve assets to gold, 
could only be on a limited scale due to a lack of strong 
inducements for the Group of Eleven (which already holds 
a sizable amount over seventy per cent in 1966 as stated 
in a previous Table of total noncommunist gold holdings) 
to procure additional gold. Only countries outside the
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Group of Eleven would have such an inducement and even 
this would be on a limited scale.
While all these arguments in support 6f or in 
opposition to a close link between the new reserve assets 
and gold still remain within the realm of subjective 
judgements, it appears pertinent to note that except that 
the extension of a gold link might move the system back­
wards, the pro-gold arguments seem more convincing.
A Return to Classical Gold Standard?
What about a return to the pure gold standard and
all its rules? Whether or not this can be a solution of
the problem of international liquidity remains a value
judgement. It would seem that such a return is a step
backward and could lead to a contraction in world trade,
increasing unemployment, and sharp swings in economic
activities. A strict gold standard would mean also that
all countries must be willing to buy and sell gold at a
fixed price. Needless to say the U.S. is now the only
nation doing so. Thus it is difficult to accept a return
to gold standard. Further reasoning is best explained by
Reginald Maudling.
Either it return to the classical gold standard} 
means that the values of world trade must be tied to
the amount of gold that can be mined and acquired by
monetary authorities, which seems to me a proposi­
tion that is not intellectually sustainable; or the 
volume of gold available must be brought in line with 
world reserve requirements by variations in the price 
of gold, and the difficulties of this course are only 
too clear to all of us. To quote the Managing Direc­
tor's Jayne Lectures for I96I, "it is certain that
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gold output alone cannot be relied upon to bring about 
the necessary increase in the world's money supply.
A Continuing Place for the IMF
The next question concerns the role of the IMF 
and whether it should be given a vital role in the crea­
tion of reserve assets. Opponents of this view assert 
that ;
1) If the IMF were given the power to create and 
distribute reserves on its own initiative, this would 
shake and impair its role as a custodian of monetary 
discipline which is based, so the argument runs, on the 
conditional grants of credit. This argument does not seem 
plausible, because the role of the IMF as a custodian of 
monetary discipline does not necessarily require that 
there must be inadequate international liquidity. Further­
more, supervision by the IMF cannot ensure international 
monetary order if the countries of the world do not want 
to adhere to monetary disciplines.
2) It is also asserted that the present procedure 
of weighted voting in the IMF gives too much influence to 
a few countries. There is an element of truth in this, 
but this concerns the rules of voting rather than the 
potential participation of the IMF in reserve creation 
per se.
^Maudling in International Monetary Fund, Summary 
Proceedings, Annual Meeting (Washington, D. C., 1962),
p. 66.
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3) To the above disadvantages it is added that 
there will be difficulty in drawing a line between those 
IMF members who would benefit from reserve asset creation 
and those who would not. While this is true, certain 
lines of recognition have been accepted, arbitrary though 
they are (e.g. $500 per capita annual income distinguishes 
developed from underdeveloped countries^). There is no 
reason why one should be over-concerned with this case.
k) It is also said that countries have, in the 
past, shown reluctance to draw on the IMF. Past reluc­
tance need not necessarily continue; in fact, such coun­
tries will probably have to draw more heavily on the IMF. 
Some fear that countries applying for such aid might be 
forced to repay before its reserves improve. Repayment, 
however, might be extended over a period of several years 
to remove undue pressures on policy. It would seem that 
a country could adjust its fiscal, monetary and other 
policies toward adjustment without inappropriate pressure 
over a period of several years.
5) Finally, some economists fear that the neces­
sary amendments of the Articles of Agreement may open the 
door to further unpredictable and perhaps undesirable 
modifications in the Agreement. Fears like these are not 
well-founded; countries can, by means of weighted votes,
^Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959), pi o.
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prevent undesirable modifications.
The above paragraphs show that arguments against 
the participation of the IMF in the creation of new 
reserve assets are not well-fotmded.^ Apart from these, 
however, there are strong reasons which would lead one to 
believe that IMF participation (or at least supervision) 
is useful.
First, reform of the international monetary system 
is a matter of concern not only to developed but also to 
the underdeveloped countries. If this were true, an 
international institution such as the IMF with a diversi­
fied membership should be entitled to have some influence 
over matters of international financial concern.
Second, the IMF's experience and prestige make it 
a natural center for the creation of new reserve assets.
Third, if maintenance of a proper balance between 
the creation of additional reserves and the extension of 
credit facilities were desirable, it would seem to be 
more appropriate to combine these functions in one insti­
tution. In fact, it would be unfortunate, and perhaps 
also confusing, to establish a rival center of decision 
in the field of international monetary management.
Fourth, the Fund has shown its willingness to 
treat the gold tranche as an automatic reserve asset which
^In this section, reliance is made on the 1965 
Report of the Study Group, op. cit. , pp. $4-64.
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countries can use without reluctance. The same thing may 
happen to the newly created reserves.
Finally, the weighted voting system has generally 
reflected the relative economic weight and share of the 
countries in international trade, and as such it is an 
equitable procedure. It can be made to reflect changes 
in relative positions through reconsideration of all coun­
tries' positions through periodic (once every four or five 
years) changes to be agreed upon in the form of a conven­
tion arrived at in the beginning.
New Reserve Creation
If a rise in the price of gold and a flexible 
exchange rate each face dubious support from the prac­
ticing monetary authorities, and if the requirements for 
fairly free international trade and investment are to be 
met, one is forced to consider the third broad alternative 
of the creation of international reserves.
New arrangements, of whatever form, must not 
necessarily interfere with the international prestige of 
the dollar. New arrangements must not be imposed on indi­
vidual sovereign nations; they should be left, rather, to 
their free choice and must not disrupt or seriously alter 
the native right of control over* the domestic currency of 
any country. New arrangements should not be inconsistent 
with the present role that the IMF plays in international 
monetary affairs; in fact, the likelihood of success
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appears to be larger if reliance were to be placed on the 
IMF. The possibility that such reliance may necessitate 
amendments in the charter of the IMF, should not be 
regarded as a major obstacle.
Confidence is a crucial and vital factor in the 
survival of a monetary system; radical changes adversely 
affect this factor and for this reason must not always be 
attempted. The probability of success of new arrange­
ments would be higher if the new arrangements were to 
contribute to rather than negate or reduce the maintenance 
of the relatively fixed parities of exchange rates now 
available =
The probability of success of any new arrangement 
may also be raised if provision is made for fitting them 
into familiar patterns of experience. This, however, 
should not preclude the acceptance of new institutional 
arrangements. At the time the IMF was established, the 
circumstances were too critical to allow a real apprecia­
tion of the role that it could play in international 
monetary affairs. Today, however, the role that the IMF 
plays is better understood. The same analogy may hold 
true with respect to the introduction of totally new 
arrangements. Nevertheless, as noted above, radical 
changes may reduce the probability of success because of 
their effect on the confidence element.
If new arrangements, or amendments in already
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existing ones, take the form of creating additional 
reserves, a probability of success would exist if they 
were to be made operationally interchangeable among central 
bankers and other monetary authorities of different coun­
tries and with any or all domestic currencies.
New arrangements must be handled in such a manner 
that they will include the capacity to : (a) enlarge or
reduce international liquidity, depending on the circum­
stances of the time as decided upon by international 
supervisory monetary authorities, and not inject so much 
liquidity into the system as to create inflationary 
tendencies in different countries' expansion, and (b) not 
inspire reckless monetary managements and neglect of 
monetary disciplines. New arrangements must provide the 
system with long-term criteria for adding to the inter­
national liquidity through automatic arrangements, if 
possible, rather than giving authority to act only in 
response to short-term needs. Any such criteria must take 
into account the long-term or secular needs of the inter­
national economy in terms of economic growth, employment, 
and stability.
Operational Authority for Managers of the Newly Created 
Reserves
As James Meade has suggested, "all federal or 
confederal arrangements rest upon a sensible division of 
functions between the central and the local governments.
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suitable to the practical problems of the real situation.”  ̂
If the countries of the world reach an agreement on the 
lack of adequate liquidity in the present international 
system, then they would have to accept a "sensible divi­
sion of function" under a new or amended set of arrange­
ments. It becomes all the more important for the United 
States, as well as for the U.K., to conduct their financial 
and economic policies with the highest sense of responsi­
bility.
Certain Statistical and Non-Statistical Findings
The statistical analysis of the previous chapter 
showed that production of world gold was a variable showing 
a high coefficient of correlation with the passage of time 
(measured in years). Then the future trend of world gold 
production was predicted which, due to the high positive 
degree of correlation, can be a dependable projection. 
Comparing the rate of growth of gold with the growing 
needs of international trade in an expanding world economy, 
the conclusion was drawn that the gold foundation around 
which the present international monetary system is centered 
cannot increase as fast as is needed to finance the long 
run growth of international trade.
Again, statistical analysis made on the basis of 
the estimates of world production and international trade
^Meade, Readings in International Economic Rela­
tions , op. cit. , p. 2
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showed that the average propensity to import in the inter­
national economy seems to have increased, resulting in 
more international interdependence. Given the growing 
needs of the international economy and perhaps the growing 
international interdependence between countries, there is 
no doubt that the probability of collapse of the system 
or periods of weakness of individual key currencies become 
increasingly greater if it were to be left to itself 
without provisions for long term international liquidity.
The statistical analysis of the previous chapter 
also revealed that variations in international trade are 
correlated with changes in international reserves, yet the 
highest degree of correlation for the period 1950-1966 
existed between international trade and world gross product 
Thus variations in international reserves did explain part 
of the changes in international trade, but less so than 
variations in the world gross product.
It was seen in Chapter VII above that variations 
in world gross product could explain ninety-four per cent 
of the changes in international trade; the coefficient of 
correlation for the period under observation (1950-1966) 
was .97 and its square or coefficient of determination 
was .94. It was also shown that introduction of a one 
year lag into the data of international trade did not 
change the results of the correlation significantly. It 
was also shown that the coefficient of correlation between
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international trade and international reserves was 
giving a coefficient of determination of .89* And even 
when a one year time lag was introduced to the data, the 
results of the correlation were not significantly affected. 
Comparing these coefficients of determination one may say 
that vaiiations in international reserves could explain 
less of the variations in international trade (only 
89 per cent) than could variations in world gross product.
If, on theoretical grounds, changes in the world 
gross product be taken as a cause of variations in inter­
national trade--note that in a statistical sense correla­
tion does hot mean causation--then the high positive 
coefficient of correlation between the two variables could 
mean that when world gross product increased, international 
trade increased also, and vice versa.^
^It is interesting to note that based on the data 
presented in Table 25 above, another statistical analysis 
was applied and a coefficient of correlation was computed 
for international reserves as a function of world gross 
product. This was .97, again a high positive correlation. 
The square of this, or the coefficient of determination, 
is .95, indicating that variations in world product 
accounts for ninety-five per cent of the variance in 
international reserves. A one year time lag was then 
introduced to the world gross product figures; that is, 
the data pertinent to international reserves of each year 
were correlated with the world gross product figures of 
their preceding years. The coefficient of correlation 
for these two variables was, again, .97, and its square 
.95" Thus introduction of a one year time lag did not 
change the results of the correlation.
Comparing these findings with the findings of sub­
sections pertinent to the correlation between trade and 
world gross product, the high positive coefficients of 
correlation would lead one to believe that world gross 
product accounts for ninety-four per cent of the variance
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Statistical analysis of the behavior of twenty 
selected countries also revealed that there was no one 
behavior among countries with respect to how much reserves 
they held for their imports and emergencies. Some coun­
tries such as the U.S. and Switzerland appeared to be 
holding high reserve-import percentages, while others 
such as Japan and Germany had, at times, had very low 
percentages. The countries with a high average propensity 
to import have had relatively low percentage ratio of 
reserves to their imports, which may mean they have been 
faced with difficulties in financing their imports. The 
statistical analysis fdrther revealed that on the whole 
the twenty selected countries showed an average reserve- 
import ratio of less than fifty per cent, which is, in 
any case, less than half of their import needs. An 
attempt was made to represent the eleven industrialized 
countries in the sample, due to their relative effect on 
the gold and foreign exchange holdings compared to the 
world total holdings. It was also hoped that the sample 
size was large enough to cover certain developing coun­
tries whose role in international trade appeared to be 
important. Yet, it must be frankly confessed that other 
samples of countries must be statistically reviewed and
in international trade, and ninety-five per cent of the 
variance in international reserves. Thus in both cases, 
it is the world gross product which explains a good per­
centage. of the variations in international trade and 
international reserves.
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the results must be compared; in this study such attempts 
were not undertaken. This study had the objective of 
initiating some quantitative measurements which are so 
badly lacking in a good many international economic dis­
cussions. If there is reason to believe that the reserve 
behavior of countries will show widely different trends 
as the IMF believes^ there is no doubt that individual 
countries, despite the reform of the system, may still 
have far less liquidity than they need.
The study also undertook a review of major pro­
posals made in the 1960's for the reform of the interna­
tional monetary system. Such a review revealed further 
interesting results. For example, one could see that many 
a plan suggested in the 1960's had realized that opposi­
tion to the fixed price of gold is unacceptable to busi­
nessmen, central bankers, traders, and practical men. On 
the other hand, one could also sense a growing under­
standing among economists and policy makers that a flexible 
exchange rate, despite its theoretical acceptability, is 
not regarded to be a desirable solution, as it will intro­
duce elements of risks into the system, thus worsening 
instead of improving the system.
The study also showed that there are many econo­
mists (such as Lutz) who can clearly see the different 
aspects of various reform proposals as well as their
^1964 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 35-
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different possible consequences. As a result, there is 
today a sensible attempt to choose from different alterna­
tives. There is a further attempt to be selective about 
an alternative, which if not the best, will more likely 
give better results. As a consequence of such mental 
evolution, it seems that the focus of the economists' as 
well as the practitioners' attention has been directed 
more and more toward further international cooperation and 
understanding in the form of reserve creation.
Thus considering the fact that many central bankers 
are not willing to accept radical changes, it would appear 
that creation of additional reserves within the basic frame­
work of present institutions (with possible amendments to 
their charters) emerges as the best chance for reform.
If this prediction can be relied upon, the analysis of 
different aspects of reserve creation as well as their 
procedural arrangements should more seriously be under­
taken by the technical staff of the IMF, or some such 
institution.
Recalling the review of various plans suggested 
in the 1960's, one can almost safely conclude that there 
is less and less attention being given to the problem of 
balance of payments adjustment than to international 
liquidity. These two aspects of the international monetary 
system are, of course, interrelated. In view of such an 
interrelation, it is not hard to see that some economists
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hope that the problem of balance of payment adjustments 
would automatically be eliminated or reduced as adequate 
liquidity is provided for the system.
The review of various plans and proposals also 
revealed that no one plan can be singled out from the 
various proposals and proclaimed to be the best or the 
worst. In fact, an attempt must be made to restrain one­
self from making blunt value judgements. An intelligent 
choice, according to Machlup,
would have to depend on many conditions and one 
cannot ascertain whether and to what extent they are 
fulfilled. What under certain circumstances would 
appear as the best solution may under other circum­
stances be hopelessly wrong. In economic policy deci­
sions much depend on how they fit in with other 
measures adopted and objectives accepted.^
The decade of the 1960's happily shows an improve­
ment over the preceding decade in that there seems to be 
a growing agreement that the supply of liquidity in the 
future international economy is going to be less than ade­
quate if present trends continue. There are some who go 
beyond this assertion and hold that international 
liquidity has been less than adequate in the past, is 
still inadequate, and will become increasingly more so __ 
in the future. (Triffin is one example.) The statistical 
test run on the basis of the records of the past would 
seem to support that for the whole world, and on the 
average, international reserves which form a part of
p. 89.
^Machlup, "Plans for Reform . . .," op. cit.,
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international liquidity have been less than adequate if 
they were to be compared with the needs of international 
trade.
In spite of the fact that concern for interna­
tional liquidity is receiving more attention and added 
urgency in the 1960's, the world's monetary authorities 
still remain in substantial disagreement. The Ossola 
Committee (of the Group of Ten) is an example in this 
case. Despite the fact that the Study Group reached 
unanimous agreement that reserves needed to be increased 
--an achievement not to be underrated--there was total 
disagreement as to what the desired increase should be 
and how it should be effected. Fortunately, however, 
official sources (such as the IMF) as well as academic 
economists (e.g., Fritz Machlup) are on their way to 
arriving at points of agreement.
It appears that the general type of monetary 
reform which will emerge from discussions of the inter­
national monetary system would be basically along the 
lines of creation of additional reserves under the super­
vision of the IMF and within the framework of a fixed 
price of gold and a relatively fixed par value of cur­
rencies in terms of gold. The position taken by the U.S., 
the U.K., France, and more generally the readiness of the 
Group of Eleven to cooperate will have much to do with the 
outcome. These positions are, as yet, not perfectly known.
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Furthermore, it is undemocratic to exclude the under­
developed countries and developed countries outside the 
Group of Eleven from effective participation in the reform 
scheme; yet, from a practical point of view the influence 
of the Group of Eleven in terms of the size of their 
holdings of gold and foreign exchange as well as drawing 
rights with the IMF is strong enough to make their deci­
sions effective, as the statistical review of the propor­
tion of their international reserve holdings showed that 
their share has been more than seventy-two per cent since 
1958, while other countries' shares are comparatively 
negligible (less than thirty per cent since 1958).
Certain Related Notes
Should the reform take the form of adding to 
international reserves, the adjustment in balance of 
paymenis would still take the form of domestic adjustments 
in relative incomes and prices. Moreover, periodic reli­
ance on controls, direct or voluntary, would continue to 
exist over international receipts and payments even if to 
a lesser degree.
As has already been indicated, the existing inter­
national monetary system based on narrowly fixed exchange 
rates does require more liquidity. Yet, in a broad sense, 
more efficient balance of payments adjustment may be 
looked upon as a substitute for international liquidity 
creation in that the less international liquidity which
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will be needad--by the world and each conntry--the more 
efficient will be the adjustment mechanism of balance of 
payments. This is to point out that the growing needs of 
the expanding world economy are not the only factors to 
be taken into consideration; mechanism of adjustment in 
balance of payments also affects international liquidity.
It should be realized that the current world 
opinion is not eager to grant the authority of reserve 
creation to a supernational authority. Many countries 
have a tendency to attach priority to the reserves over 
which they have their own controls; thus in view of present 
prejudices of many influential central bankers, the amount, 
method, and procedures of international credit creation 
would still be controlled for a while by the influential 
nations through negotiation, rather than through super- 
national authority.
Few people can doubt that domestic money evolved
from full-bodied, through representative and "managed,"
to "book entry" or "deposit" money. The gold exchange
standard, as it exists today, represents the counterpart
of representative money in the international economy.
Part of the disagreement on international monetary issues
has its real roots in whether the world should move to a
"managed" and finally to a "book-entry" money or not,
and whether or not the world can— and should--jump over
the managed stage and establish the "book-entry" or deposit 
money stage.
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If the members of the European Common Market with 
their amazing efforts toward integration are still not 
even close to accepting a common monetary policy, a common 
central bank for the world and an international currency 
face less chance of success than reserve creation at least 
for the foreseeable future, since a world central bank 
may necessitate national governments to abdicate at least 
part of their monetary sovereignty--a step for which most 
of the countries of the world at the present time are 
still not ready. As yet central bankers do not seem pre­
pared to consider their drawing rights and lines of 
credit a satisfactory substitute for their owned reserves, 
let alone try for the acceptance of a "bancor," or a super 
central bank which will be acceptable to over a hundred 
sovereign nations. Eventually, however, further interna­
tional reserves created under the surveillance of the IMF 
may prove as acceptable as an international money. If this 
stage is ever reached, then the world would not be far 
from the creation of a world central bank.
Chances for the Creation of New Reserves
At this point it is appropriate to analyze the 
new "Outline Plan"^ developed by the United States
^See Statement of the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, 
Secretary of Treasury. Before the Subcommittee on Inter­
national Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic 
Committee /[of the U.S. Congress^ September 14, 19^7 »
10:00 A.M. EOT. The statement is mimeographed by the 
Treasury Department, and carries no more reference to the 
facts of its publication.
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government as a result of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Fowler's negotiations with the Group of Ten Governors.
The "Outline Plan" points out that international
liquidity needs cannot be adequately met by existing
sources of reserves such as gold, dollars, and pounds
sterling.^ It is also asserted that Special Drawing
Rights (SDR) in the IMF is a way to create supplements
to existing international reserves. The objective of
SDRs is "to provide a means by which global reserves can
be expanded on a permanent basis by international deci- 
2sions." The agreement reached between the Group of Ten 
Governors and Central Bankers, in Secretary Fowler's
opinion, avoided impairing the role of the dollar in the
4
3future. The SDRs are also consistent with the role
presently played by gold as an international reserve.
A period of time such as one year was regarded too short 
for reaching international decisions on a difficult matter 
such as international liquidity; accordingly, decisions 
on the amounts of SDRs to be established will cover five- 
year periods with interval allocations that can be made 
annually.





The principle of participation of all IMF members 
was fully agreed upon. Distribution of SDRs between IMF 
members according to their quotas was also fully pgreed 
upon. The SDRs have no direct relation with foreign aid 
devices; yet underdeveloped countries may benefit from 
them in the form of additions to their reserves and insofar 
as adequate growth of reserves reduces their tendency to 
impose restrictions on capital flows.^
Furthermore, the Outline Plan covering the SDRs 
did not attempt to tackle the balance of payments adjust­
ment. The contribution of the U.S. attempts made the 
1965 J.E.C. envisaged Guidelines a collective international 
judgement of 1967; in the process of negotiations indi­
vidual views were hammered into the shape of an agreed 
plan for the creation of a supplement to the existing 
reserve assets. The agreement reached among the Governors 
of the Group of Ten made it clear that industrial coun­
tries have shown, according to Secretary Fowler, "their 
clear and sincere intent to build strongly and securely
2on the base of our current international monetary system." 
Finally, Fowler informed his audience of the unquestion­
able committment of the U.S. to convert gold into dollars 





by the IMF prior to its consideration at the Annual Meeting 
of the Board of Governors of the Fund held in Rio de 
Janeiro during the last week of September, 196?*
The Outline Plan's major characteristics, as out­
lined above, are shared by this study, and if implemented, 
could provide a dynamic element of growth in the world's 
reserves for the future.
CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The growth of money supply in both domestic and 
international economies is necessary to facilitate the 
continued growth of economic activities. Too much money 
creates inflationary pressures and too little of it brings 
about deflationary pressures. The international monetary 
system--the system by which international payments and 
settlements take place— is subject to question because the 
increase in the annual production of gold has been less 
than the needs of international trade. Also, all interna­
tional reserves have increased less than proportionately 
to the needs of the international economy. This poses a 
problem of liquidity in the international economy.
The various means used in international settle­
ments: gold, dollars, pounds, and drawing rights on the
IMF, and the role that each plays in the system were dis­
cussed. In addition to an introduction to the structure 
of the present international monetary system and the way 
that it came into existence, attention was focused on its 
performance and the factors affecting it. In order to 
deal with the problem of international liquidity short
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term measures such as "swap" agreements, the General 
Arrangements to Borrow, and increases in IMF quotas were 
introduced into the system. These resulted in some 
improvement but were not sufficient in terms of long run 
needs. One problem is the fact that the key currency com­
ponent of international reserves cannot increase indefi­
nitely to keep pace with the growing needs of interna­
tional trade. Elements of vulnerability enter the inter­
national monetary system to the extent that other countries 
do not want to accept U.S. and U.K. deficits indefinitely, 
that the problem of gold hoardings exist, that gold produc­
tion increases by limited annual amounts, and finally that 
drawing rights on the IMF are limited and sometimes condi­
tional .
In order to deal with these problems a large set 
of proposals have been suggested. These proposals were 
discussed under three main categories; a change in the 
price of gold, a flexible exchange rate system, and 
increasing international understanding and cooperation.
This discussion was meant to evaluate the pros and cons 
of each group of proposals, upon which a further study of 
proposals could be based.
A review of the proposals suggested in the igbO's 
showed that Rueff supported a return to pure gold standard, 
and Lerner advocated doing away with gold. Another group 
of proposals for reform of the international monetary
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system called for the acceptance of a flexible exchange 
rate system. Meade's plan was one such proposal. A third 
group of proposals centered around international under­
standing and/or cooperation. This group covered a wide 
range of suggestions. Lutz, Roosa, Bernstein, Zolotas, 
Maudling, Stamp, and Hansen advocated creation of an 
international unit of settlements; each of these individu­
als, however, used a different label for his proposed 
system. Keynes' and Triffin's plans were added to the 
analysis because of their pioneering significance.
Posthuma called for an agreement among major gold 
holding countries to take a lower percentage ratio of 
gold and a higher percentage ratio of foreign exchange.
On the Hart, Kaldor, and Tinbergen Plan, it was pointed 
out that in contrast to many authors who have focused 
their attention on either the problem of inadequacy of 
international reserves and/or balance of payment adjust­
ment, these three economists broadened their view and 
dealt with commodity price stabilization along with inter­
national liquidity.
The official and semi-official views of the IMF, 
the Group of Ten Governors, and the U.S. Joint Economic 
Committee were discussed. It was shown that these studies 
neither supported a rise in the price of gold nor the 
acceptance of a flexible exchange rate. The U.S. Joint 
Economic Committee, however, saw the latter as one to be 
studied further.
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The negotiating aspects of the problem of making 
a choice between the alternative proposals, and of the 
relatively different attitudes and incentives of various 
countries throughout the world present obstacles to any 
agreement on reform measures. However, all countries saw 
the desirability of reform of the international monetary 
system.
Statistical study of the behavior of twenty 
selected countries revealed that there is no one behavior 
among countries with respect to how much reserves they 
have held for their imports. Interestingly enough, it was 
found that the Scandinavian countries have had a rela­
tively low percentage ratio of reserves to their imports. 
On the other hand, the U.S. and Switzerland appeared to 
be holding high reserve-import percentages. Analysis 
further revealed that on the whole the twenty selected
I
countries showed an average reserve-import ratio of less 
than fifty per cent. ~
A series of correlation analyses showed that a
strong positive correlation existed between international
!
trade as measured by imports (cif) and world gross 
product data. 1 Next to this high positive correlation 
was the correlation between world product on the one hand 
and international trade and international reserves on the
other. The analysis indicated that the gap between 
international reserves and the growing needs of inter­
national trade is widening, and that if the system is left
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to itself without any shoring up, it is liable to failure 
and collapse.
Success criteria made it clear that it is unrea­
sonable to expect that any one proposal can effectively 
cope with all the problems of international monetary system. 
It was indicated that the analysts' aims were different, 
and somewhat incompatible with one another, and that no 
proposal could be objectively proclaimed as best. Despite 
the fact that the variety of appraisals and suggestions 
could be interpreted as lack of essential consensus, the 
discussions showed a remarkable manifestation of ingenuity 
on the part of the economists, and were informative and 
conducive to the undertaking of reform by responsible 
authorities.
There was a sensible attempt to choose from dif­
ferent alternatives and to be selective about an alterna­
tive which, if not the best, will more likely give better 
results. The focus of the economists' as well as the 
practitioners' attention was, as a result, directed more 
and more toward further international cooperation in the 
form of reserve creation. Also, in search for selectivity 
the problem of long run provision for international 
liquidity seemed to be given priority over balance of 
payments adjustment, and the latter was dismissed from 
many of the proposals suggested in the 1960's.
The guidelines for the reform suggested that the
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reform of the system must provide for non-inflationary 
expansion of world production and trade, that gold is too 
scarce a reserve asset to be assigned a quantitatively 
dominant role in international transactions, that mere 
reliance on additional supplies of dollar and/or pound 
liabilities for the secular growth of world reserves would 
be unwise, and that in view of the hesitation of many 
countries to tolerate undesirable consequences of adjust­
ment to a balance of payments deficit in regard to their 
employment and national income creation of more interna­
tional reserves under the supervision of an international 
agency is the most promising and the least damaging direc­
tion in which the reform can develop.
It was found that there is no indication that the 
monetary authorities of Switzerland, Germany, or any other 
country are anxious to see their money more widely used 
as international reserves. In view of the widening gap 
between the growth of international reserves and the growing 
needs of international economy, it was indicated that new 
arrangements need not shake the confidence placed on the 
dollar and need not interfere with the key currency role 
that dollars and to some extent sterling now play in the 
system. Furthermore, it was concluded that new arrange­
ments need not be inconsistent with the present role that 
the IMF plays in international monetary affairs; in fact, 
the likelihood of success appeared to be larger if reli­
ance were to be placed on the IMF.
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It was shown that the probability of acceptance 
of created reserves could be higher if they were opera­
tionally interchangeable among central bankers and other 
monetary authorities of different countries, if they were 
convertible to gold, if they were capable of being enlarged 
or reduced depending on the circumstances of time, and 
if they were not to inspire reckless monetary management.
The objective was not merely to add one more pro­
posal to the already existing stock of proposals for 
reform of the international monetary system. The direc­
tion in which the writer thinks reform will proceed is 
similar to the recent agreement achieved among the Gover­
nors of the Group of Ten before the 1967 Annual Meeting 
of the IMF in Rio de Janeiro and ratified by all members—  
which is, however, still subject to an agreement with 




On November l8, 196? the British pound was devalued 
by l4.3 per cent from $2.80 to the pound to $2.40 to the 
pound. The government of the U.K. decided that this action 
was necessary "in order to achieve a substantial surplus 
on the balance of payments consistent with growth and full 
employment."^ Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director 
of the IMF, has made the following remarks on this British 
devaluation :
The Fund has indicated its agreement that the change 
is needed to deal with a fundamental disequilibrium 
reflected in the continued weakness in the balance 
of payments of the United Kingdom and, during the 
past few months, in heavy losses of reserves. Some 
of the causes of this weakness are temporary, but 
deficits in the current account have persisted despite 
determined and courageous efforts by the U.K. authori­
ties to bring about a surplus.^
The U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer clearly states 
that "We need an improvement in our balance of payments 
of at least 500 million pounds a year, and the Government
3intends to insure that this is achieved." How successful 
the U.K. will be in this direction remains to be seen. It 
is hoped that the devaluation will bring with it "fresh
^Statement by James Callaghan, U.K. Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, November l8, 196? reprinted in: Interna­
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey, 





opporttuiities"--but these will be at a heavy cost. The 
major advantage offered by the devaluation is to British 
exporters; they should be able to increase their exports 
by selling to overseas markets more British heavy manufac­
tured goods such as motor vehicles, tractors, textiles, 
chemicals, ships, aircraft. Derivation of full benefit 
from the devaluation requires, however, that growth of 
domestic consumer demand must be reduced in order that a 
shift of resources to exports and imports saving be pos­
sible .
As of May 31, 1966 the United Kingdom had used 
its drawing rights on the IMF by 2435*5 million dollars 
on a net basis (net Fund sales of currency).^ As of
June 30, 1967 the same figure stood at 1862.6 million
2dollars. These and similar figures indicate that the 
United Kingdom faced the weakness of its balance of pay­
ments long before the devaluation, partly due to a weakened 
competitiveness.
The par value of the pound sterling which became 
effective on November 18, 1967 is as follows, expressed 
in terms of gold and in terms of the U.S. dollar: 2.13281
grams of fine gold per pound sterling; 14.5833 pounds 
sterling per troy ounce of fine gold; 0.4l6667 pounds
^International Monetary Fund, International Finan­
cial Statistics, Vol. XIX, No. 7 (Washington, D. C.,
July 1966), p. 3*
^IMF, IFS, Vol. XX, No. 8, August I967, P* 3*
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sterling per U.S. dollar; 240.000 U.S. cents per pound 
sterling.^
In conjunction with devaluation, the Government of 
the United Kingdom raised the bank rate to eight per cent, 
requested a new stand-by arrangement in an amount equiva­
lent to $1.4 billion, and announced its intention to 
carry out a program comprising credit and fiscal measures 
and a strengthening of prices and incomes policy. The IMF 
gave prompt attention to, and indicated a favorable atti­
tude toward, the request for $1.4 billion of stand-by 
arrangements. It is hoped that the devaluation will not 
only make it possible for the U.K. to improve its balance 
of payments, but also to rebuild gradually its reserves 
while repaying the large debts incurred in recent years 
and allowing for adequate growth in the economy.
It is questionable whether any external help, 
while possibly effective in postponing the recent British 
devaluation of the pound, could have definitely prevented 
it. As there are still economies which have their foreign 
trade with Britain and still keep part of their interna­
tional reserves--though to a lesser extent--in the form 
of British pound, whatever the effects of devaluation might 
be on the economy of the United Kingdom, from the stand­
point of international liquidity the move has doubtless
p. 382.
^International Financial News Survey, op. cit.,
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helped maintenance and continuance of the key currency 
position of the pound in the international economy. It 
can be hoped that with the introduction of SDR's, key 
currency countries would face less periods of strain to 
the extent that Britain recently experienced, and the pos­
sibility of further future devaluations can be reduced.
The governments of Ireland, Israel, Guyana, Spain,
Cyprus, Malawi, Denmark, New Zealand, Jamaica, and Ceylon
have proposed changes in the par value of their currencies
following the British devaluation.^ After devaluation of
the pound, a gold rush began. According to a report of
the Associated Press, in order to limit gold speculators,
maneuvering central bankers of the seven members of the
London gold pool (the United States, Britain, Switzerland,
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands) met in
Basel, Switzerland on the ninth and tenth of December, 196?,
and formulated a new gold strategy for the world gold mar- 
2ket. The new strategy is based on a pledge to cooperate 
in supplying gold buyers from the reserves of the central 
banks mentioned above at the official U.S. price of $35 
per ounce. Under the new strategy, the central banks of 
the seven gold pool countries also agreed to ban gold sales
^For new par values of their currencies see the 
source of the above footnote.
2Reprinted in the Oklahoma Daily, Norman, Oklahoma, 
No. 68, Thursday, December l4, 1987 » p. 4, columns 1-3»
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on credit or for future delivery. The move was primarily 
intended to protect the U.S. dollar but was possibly 
designed also to put a squeeze on France. Since the Bank 
of France has dropped out of the London Gold Pool, the 
French may have to bear the brunt of private speculative 
hoarding.
At the time these lines are written, the outcome 
is not quite clear. The first indications, however, are 
that speculators already are being frozen out of their 
past sources and are turning to the Paris gold market or 




So far nothing has been said about the problem of 
gold hoards. As gold still constitutes a vital component 
of international reserves, no discussion of international 
liquidity is complete without touching, at least briefly, 
on this topic. Accordingly, in what follows an attempt 
will be made to look at some of the factors related to 
gold hoards. It must be emphasized at the beginning, 
however, that precise information on this topic is lacking.
Due to the existence of gold hoards, not all gold 
produced becomes available for the use of monetary authori­
ties; no one knows precisely how much gold goes into hoards. 
It is not the theme of this study to recommend an increase 
in the available supply of monetary gold as the solution 
to the problem of international liquidity. This should 
not, however, be taken to mean that the world's monetary 
liquidity can be increased by drawing the amount of hoarded 
gold into the monetary use.
The analysis of gold hoards necessitates an under­
standing of the supply of and the demand for gold. The 
supply of gold for monetary use can be increased as a 
result of any or a combination of the following factors:
1) increase in the free world's gold production from 
existing mines, 2) discovery of new gold mines (subject to
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prevailing costs of production at different times),
3) sales or other transfers of gold by the Soviet Union or 
other countries in the Communist bloc to the West, and
4) release of gold by gold hoarders. It must be noted 
here that not all of these factors lend themselves to 
quantitative measurements. For example, someone who 
hoards gold in secret vaults may keep it there indefinitely 
and might never be found out.
On the demand side, one can see the following uses 
for gold: l) industrial and artistic uses, 2) means of
payment for official users in international transactions,
3) means of payment or settlement for private individuals,
4) a legal cover for currency circulation and occasionally 
for other liabilities, and 3) the use of gold for tradi­
tional ceremonies in some countries. Again, on the demand 
side, not all of these are subject to quantitative measure­
ment .
Another questidn concerning gold in this context 
is: Why does gold hoarding exist? A simple and defini­
tive answer cannot be given to this question; yet, it 
would seem that the following reasons for gold hoarding 
might be pertinent:
1) to keep a gold reserve for the rainy days when domestic 
money and/or foreign exchange may not be adequate or 
acceptable for the urgent needs of individuals;
2) to keep precautionary official gold reserves for use
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in international settlements or for backing of the domestic 
currency;
3) to avoid losses as a result of rumors of a major devalu­
ation;
k) and to some extent, expectation of profit as a result 
of possible upward valuation of the price of gold or a 
decrease in the price of commodities for speculators. Not 
all of these reasons lend themselves to quantitative mea­
surements and analyses. In view of the unquantifiable 
nature of some of the factors affecting supply of and 
demand for gold, as well as motivations behind its hoarding, 
it is not surprising that the question of gold hoarding 
remains so unclear even for professional analysts and 
international institutions.
Despite this unquantifiable and sometimes unpre­
dictable nature of the factors affecting gold hoarding, 
analysts can devise ways to increase the effective use of 
gold for the purpose of international liquidity. The next 
question, then, is: What could be done to reduce, or
completely eliminate, gold hoardings?
Several economists have answered this question, 
each in a different manner. On the one hand, one can 
find proposals which suggest a definite program of peri­
odic small increases in the price of gold. For example, 
Miyata and Wonnacott have suggested that governments may 
make a firm declaration on a definite increase in the
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price of gold, as much as one per cent every six months, 
but in any case less than the interest rate; gold specu­
lators, so the argument runs, could make no profits from 
the periodic increases in the monetary price of gold.^ 
This plan is a poor way to discourage hoarding. Its 
success rests upon the assumption that a firm declaration 
will be in regard to the upward rise in the price of gold 
and then action will be taken accordingly; this is not a 
practical assumption for all governments today. In addi­
tion, the expectation of an upward increase in the price 
of gold is the very factor which motivates some hoarding. 
How, then, can one maintain that the periodic definite 
increases would eliminate hoardings? Finally, gold is 
still a partial backing for domestic currency in many 
countries, and an increase in its price would mean a 
devaluation of those currencies in terms of gold.
Because of all these disadvantages, other econo­
mists have turned their attention to a decrease in the 
price of gold. Fritz Machlup, for example, thinks that 
the buying price of gold should be reduced by a series of 
steps in the following manner:
If the leading monetary authorities of the free world 
were to reduce, over a period of several years, the 
price of gold by, say, three fourths of one per cent
^Kiyozo Miyata, "A Proposal to Increase the Price 
of Gold" in Factors Affecting U.S. Balance of Payments, 
op. cit., p. 22ti; and Paul Wonnacott, "A Suggestion for 
the Revolution of Gold," ibid. Sir Roy Harrod is also a 
remarkable example in this group.
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every three months, one could expect that several 
billion dollars' worth of gold would be de-hoarded 
and offered for sale to the monetary authorities.
. . . As soon as the speculators are convinced that
they could buy all the gold they wanted, and at a 
reduced price if they waited a while, they would be 
transformed from buyers into sellers. . . . The
chief objective would be to make it perfectly clear 
all around that gold holders may lose money. If 
capital losses were just as likely as capital gains, 
then gold would no longer be the object of hoarding 
and speculation for a rise.^
It is interesting to note that in Machlup's opinion a plan 
for reducing the price of gold can always be made the sub­
ject of public discussion with the favorable result of a 
contraction in gold hoardings. Machlup's plan in this con­
text seems more logically acceptable, especially in view 
of the fact that an announcement of a reduction in the 
price of gold would threaten gold hoarders.
A third means of reducing gold hoards is compul­
sory cashing-in of gold by individuals. In 1933 the U.S. 
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury "to 
require every person in the United States to relinquish, 
in exchange for dollar currency, all gold coins, gold 
bullion and gold certificates in his possession." By the 
end of March, 1933, as Hansen reports, the public had sur­
rendered $200 million worth of gold, and another $30 million
2or so was relinquished in April.
^Machlup, "Factors Affecting the United States 
Balance of Payments," op. cit., p. 226.
2Hansen, op. cit. , p. ^3.
392
Critics of this system assert that prohibition or 
elimination of individual gold holdings amounts to con­
fiscation of private property. This is not really a 
serious criticism. All citizens who respond to a compul­
sory cashing-in of gold are compensated, and since indi­
viduals are given the right to either surrender their gold 
or to suffer the loss, if they do not choose the first 
alternative the loss is their own fault and does not con­
stitute a confiscation of private property.
Howard Piquet has proposed another plan which calls 
for the U.S. to announce that while it would continue to 
sell gold at #35.0875 per ounce, it will no longer guar­
antee to buy gold at #34.9125 an ounce. According to 
Piquet, mere announcement of such a plan might frighten 
gold hoarders to the extent of causing them to put their 
gold on the market at a lower price.^
Such an announcement may affect gold hoarders 
psychologically, but to what extent it will have a notice­
able impact, especially for the U.S. position remains an 
open issue.
Still another plan is offered by Lerner. Since 
his slogan: "Let us Get Rid of Our Cross of Gold" has
been discussed in an earlier chapter, it will be dismissed 
here. Hansen, too, mentions that "gold no longer controls
^Howard S. Piquet, "Some Consequences of Dollar 
Speculation in Gold" in Factors Affecting the U.S. Balance 
of Payments, op. cit., ppT 305-324.
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the domestic money supply of any leading industrial country. 
Everywhere deliberate monetary management has taken the 
place of the automatic gold standard.
Hansen's proposal is based on two possible plans:
first, a full-scale gold value guarantee, second a risk
sharing scheme. With respect to the former, Hansen asserts;
Let the United States offer to all official holders of 
dollar balances a firm gold-exchange guarantee under 
which losses sustained by official holders in the 
event of a future devaluation of the dollar would be 
fully compensated. To insure complete confidence in 
this exchange guarantee, let the U.S. government 
pledge that all the gold profits made by the U.S. 
Treasury from the devaluation would be applied to 
indemnify the losses suffered by foreign official 
holders of dollar balances.^
A risk sharing scheme can, according to Hansen, 
take one of two forms: First, official dollar holders can
be given the privilege of escape from the risk of devalua­
tion by accepting non-interest bearing gold certificates 
in lieu of their dollar holdings. This would imply that 
official dollar holders would lose the advantage of earning 
about a three per cent rate of interest on their reserve 
holdings in exchange and as a trade-off for the advantage 
of escape from possible devaluation losses. Second,
Let the United States offer gold certificates bearing 
2 per cent interest. Official holders would lose some 
interest as compared with the continued holdings of 
dollars, but they would be compensated for this by 
escaping possible devaluation losses. . . .
^Hansen, op. cit. , p. 59*
^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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Foreign official holders would then have the free 
choice of holding their reserves in any one of three 
forms and in such proportions as they might with:
(1) gold, (2) low-interest bearing gold certificates, 
and (3) dollars.!
The above selection of plans shows that the problem 
of gold hoarding is, like the problem of international 
liquidity, a controversial subject, though to a lesser 
degree. It would seem, however, that international coopera­
tion can affect the problem of hoarding very greatly. For 
example, if all members of the Fund agree to make it 
illegal for individuals to hold more than a limited amount 
of gold (other than for dental and artistic uses) many 
gold hoards would then be released by the government 
purchase of this gold. This approach, however, is not 
feasible at the present time, and so long as the differ­
ence of regulations with respect to gold holding exists 
between countries, gold can easily be transferred from one 
to another country. There are, of course, unilateral 
methods within the power of certain countries such as the 
U.S. which can be effected such as offering a gold-value 
guarantee to all official (and probably non-official 
holders) of dollars, or spreading the Treasury's selling 
and buying price of gold up to 1 per cent below and above 
the par value. However, there is no accurate way of mea­
suring the effects of such measures and therefore not too 
much reliance can be placed on such attempts to dehoard
^Ibid., p. 76.
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gold. As a result this line of attack upon the interna­
tional liquidity problem will be dismissed as impractical 
or highly uncertain.
a p p e n d i x  III
OFFICIAL RESERVES HELD, IMPORTS, AND RATIO OF RESERVES TO IMPORTS FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES (1948-1966)
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
JAPAN AUSTRALIA CANADA
YEAR R* I* %R to I* R* I* %R to I* R* , I* %R to I*
1948 n . a. 684 — — 1723 l4ll 122.1 1086 3014 36.0
49 n.a. 905 — — 1123 1592 70.5 1197 2884 41.51950 n . a. 974 — — 1492 1622 92.0 1845 3128 59.0
51 n.a. 1995 — — 1134 2422 46.8 1901 4106 46.352 1101 2028 54.3 1032 1979 52.1 1938 4370 44.3
53 892 2410 37.0 1362 1471 92.6 1902 4697 40.554 930 2399 38.8 1133 1869 60.5 2029 4433 45.8
1955 1076 2471 43.6 844 2160 39.1 1985 5020 39.556 1270 3230 39.3 961 1964 48.9 2035 6110 33.357 828 4284 19.3 1329 1945 68.9 1926 6188 31.158 1062 3033 35.0 1128 2039 55.3 2038 5638 36.1
59 1447 3599 40.2 1273 2125 59.9 2029 6242 32.5i960 1949 4491 43.4 915 2704 33.8 1989 6150 32.361 1666 5811 28.7 1348 2394 56.3 2276 6196 36.762 2022 5637 35.9 1387 2551 54.4 2547 6367 40.063 2058 6737 30.6 1880 2776 67.7 2603 6618 39.364 2019 7948 25.4 1947 3313 58.8 2881 7556 38.1
1965 2152 8156 26.3 1531 3672 41.6 3027 9898 30.566 2119 10222 20.7 1568 3530 44.4 2693 10962 24.5
Source : Data for 1948 to 1964 are from the International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics , Supplement to 1965/66 Issues (Washington , D. C.),
p. V for reserves and p. xvii for imports Data for 1965 and 1966 are taken from
V u J
vO
the IMF, IFS, Vol. 20, August 1967» p. I6 for reserves, and p. 35 for imports.
Notes: Imports are at cif value as quoted in IFS; reserves are as of
the end of each year.





I* %R to I* R*
AUSTRIA 
■ I* %R to I* R*
SWEDEN 
I* %R to I*
1948 295 n.a. n.a. 62 490 12.6 233 1377 16.949 196 n.a. n.a. 92 592 15.5 269 1171 23.0
1950 190 2697 7.0 91 477 19-1 289 1182 24.5
51 455 3491 13.0 106 653 16.2 520 1776 29.352 960 3814 25.2 152 652 23.3 504 1730 29.1
53 1773 3771 47.0 325 646 59-5 558 1579 35.354 2579 4571 56.4 425 653 65.1 543 1776 30.6
1955 3018 5793 52.1 374 887 42.2 522 1997 26.156 4202 6617 63.5 419 974 43.0 535 2209 24.257 5197 7542 68.9 523 1128 46.4 501 2428 20.758 5879 7576 77.6 678 1074 63.1 516 2368 21.8
59 4790 8482 56.5 697 II45 60.9 478 24i4 19.8
i960 7032 10107 69.6 716 I4l6 50.6 528 2901 18.2
61 7163 10948 65.4 845 1485 56.9 736 2929 25.162 8956 12289 56.6 1081 1553 69.7 801 3123 25.763 7650 13022 58.8 1229 1675 73.4 758 3393 22.364 7882 I46i8 53.9 1317 1863 70.7 964 3855 25.0
1965 7429 18880 39.3 1311 2367 55.3 972 4675 20.766 8028 18526 43.3 1333 24i4 55.2 1027 4840 21.2
wvo•nI




I* %R to I* R*
ITALY
1* %R to 1* R*
DENMARK
1* %R to 1*
1948 144 750 19.2 n '. a ... 1539 „ 84 714 11.7
49 104 779 13.3 n.a. 1545 — — 87 807 10.7
1950 125 679 18.4 602 1488 40.5 97 853 11.3
51 163 878 18.5 774 2167 35.7 118 1013 11.6
52 i64 874 18.7 696 2336 29.8 142 962 14.7
53 156 912 17.1 768 2420 31.7 167 1000 16.7
54 151 1019 i4.8 927 2439 38.0 144 1170 12.3
1955 178 1090 16.3 1167 2711 43.0 l40 1178 11.856 191 1211 15.7 1236 3174 38.9 138 1311 10.5
57 197 1274 15.4 1354 3674 36.9 172 1359 12.658 256 1310 19.5 2184 3216 67.9 230 1347 17.059 281 1323 21.2 3056 336? 90.7 328 1602 20.4
i960 308 1462 21.0 3251 4725 68.8 286 1806 15.861 303 1616 18.7 3799 5223 72.7 282 1873 15.062 304 l664 18.2 3818 6075 62.9 256 2130 12.0
63 354 1822 19.4 3406 7590 44.9 470 2129 22.064 387 1984 19.5 3823 7231 52.9 645 2614 24.6
1965 476 2335 20.3 4800 8082 59.3 587 2907 20.266 527 2871 18.3 4911 9147 53.6 597 3283 18.1
* R = Reserves ; 1 = Imports; %R to 1 = Percentage Ratio of Reserves, to
CO
Imports.
Ap p e n d i x h i  (cont.)
YEAR R*
BELGIUM 
I* %R to I*
NEW ZEALAND 
R* I* %R to I* R*
GREECE
I* %R to I*
1948 987 2046 48.2 236 450 52.4 91 364 25.0
49 978 1803 54.2 151 449 33.6 77 484 15.9
1950 849 1942 43.7 172 455 37.8 83 428 19.3
51 1100 2535 43.8 217 596 36.4 87 398 21.852 1133 2444 46.4 183 773 23.6 94 346 27.1
53 1144 2413 47.4 271 538 50.3 i4o 296 47.354 1098 2535 43.3 23C 688 34.5 i48 330 44.8
1955 1203 jîlî 42.5 178 802 22.1 201 52.655 1219 37.1 200 751 26.6 204 43.9
51- 1148 3444 33.3 152 832 18.2 193 524 36.858 1553 3129 49.6 187 798 23.4 170 565 30.059 1306 3442 37.9 217 648 33.5 225 567 39.6
i960 1506 3969 37.9 188 790 23.8 238 702 33.961 1813 4223 46.9 137 904 15.1 266 714 37.262 1753 4569 46.9 171 756 22.6 285 701 40.663 1940 5112 47.3 143 903 15.8 293 8o4 36.464 2192 5901 37.2 166 961 17.2 281 885 31.7
1965 2304 7174 32.1 97 1082 L9 250 1305 19.166 2320 7531 30.8 95 1076 8.8 273 1399 19.5
*
Imports. R = Reserves; I = Imports ; ”/oR to I = Percentage Raitio -1of.Reserves to
wVO
VO
Ap p e n d i x h i  (cont.)
YEAR R*
TURKEY 
I* %R to I* R*
ARGENTINA 
I* %R to I* R*
VENEZUELA
I* %R to I*
1948 198 348 56.8 704 1562 45.0 390 8l4 47.949 206 346 59.5 477 1180 40.4 449 796 56.4
1950 201 311 64.6 655 964 67.9 378 667 56.6
51 216 407 53.0 520 l48o 35.1 377 761 49.552 198 556 35.6 420 1179 35.6 443 845 52.453 208 532 39.1 531 795 66.7 484 916 52.854 204 478 42.6 524 979 53.5 482 1024 47.0
1955 208 498 41.7 457 1173 38.9 534 1058 50.456 225 407 55.2 382 1128 33.8 952 1249 76.257 268 397 67.5 286 1310 21.8 1459 1868 78.158 286 315 90.7 129 1233 10.4 1062 1599 66.459 144 470 30.6 276 993 27.7 724 1577 45.9
i960 203 468 43.3 525 1249 42.0 609 1188 51.261 194 509 38.1 386 l46o 26.4 580 1092 53-162 189 622 30.3 114 1357 84.0 583 1096 53.163 178 691 25.7 270 981 27.5 745 950 78.464 l44 542 26.5 153 1077 14.2 831 1155 71.9
1965 l4i 587 24.0 236 1174 20.1 843 1576 53.466 131 743 17.6 215 1211 17.7 776 1162 66.7





I* %R to I*
NETHERLANDS 
R* I* %R to I*
SWITZERLAND 
R* I* %R to I*
1948 553 3443 16.0 343 1871 18.3 1661 1163 142.8
49 ,580 3291 17.6 434 1844 23.5 1693 882 191.8
1950 791 3030 26.1 548 2056 26.7 1579 1056 149.5
51 616 4457 13.8 554 2553 21.7 1645 1375 119.652 686 4326 15.9 944 2224 42.4 1667 1208 138.0
53 829 3942 21.0 1232 2376 51.9 1768 1176 150.354 1264 4221 29.9 1278 2858 44.7 1837 1300 141.3
1955 1975 4739 41.7 1292 3209 40.3 1847 1489 124.056 1311 5558 23.6 1107 3725 29.7 1882 1766 106.6
57 645 6175 10.5 1009 4106 24.6 1898 1964 96.658 1050 5609 18.7 1539 3625 42.5 2063 1706 120.959 1736 5088 34.1 1442 3940 36.6 2063 1923 107.3
i960 2272 6281 36.2 1863 4531 4l.l 2324 2243 103.661 3799 6679 56.9 1958 5089 38.5 2759 2707 101.962 4o49 7517 53.9 1946 5347 36.4 2872 3020 95.163 4908 8727 56.2 2101 5966 35.2 3078 3253 94.664 5724 10070 56.8 2349 7055 33.3 3123 3610 86.5
1965 6343 11356 55.8 24i6 8359 28.9 3244 3884 83.566 6733 12756 52.7 2448 8100 30.2 3324 4143 80.2
oH
Imports.
R = Reserves; I = Imports; %R to I = Percentage Ratio of Reserves to
APPENDIX III (cont.)
YEAR UNITED KINGDOM R* I* %R to I*
UNITED STATES 
R* I* :%R to I*
1948 2009 8447 23.7 25758 8081 318.7
49 1752 8522 20.6 26024 7544 345.0
1950 3443 7358 46.8 24265 9631 251.9
51 2374 10955 21.7 24299 11922 203.852 1958 9802 20.0 24714 11707 211.1
53 2670 9314 28.7 23458 11846 198.054 3034 9405 32.3 22978 lll40 206.3
1955 2392 10809 22.1 22797 12489 182.556 2^76 10812 21.1 23666 13987 165.2
57 2374 11322 21.0 24832 14620 169.958 3105 10493 29.6 22540 14619 154.2
59 2801 11153 25.1 21504 17008 126.4
i960 3719 12714 29.3 19359 16506 117.361 3318 12308 27.0 18753 16071 116.762 3308 12563 26.3 17220 17764 96.9
63 3147 13476 23.4 16843 18590 90.664 2316 15438 15.0 16672 20251 80.3
1965 3004 16429 18.2 15450 25636 60.266 3100 15859 19.5 l488l 29379 50.6
* R = Reserves; I = Imports; %R to I - Percentage 




Alchian, Armen A. and Allen, William R. University Eco>-
nomics. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, Inc., 1964.
Clement, M. 0.; Pfister, Richard L.; and Rothwell,
Kenneth J. Theoretical Issues in Internatibnal 
Economics. Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967•
Cfoxton, Frederick E. and Cowden, Dudley J. Applied General 
Statistics. Second ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196O.
Fite, Gilbert C. and Reese, Jim E. An Economic History of 
the United States. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959.
Halm, George. International Monetary Cooperation. Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1945.
Hansen, Alvin H. The Dollar and the International Monetary 
System. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, I965.
Higgins, Benjamin. Economic Development. New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959-
Hut chins on, Harry D, Money, Banking, and the United States 
Economy. New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 19^7.
Jensen, Finn B. and Walter, Ingo. Readings in Interna­
tional Economic Relations. New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1966.
Johnston, Lee J. Econometric Methods. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963•
Keynes, John M. A Treatise on Money. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1930.
403
4o4
Leibenstein, Harvey. Economic Backwardness and Economic 
Girowth. New York : 'John Wiley & Sons, 1957*
Patinkin, Don. Money, Interest and Prices. New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965•
Roosa, Robert. Monetary Reform for the World Economy. New 
York : Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965.
Shannon, Ian. International Liquidity— A Study in the Eco­
nomic Functions of Gold. Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1966.
Smith, Warren L. and Teigen, Ronald. Readings in Money, 
National Income, and Stabilization Policy. Home­
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956.
Snider, Delbert A. Introduction to International Economics.
Homewood, Illinois : Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I963.
Triffin, Robert. Gold and the Dollar Crisis. Revised;
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
I96I0
_______ . The World Money Maze. New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press, I966.
Ward, Richard. International Finance. Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965»
Wooley, Herbert B. Measuring Transactions Between World
Areas. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1966.
Periodicals
Altman, Oscar L. "A Note on Gold Production and Additions 
to International Gold Reserves," International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers (Washington, D. C.,
April 195üj, p. 2W2.
_______ . "Professor Triffin on International Liquidity
and the Role of Fund," I M.F . Staff Papers, Vol. 8 
(Washington, D. C., May I96I), p. 188.
Angel1, James W. "The Reorganization of the International 
Monetary System: An Alternative Proposal," The
Economic Journal, Vol. 71 (December 1961), p. 70?.
The Economist, no vol. given (September 2, 1967)1 p. 8OO.
405
Fleming, Marcus J. "Toward Assessing the Need for Inter­
national Reserves," Essays in International Finance, 
No. 58 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University--
International Finance Section, February 1967)1 P» 1*
Harrod, Sir Roy. "World Reserves and International
Liquidity," The South African Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 351 No."“2 (June 196?) , p. 93.
Hawkins, Robert G. (ed.). "Compendium of Plans for Inter­
national Monetary Reform," The Bulletin, No. 37-38 
(New York: C. J. Devine Institute of Finance,
December 1965)1 pp. 60-68.
International Monetary Fund. International Financial
Statistics, Vol. 11, Nol 5"i pT! 15; No. 12, p. 4 
(195Ü); Vol. 19, No. 7 (1965); Vol. 20, No. 8 , 
pp. 16 ff. (1967) (Washington, D. C.).
_______ . Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations
(Washington, D% C .', 1963) 1 p% 11.
_______ . International Financial News Survey, Vol. XIX,
Nol (Washington, D. C., November 24, 1967)1
p. 381.
"International Monetary Fund," International Financial 
Statistics, Supplement to 19651 66 (Washington,
D. C.J.
Keynes, J. M. "The Balance of Payments of the United 
States," Economic Journal, Vol. LVI, No. 222 
(June 194b), p. 171.
Kindelberger, Charles. "The Politics of International
Money and World Language," Essays in International 
Finance, No. 6l (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Uni-
versity--International Finance Section, August
1967), p. 2.
Kriz, Miroslav A. "Gold: Barbarous Relic or Useful
Instrument?," Essays in International Finance,
No. 60 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University--
International Finance Section, June 1967)1 29»
Lutz, Friedrick A. "The Problems of International Liquidity 
and the Multiple-Currency Standard," Essays in 
International Finance, No. 4l (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University--International Finance
Section, 1963)1 p. 9«
4o6
Machlup, Fritz. "The Need for Monetary Reserves," Reprints 
in International Finance, No. 5 (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University--International Finance Section, 
October I966), p. 1.
_______ . "World Monetary Debate--Bases for Agreement,"
Reprints in International Finance, No. 4 (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University--International Finance
Section, September I966).
_______ . "Plans for Reform of the International Monetary
System," Special Papers in International Economics, 
No. 3, Revised (Princeton, Nl J .: Princeton
University--International Finance Section, March
1964).
_______ . "International Monetary System and the Free
Market Economy," Reprints in International Finance 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University--Interna-
tional Finance Section, No. 3, February I966;
No, 4, September I966).
__________ "The Cloakroom Rule of International Reserves:
Reserve Creation and Resources Transfer," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXIX, No. 3 
(August 1965), pp. 337-355-
McKinnon. "Optimum World Monetary Arrangement, and the
Dual Currency System," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
(del Lavoroj December I963), pp. 366-96.
Mundell, R. A. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Area,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 51 (September I961),
pp. 657-665.
Lerner, Abba P. "Let's Get Rid of Our Cross of Gold," 
Challenge, The Magazine of Economic Affairs,
Vol. 12 (1964), pT 22.
Posthuma, S. "The International Monetary System,"
Quarterly Review, No. 66 (Banco Nazionale del 
Lavoro, September 1963).
Robertson, D. H. "Post-War Monetary Plans," Economic 
Journal, Vol. 53 (December 1943), p. 359*
Roosa, Robert. ^'Balance of Payments Adjustment and Inter­
national Liquidity," Journal of Finance, Vol. 19 
(March 1964), p. 1.
407
Ruff, Gunther. "A Dollar-Reserve System as a Transitional 
Solution," Essays in International Finance, No. 57 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University--Interna-
tional Finance Section, January 1967), p. 7*
Rueff, Jacques-* "The West Is Risking a Credit Collapse," 
Fortune, Vol. 64 (July I961), p. 126.
Stitovsky, Tibor. "A New Approach to International
Liquidity," The American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, 
No. 5 (Homewood, Illinois: American Economic
Association, December I966), p. 122.
Tew, Brain. "The International Monetary Fland," Essay in 
International Finance, No. 36 (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University--International Finance Sec­
tion, March I961), p. 3.
Triffin, Robert. "From Waterloo to Tokyo," The Economist, 
Vol. 208 (August 15, 1964), p. 659.
Wang, N. T. "New Proposals for the International Finance 
of Development," Essays in International Finance, 
No. 59 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University--
International Finance Section, April I967), P* 1.
Williams, John H. "Currency Stabilization: The Keynes
and White Plans," Foreign Affairs, (July 1943), 
p. 649.
Williamson, John H. "Liquidity and the Multiple Key Cur­
rency Proposal," The American Economic Review, 
Vol. LIII (June 1963), pp. 430-431.
Public Documents
Bank of Greece. Alternative Systems for International 
Monetary Reform--A Comparative Appraisal. Bank 
of Greece Papers and Lectures, Xenophon Zolotas, 
Governor, No. 18, 1965*
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. Federal
Reserve Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 8 (Washington, D. C., 
August 1967), T¥46.
. Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1933), 699»
Group of Ten. Communique of Ministers and Governors and 
Report of Deputies.(Hague, July 7, 1966 J .
408
Group of Ten. Ministerial Statement of the Group of Ten
and Annex Prepared by Deputies (10th August, 1964),
1.
_______ . Report of the Study Group on the Creation of
Reserve Assets . (Washington, D"I C . : Ü1 S"I Government
Printing Office, May 31, I963).
International Monetary Fund. I963 Annual Report (Washington, 
D. C.), p. 29.
_______ . 1964 Annual Report (Washington, D. C.), p. 27 ff.
_______ . 1965 Annual Report (Washington, D. C.), p. l4.
_______ . Summary Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting
of the Board of Governors (Washington, 51 C., 1957),
p. 2.
_______ . International Reserves and Liquidity. (Washington,
D. C., Aug. 15, 195a), 94.
_______ . Summary Proceedings. Annual Meeting (Washington,
D. c., 1962), pp. 60V 68.
International Monetary Fund. A Note on Gold Production 
and Additions to International GoldReserves 
(Washington, D. C., April 1958), 282.
Mikoto, Usui and Hagen, Everett. World Income, 1957» 
(Cambridge, Mdss.: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology--Center for International Studies, 1959)«
United Nations. Statistical Yearbook (1964), 343*
United Nations, Committee on Invisibles and Financing 
Related to Trade. Memorandum on International 
Liquidity, No. 4 (Geneva, 1966), 7-10.
United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development.
Memorandum: The Case for an International
Commodity Reserve Currency. Submitted to the 
Conference by Hart, Albert G., Kaldor, Nicholas, 
and Tinbergen, Jan (Geneva, March 28-June I5,
1964).
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Hearings ; The 
United States Balance of Payments, Part I (1963), 
96-101.
_______ . Hearings: Outlook for the United States Balance
of PaymentsJ 87th Cong., 2nd Session (I965)•
409
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. International 
Effects of U.S. Economic Policy, 86th Cong.,
2nd Session (196O).
_______ . Factors Affecting the United States Balance of
Payments. 8?th Cong., 2nd Session (l962j.
U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on International Exchange and 
Payments of the Joint Economic Committee. State­
ment of the Honorable Fowler, Henry H., Secretary 
of Treasury (September 14, I967).
U.S. Treasury Department. Treasury Bulletin.(Washington, 
D. C., September I967), 91•
Other Sources
Kondanassis, A. J. "Concepts of Economic Development with 
Special Reference to Underdeveloped Countries" in 
The Emergent Nations. Monograph No. 1, Graduate 
International Studies Program (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 8l.
Oklahoma Daily, Norman, Oklahoma, No. 68, Thursday, 
December l4, I967, p. 4.
